According to that line of thinking, then marrying a closet too, heaven forbid, is something one must not interfere with, and someone who wants to marry 4 women should also be allowed to do so.

As for four women, indeed yes. And likewise regarding a brother and sister who want to marry. As for a closet, there is no pair of people here, and no reason to grant it benefits and rights beyond what a single person receives.

The whole idea of a democratic state is taking away rights from the minority. The minority has no rights. Only the majority does.

Therefore, if the majority decides something about a minority group—for example, that the unvaccinated should be put in quarantine camps or sterilized—then that is what should happen in a democratic state.

That is the meaning of democracy. And therefore, if the majority in a democratic state are stupid and evil, then the state will be stupid and evil. Exactly what is happening in the State of Israel and in the rest of the countries.

There is some confusion here. The main discussion is not the benefits and rights (although even there I do not understand the Rabbi’s words—why should a single person have fewer rights than a couple), but the issue of recognition. Is a state obligated to recognize same-sex marriage? If there is coercion in this matter, then the LGBT group is trying to force the state to recognize them. Every state and every culture has the right to recognize marriage according to the values it sees fit. For example, a 19-year-old young man who wants to marry a 17-year-old young woman is breaking the law in Israel.

Most of the argument is about the brand “marriage.”
Rights and benefits can be obtained through the status of common-law partners plus signing a legal contract (the differences between the legal status of recognized marriage and a legal contract are small differences, and not necessarily in favor of the married couple, and those are not what the bitter argument is about).
Most of the argument is about a brand.
But an official brand, and the question of who is entitled to it, is a very important issue for people on both sides of the divide.

Any society—any collective—is entitled to decide on values that are important in its eyes and to reward those who promote those values. That is part of its freedom of association. A society may decide that it wants to promote marriage among its members through financial benefits (even though I personally oppose that. But it is reasonable). And it may decide that not all marriages are equal. Among other things, incestuous marriages or polygamy (even though I do not oppose polygamy) may be prohibited by law or not recognized by law. And homosexual marriages may not be considered marriages at all, and even if they are, they may still not have the same status as regular marriage between a man and a woman. Not everything in the world is equal—humanities are not equal to the natural sciences, and homosexual marriages are not equal to heterosexual marriages. It is permissible to think that way, and also permissible to decide to live according to that way of thinking. That does not necessarily contradict individual freedom, and even if it does, it is still within the ordinary balancing between individual freedom and collective freedom. And someone who does not think that way and feels it is unjust can leave the society or the collective.

I will address your words, may his honor live long,

A. You say that one citizen’s right is restricted so that it will not affect others. That is, you do not restrict the right because in your opinion the thing itself is sufficiently wrong to justify intervention and restriction of the individual; rather, you restrict the individual’s right because he will cause others to weaken in the value of wanting to live in a society in which he is present.

A1. But obviously people do things in order to affect things that are currently accepted in society. Is a left-wing demonstration not liable to weaken the commitment of right-wing people to the right? Even if in practice this does not happen, that is part of the declared purpose of a demonstration. Restricting the right to influence public opinion is a very excessive restriction. If someone disagrees with the non-recognition of gays, he is entitled to try to persuade others or to show them what the thing they so strongly reject actually looks like, and then their opinion or behavior may change. Therefore, presenting discrimination against gays as a tool for preserving society’s values is problematic. How is this different from other values and principles regarding which every person is entitled to try to exert influence? [If one sees only the thing itself as forbidden and therefore restricts the individual from doing it, then removing the restriction does not at all conflict with collective freedom, because it does not change.]

A2. I see the root of the problem differently. When one looks for a justification to restrict an individual right, one does not look for some lofty principled justification that allows us to violate the sacred law of not restricting individuals [and then you say, here there is a principled justification]. There are many cases where on the face of it we would want to impose restrictions. What good is it for us to have anti-vaxxers? To have supporters of rent control? Let’s restrict them.
We do not do that because of the slippery slope, which is slippery and more slippery than can be imagined, with a deep pit at the end full of snakes and scorpions. We assume or know that a great deal of freedom must be given so that we do not reach a situation in which core and important freedom will also be harmed, and in the end everyone will suffer. Therefore, an attempt to justify a restriction must explain why specifically here there is not enough slipperiness, because the difference is clear and conspicuous and people will not get confused, or explain that indeed there is slipperiness here and over time they may reach a core violation of individual freedom, but nevertheless the price of not restricting things right now is so high that we will pay it and bear the consequences.

B. Any argument can be turned into a matter of principle, and then one can suggest that the complainant emigrate. An argument about the height of the women’s section divider? Don’t argue—if you don’t want it, leave. An argument about capitalist/socialist characteristics in society—don’t argue—if you don’t want it, leave. They are not interested in leaving, but in remaining with their society, with its full range of distinctive characteristics and connections, and still promoting the issue they are complaining about. If it doesn’t suit you, then you leave.
[If you prefer, this is midrashic conservatism of “social change,” which each time adapts itself to the latest innovations discovered in the field of morality, for example, and specifically the one who stops the constant change is the one doing the changing.] And in fact things do change, such as recognition of gay rights itself, which is becoming more widespread in the various publics.

I will answer you in parts:

A.1 From the outset, society came together for certain purposes (which for our purposes we will call values). The whole argument is about values that lie outside that set of purposes. Individual freedom (or any freedom at all) is not a value but a means of achieving values (imagine someone who fights with all his strength and heart for his freedom and liberty, and once he attains them he has no idea what to do with his life, falls into depression and drugs, and in the end commits suicide because his existence has no meaning). Right and left (at least in the past) do not undermine the purpose of Israeli society, which is the independent and dignified existence of the Jewish people (not exactly a value either, but let’s say so. At least not an ultimate value). So within that framework one can argue about what is and is not a value. Someone who tries to argue against a value for the sake of which society originally coalesced and was created is in effect trying to dismantle that society (or build a new one around a different value). He is allowed to do so, unless everyone else still wants to remain united under the value that originally brought them together. One can always persuade regardless of anything else, but if a society wants to continue existing as a society around that same value, then from a certain point on this is like trying to persuade a person that he should cease to exist (commit suicide—which is also legitimate unless he has already decided not to, in which case it borders on harassment and endangerment), and therefore society may ostracize him from within it if it so wishes.

We’ll continue tomorrow.

Corrections: “(which for our purposes we will call values)”

“So within that framework one can argue about what is and is not a value (that is, within the framework of the values outside the set of values around which society originally coalesced).”

“(commit suicide—which is also legitimate unless he has already decided otherwise (that he wants to continue to exist), in which case it already borders on harassment and endangerment, and he should cut off contact with the persuader)”