Question

Hello,
If I understood Kant’s categorical imperative correctly, I have a question about it.
Is it proper to will a certain action that cannot be a universal law, except on condition that one would have to pay some steep price for that action?
For example: I broke a record in mountain climbing, and I want to live at the public’s expense. Even though I would not want the entire public to live at the public’s expense, I would certainly agree that all record-breakers in mountain climbing should live at the public’s expense.
Today I learned the passage about Ben Azzai in tractate Yevamot. He basically argues that although refraining from engaging in procreation causes a diminution of the divine image and is considered bloodshed, “What can I do, my soul longs for Torah; the world can be sustained by others.”
This statement, in effect, seems at first glance to contradict the categorical imperative, since those “others” could also decide that their souls long for Torah, money, chess, embroidery, or anything else, and that the world will be sustained by others. And it’s not as though Ben Azzai fails to recognize the importance of engaging in procreation; he simply exempts himself because there are “others” who will do it.

So I thought that Ben Azzai relied on the fact that he was in effect giving up conjugal life and sexual relations altogether. And he indeed agrees that all those who agree to abstain completely from women and from married life should not engage in procreation and should rely on the others—who are most of the world, and who need sexual activity—and on them will rest the obligation to ensure the world’s continued existence.
So he is basically saying this: I am permitted to exempt myself from involvement in sustaining the world, because I agree that all those who completely abstain from women and from married life should not engage in sustaining the world. Even if this universal law were indeed put into effect, the world would not collapse.
What do you think?