There’s something I didn’t understand. Does the liability to punishment (death, lashes, whatever it may be) take effect immediately after committing the transgression—meaning it is a direct consequence of doing the transgression (the person changes from an ordinary person into someone liable for death)—except that carrying out the liability is only through the religious court; or is there not even any liability for death upon him as long as the religious court has not ruled that he is liable for death?

Besides that, even if you say that the offender is forbidden to kill himself in order to fulfill the “liable for death,” is he at least obligated to go to the religious court and tell them that he committed a transgression for which he is liable for death? And if you would say that a person cannot make himself into a wicked person, is he obligated to make sure to bring witnesses (for example, those who gave the warning before he committed the transgression) to the religious court to testify against him that he is liable for death?

I explained. On the accepted view, he is not liable for death until a religious court rules that way. See Rabbi Akiva Eger there.

In my opinion, he is indeed obligated to bring the witnesses if he can. My proof is from the Mishneh LaMelekh’s question at the end of the first chapter of the laws of a murderer, from Zimri: the Talmud says that Pinchas had the law of a pursuer with respect to him, despite the rule that zealots may strike him. And the Mishneh LaMelekh asks: why shouldn’t the person sentenced to death be able to kill the agent of the religious court under the law of a pursuer? In my opinion, the answer is that the obligation to kill a Sabbath desecrator rests on all of the Jewish people, including the desecrator himself, and the religious court merely carries it out. The obligation to kill him rests on him too, and therefore the agent is his agent as well and is not a pursuer. This is unlike the rule that zealots may strike him, where there is no obligation on the public to kill a man who has relations with an Aramean woman. [And this does not contradict Rabbi Akiva Eger’s view that there is no death liability without a religious court ruling. There is an obligation on the public to bring him to the religious court and have him judged.]
We thus see that the obligation to execute those liable for capital punishment rests on the entire public, including the liable person himself.
This can still be further analyzed, but this is not the place.

(Sorry for nitpicking.) The Mishneh LaMelekh there does not ask about killing the agent of the religious court, which of course makes no sense because the agent has a duty to kill; rather, he raises a doubt about the blood avenger (apparently only according to the view that avenging is optional for him and not a commandment), whether the accidental killer can turn around and kill him. So the Mishneh LaMelekh says that no pursuer is permitted to turn around and kill the rescuer, because the rescuer is doing his duty. So there’s no need to get to the idea that the obligation rests on everyone, etc.

Without overanalyzing too much, isn’t there an internal contradiction in what you’re saying? You began by saying that only the religious court can rule whether the offender is liable for death or not, and you ended by saying that the offender must bring the witnesses to the religious court because the obligation to execute those liable for capital punishment rests on the whole public. But before going to the religious court he still isn’t liable for death! So why would he be obligated to bring the witnesses?

Maybe one practical implication that comes out of your claim (that the obligation to execute those liable for capital punishment rests on the whole public, including the liable person himself) is that the offender is forbidden to run away after they ruled that he is liable for death! That’s really a novelty—we don’t find such a prohibition. Seemingly, who says the offender is forbidden to flee before receiving the punishment? What do you think?

Tirgitz, as far as I remember the Mishneh LaMelekh also comments about the agent of the religious court. But I don’t have it in front of me now.

EA, it seems you aren’t reading what I write (maybe because of the excitement these days 🙂 ).
Indeed, the question of fleeing is also an implication of what I said.

Lol no, actually I’m focused… maybe I missed something in what you wrote. I’ll go over it again tomorrow!

(Maybe he comments on it elsewhere. https://ibb.co/Czg1jKL)

I probably mixed up one of my notes. There is still room to discuss the agent of the religious court and why the Mishneh LaMelekh didn’t bring that too.
So it seems that the agent of the religious court is even more stringent than a pursuer, since regarding him there isn’t even a hesitation. What’s the difference? After all, even in the case of a pursuer there is a commandment to kill the pursuer. That’s why I wrote that here it isn’t only that there is an obligation on him to kill the condemned person, but that the obligation is on all of us, including the condemned person himself.
So it turns out there is a hierarchy in this law:
Zealots may strike him — optional.
The blood avenger — commandment/right.
Pursuer — obligation.
Agent of the religious court — obligation on the public.
(And there is some room to discuss why in the case of a pursuer we do not say that this is an obligation on the public including the pursuer himself. A distinction can be made.)

