Question

To the honor of my teacher and master, our revered master, may he live long and well: I have a number of questions, and I would be happy if he would answer some of them…

A] In the Talmud (Megillah 4a): Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, when Purim falls on the Sabbath, we ask and expound on the matter of the day. Why specifically Purim? Even a festival as well, for it was taught: Moses instituted for Israel that they should ask and expound on the matter of the day— the laws of Passover on Passover, etc. Purim was necessary, lest you say we should decree because of Rabbah, therefore it teaches us otherwise. This requires clarification: why was it obvious to the Talmud that Purim too is included in this rule? One could say that Moses instituted it only for the pilgrimage festivals, so what is the basis for including Purim in this rule? Even more difficult: this rule of asking and expounding on the matter of the day is a law of Torah study, whereas the law of reading the Megillah is a law of publicizing the miracle. A practical difference would be in the case of someone who does not understand: he does not fulfill Torah study, and nevertheless he does fulfill the commandment of reading the Megillah, whose essential purpose is publicizing the miracle. If so, when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that when Purim falls on the Sabbath we ask and expound on the matter of the day במקום reading the Megillah, this would mean that by doing so we fulfill publicizing the miracle, as Maimonides wrote (Laws of Megillah 1:13): “One asks and expounds on the laws of Purim on that Sabbath in order to mention that it is Purim.” If so, why does the Talmud challenge this from the general rule of asking and expounding on the matter of the day? There it is a law of Torah study, and the Torah reading on festivals is also a matter of Torah study. But this rule of asking and expounding on Purim is based on a different law, that of publicizing the miracle, and these are separate laws.

There is another difficulty: the Talmud implies that only when Purim falls on the Sabbath do we ask and expound on the matter of the day, but when Purim falls on a weekday one fulfills this obligation through reading the Megillah. But how can one fulfill the obligation of asking and expounding—which is a law of Torah study—through reading the Megillah, which is only a matter of publicizing the miracle and does not require understanding? As our master said, Torah reading differs from Megillah reading: with Torah reading, since its basis is Torah study, there is a requirement to understand; whereas Megillah reading, whose whole point is publicizing the miracle, has no requirement to understand. So how does one fulfill the obligation of asking and expounding through Megillah reading? [Still, regarding this law that when Purim falls on the Sabbath we ask and expound on the matter of the day and thereby fulfill publicizing the miracle, that means that one fulfills publicizing the miracle through Torah study, and certainly one must understand, even though in Megillah reading itself there is no obligation to understand. And see Maimonides’ wording there, that one asks and expounds on the laws of Purim, and Rashi on Megillah there wrote that one expounds the Purim letter publicly, and perhaps this is one and the same and they do not disagree].
 
B] The law is simple (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 475:1) that one recites the blessing “Who brings forth bread from the earth” over the first olive-sized portion of matzah on the night of Passover. But this needs analysis: why do we recite a blessing of benefit over this olive-sized portion? Since one is thereby fulfilling a commandment, one is no longer benefiting from it, for we hold (Eruvin 31a and elsewhere) that “the commandments were not given for benefit.” [Especially according to the conclusion of the Talmud (Berakhot 36a) that the obligation of a blessing is based on the reasoning that “it is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing.”] Now according to the view of the Ran (Nedarim 15b, s.v. veha), that if his body benefits at the time he fulfills the commandment, this is still considered benefit, even though the commandments were not given for benefit, then it is understandable why we recite over the matzah the blessing of benefit—“Who brings forth bread from the earth.” But according to the Rashba (there, s.v. ve’amar), who holds that even in such a case, where his body benefits, we still say that the commandments were not given for benefit, why do we recite “hamotzi” over matzah used for the commandment [and likewise the blessing “Who creates the fruit of the ground” over eating maror]?
 