Tirgitz, the difference between a pursuer and an agent of the religious court is that in the case of a pursuer it is a commandment on the public (or the victim’s right to defend himself), whereas in the case of an agent of the religious court it is an obligation on the public from the Holy One, blessed be He.

EA, this is the Socratic dilemma (whether to flee a death sentence), and so too in the story of Shimon ben Shetach.

Rabbi, here—I found this, which is apparently very connected to our topic. Maybe it will interest you. I haven’t read it yet, but in general I really like this author’s analyses. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/wozner-brihammismoret/he/wozner-brihammismoret.pdf

Maybe this is worth a column (in light of the exciting days coming upon us—but I don’t know if I’ll manage to read it lol) on the theory of punishment from the offender’s perspective, a perspective that hasn’t been discussed enough if I’m not mistaken

I see. You’re saying that the Mishneh LaMelekh proposed a first thought that a pursuer may turn against the rescuer, and not that someone liable for death may turn against the agent of the religious court, and from there one can distinguish between a pursuer and an agent (so that the proof rests on the author of Mishneh LaMelekh’s framing and not on the laws themselves).
If one wants to distinguish between a pursuer and an agent, maybe it can be done more simply: in the case of a pursuer, certainly the pursuer is not obligated to kill himself in order to save the one being pursued, since he can always simply stop pursuing (even according to the one who says that one is not obligated to save by injuring one of his limbs, and if the rescuer wants to kill him he may, it seems clear that he agrees that one may save by injuring one of his limbs).
And further, maybe one could suggest that the Mishneh LaMelekh’s intention in the initial thought—that a pursuer who turns against the rescuer is not killed (and maybe even that the pursuer is permitted to turn against him, and not merely exempt if he already did so)—is specifically when the rescuer is rescuing by mistake. If the pursuer decides to stop killing (he is running after the victim but secretly decided in his heart that when he reaches him he will not kill him), then an intermediate state is created, in which the rescuer, from his own perspective, rightly thinks he is obligated to kill, but in terms of the facts he is mistaken and in truth there is no obligation to kill the pursuer. Specifically in such a case there might be an initial thought that the pursuer may turn against him, since in reality after he repented in his heart there is no longer any obligation on the rescuer (and therefore any pursuer who turns against him is exempt, because perhaps he acted lawfully). But in the case of someone sentenced to death, there really is an obligation (a commandment) on the agent.
But according to this, one would then have to discuss a person sentenced to death who knows that the religious court erred—for example, he knows that the witnesses are plotting witnesses—whether he may turn against them. And here it would seemingly come out that the condemned person is in truth permitted to turn against them (it seems to me that this would also follow from your explanation. Right?)—except that if he does turn against them, the religious court will kill him by means of a new agent, since in their view he is not allowed. And the practical difference would be if he desecrated the Sabbath and was sentenced to death, and then turned against the agent (with witnesses and warning), and afterward his witnesses about the desecration were disqualified as plotting witnesses, so that he had never really been liable for death at all, and he killed the agent lawfully—would he then be executed for killing the agent? There is room to argue that he would not be.

Suicide is in itself a grave sin. A person who commits suicide is a murderer liable for death who evaded the punishment.

“Yakum of Tzerorot was the son of the sister of Rabbi Yose ben Yoezer of Tzeredah, and he was riding a horse on the Sabbath. He passed before the execution stake. He said to him: Look at the horse my master has me ride, and look at your horse your Master has made you ride. He said to him: If this is so for those who anger Him, how much more so for those who do His will! He said to him: Has anyone done His will more than you?! He said to him: And if this is so for those who do His will, how much more so for those who anger Him! The matter entered him like the venom of a snake. He went and carried out upon himself the four death penalties of the court: stoning, burning, killing by the sword, and strangulation. What did he do? He brought a beam, stuck it into the ground, tied a cord to it, arranged wood and surrounded it with a fence of stones, made a bonfire in front of it, and planted the sword in the middle. He lit the fire under the wood beneath the stones, hanged himself on the beam and was strangled. The fire reached him first, the cord snapped, he fell into the fire, the sword reached him, the stone fence fell on him, and he was burned. Yose ben Yoezer of Tzeredah dozed off and saw his bier flying in the air. He said: In a short moment this one preceded me to the Garden of Eden.” (Bereishit Rabbah, section 65, paragraph 22,)
And nevertheless it seems to me that the Torah expects the sinner to repent and not necessarily to kill himself, as Ezekiel says:
“Say to them: As I live, says the Lord God, I do not desire the death of the wicked, but rather that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn back, turn back from your evil ways; why should you die, O house of Israel?”
And similarly in the Ne’ilah prayer of Yom Kippur:
For You do not desire the destruction of the world, as it is said: “Seek the Lord when He may be found, call upon Him when He is near.” And it is said: “Let the wicked forsake his way, and the man of iniquity his thoughts, and let him return to the Lord, and He will have mercy upon him, and to our God, for He abundantly forgives.” And You are a God of forgiveness, gracious and compassionate, slow to anger and abundant in kindness and abundant in goodness, and You desire the repentance of the wicked and do not desire their death, as it is said: “Say to them: As I live, says the Lord God, do I desire the death of the wicked? Rather, that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn back, turn back from your evil ways; why should you die, O house of Israel?” And it is said: “Do I at all desire the death of the wicked, says the Lord God? Is it not rather that he turn from his ways and live?” And it is said: “For I do not desire the death of the dying, says the Lord God; therefore return and live.”
And maybe one can make use of Column 91, where the Rabbi discusses a case in which a religious court became convinced that the sinner had repented and exempted him from punishment. So according to that, if a person feels that he has repented to the point that he has become a different person, in Maimonides’ wording, he can exempt himself from punishment even for severe Torah transgressions.

EA,
For some reason what I answered doesn’t appear here. I know and appreciate Shay Wozner. It is indeed interesting. But he didn’t bring primary sources there, only secondary ones, though he could have found them. Both in the story of Shimon ben Shetach and in the story Y.D. brought, and of course from my comment about the Mishneh LaMelekh.

Tirgitz,
Indeed. The proof is from the Mishneh LaMelekh’s silence. He discusses Zimri, the blood avenger, and a pursuer, but not the agent of the religious court.
A pursuer is permitted to save himself, but not obligated. If so, the question of why he cannot kill the rescuer still stands. Just like in the case of Zimri, where Pinchas also could have stopped pursuing, and nevertheless he has the law of a pursuer.
Forced reinterpretations in the Mishneh LaMelekh are not plausible.
As for the last paragraph, it seems reasonable.

It’s worth adding, before reading Wozner’s article (and I too join the circle of those who appreciate him, etc.), a trigger warning for the faint of heart about an unusually high level of deontological radiation.

Rabbi, in the case of a pursuer where it was not possible to save the victim by injuring one of the pursuer’s limbs, but in the end something happened and because of it the pursuer did not kill the victim after all—does the pursuer incur the death penalty? Meaning, would the religious court execute him for the pursuit itself? Or is a pursuer liable for death only if the victim was actually killed?

A pursuer is not liable for death in a religious court. The rescuer must kill him in order to save the victim. There is, however, a novelty that this is considered a death liability for purposes of “he receives the greater punishment” (so if he broke utensils he is exempt from paying for them), but it is clear that there is no death liability in a religious court here. The same applies to a burglar tunneling in: if the sun has risen upon him, his blood is not forfeit.