And I wrote, in my humble opinion, that with God’s help this can be understood as follows: the Rashba’s words apply only when a person’s act is a “commandment act,” because the commandment “requires” a specific act, such as immersion, which is “the act of the commandment.” Therefore, since this act is said, as Rashi explained, to be “for the yoke,” it removes the benefit he receives from the bodily pleasure that accompanies the commandment. But if the act of the commandment is not unique and specific to its commandment-act, and rather that same act serves both for the commandment and for his enjoyment, then in such a case the rule that the commandments were not given for benefit was not said. This is a wonderful principle.
And since the act of eating matzah for its commandment is itself the very act of eating for enjoyment, then according to what was explained it is self-evident that all agree that the act of eating for its commandment does not remove the status of “benefit” from the act of eating for enjoyment.
I would be happy to know the elevated opinion of the honored great rabbi, may he live long and well.
 
C] Improvement of produce in the Sabbatical year: In the Talmud (Bava Metzia 109) Abaye and Rava dispute whether one who receives a field from another receives the improvement of standing timber, that is, trees that improved. And it brings a baraita: one who bought a field from another and the Jubilee arrived, they assess compensation for him. And if you would say this refers to greens and beets—beets and greens in the Jubilee are ownerless, [and if so there is no reason that the recipient should be able to claim them from the field owner]—rather, is it not referring to the improvement of standing timber? And the Talmud rejects this: there, the sale was a full-fledged sale and Jubilee is the king’s expropriation. In the Chazon Ish (Shevi’it 7:10) he discusses whether in Jubilee there could be grain that does not involve the prohibition of aftergrowths, according to Rabbi Akiva who holds that aftergrowths are prohibited by Torah law, in a case where the grain reached one-third growth between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, according to Rabbi Yehudah who holds that Jubilee takes effect only on Yom Kippur. If so, this grain is neither aftergrowth of the Sabbatical year nor aftergrowth of Jubilee. He notes there that according to this the Talmud could have found a case involving the improvement of grain and legumes that reached one-third growth before Yom Kippur. He wrote there that perhaps grain in such a case is uncommon, and therefore the Talmud did not bring this possibility. He then continued and noted that the Talmud could have established the case with greens and beets in just such a way. But one may comment that Maimonides (Laws of Shemittah and Jubilee 4:6) wrote that aftergrowths of the Sabbatical year remain prohibited in the eighth year until Hanukkah, or until comparable produce grows. If so, even if the law of Jubilee does not apply to the greens, they would still remain prohibited because they grew in the Sabbatical year preceding the Jubilee. So what was the Talmud thinking in assuming that the improvement of those greens would belong to the recipient?
 
D] Prayer for a tree to produce its fruit in the Sabbatical year: In the Jerusalem Talmud (Shevi’it 4:4) regarding working a tree during the Sabbatical year it says: a tree that sheds its fruit, they mark it with red paint and load it with stones, etc. And in tractate Shabbat (67a) it says: a tree that sheds its fruit, one marks it with red paint and loads it with stones. Granted, one loads it with stones so as to weaken its strength [for because it is fat and strong, its fruits fall off—Rashi], but marking it with red paint—what healing does that accomplish? And it answers: so that people will see it and pray for it [and they do it as a sign, to make known that it sheds its fruit—Rashi].

But in the Jerusalem Talmud (there) it asks from what is taught: one may not hang charms on a fig tree [that does not bear fruit]. What does one do? He brings an extra branch from a fig tree [that does bear fruit], writes a note, and hangs it on the tree, and says to it: “This one bears fruit, and you do not bear fruit.” It asks: why is it permitted to mark the tree red so that it will produce fruit; how is this different from hanging charms in order that it produce fruit? And it answers that if the tree already has fruit, it is permitted to do something so that it will not shed its fruit, but to hang a charm on a tree in order that it produce fruit is forbidden. It seems from this that it is forbidden to mark it with red paint so that people will pray that the tree recover and produce fruit, because that resembles what the Jerusalem Talmud said is forbidden—hanging a charm so that the tree will bear fruit [since the Jerusalem Talmud did not answer that only a charm is forbidden]. And seemingly the reason is that he performs an act in order to improve the tree, which is considered strengthening the tree and is forbidden. This needs great clarification: why is it forbidden to do something so that people will pray for the tree to bear fruit? After all, what causes the fruit to grow is the prayer, not the working of the tree. Is it really forbidden to bring it about that people pray for the tree during the Sabbatical year? [See Derekh Emunah, Laws of Shemittah and Jubilee 1:7, note 62].
 
 
His student, from his writings and lectures,