Q&A: The Reverse Physico-Theological Argument in a World Without Evolution
The Reverse Physico-Theological Argument in a World Without Evolution
Question
With God’s help,
I wanted to ask: is our position about God through the proof based on one of the following:
- Elimination and ruling out the competing options (for example, the evolutionary process cannot serve as a sufficient justification). And then what remains is the position regarding the unknown.
- Or is the emphasis in the proof that since we must assume that we have an implicit belief in a coordinating factor, we must say that it “knows” the entity? Or, conversely, that the coordinating factor implanted in us the understanding of its existence (a “religious” God).
That is, for example, one can imagine an imaginary world in which the components of evolution do not occur—mutations and natural selection—but instead we would discover a law that creates a human being in a “direct” way, like a kind of process of forming an embryo, except that here the process would create people from the womb of the earth. And it would take a very short amount of time in order to make observations and conclude that such a process exists in the world—nine months. Or one could also imagine an ancient land in which there had always been human beings giving birth to one another continuously (setting aside the question of whether this is a concrete infinity).
Would you also then think that a coordinating factor transcendent to the system of the world is required, or would you see in these cases a sufficient factor? That is, from your perspective is the emphasis in the proof the negation of the competitors, and therefore specifically here one must conclude that the coordinating factor is not in the world but outside it, or is it the position regarding a factor with which I can be acquainted (an external “personal” factor, and it is unlikely that I would be acquainted with a process of a child being formed from the earth and that it would care for my understanding)?
Answer
I don’t understand the question. In a world where a human being were created not through an evolutionary path, I would ask: who created the laws of that world? Why should I care whether it’s evolution or something else?
Discussion on Answer
Do you mean the revealing (theological) argument?
I don’t understand why any of this would be different in the world you described.
Yes, I do mean the revealing theological argument.
It would be different because when the “ideal” law of nature directly creates a coordinated human being, say in a way that we could verify through observations, then ostensibly we would no longer need an additional source of justification for his being coordinated, because of the skeptical question that arises regarding the evolutionary process (you do not know at what stage you are from the standpoint of natural selection—maybe specifically at the stage of those who go extinct, or it is not certain as you relate to it; for example, it works to develop survival but not necessarily truth, it is not supposed to develop emotions, and so on).
But if the emphasis in the argument is built on potential knowledge and on acquaintance with the source of the coordination, then it would not seem that such a direct process is enough, unlike an entity that has the possibility of making sure we are acquainted with it (God), and indeed empirically many people believe in its existence or experience it.
So my question is whether it is by way of elimination, 1,
or by way of possibility 2, as presented in the question.
I don’t understand. Do you mean a human being would be created whose thought’s fit to the world does not require justification? I can’t imagine such a thing. It’s like asking whether if a person were born certain that God exists, then from his perspective would that be sufficient proof? The question is not well defined.
My claim is: in a case where we would see that a human can develop from the ground and that from his standpoint he is “coordinated.” And it is very reasonable to assume, then, that we too developed that way.
And my question is whether that is because our discovery is scientific, made by a synthetic a priori method (a law of nature that we infer is coordinated),
or whether something more analytic is required, or even analytic a posteriori (an implicit belief in God).
So then, do we reject evolution in a way of elimination because it doesn’t fit, or is it simply not relevant as a source of justification? (That is, we need an entity that can implant in us knowledge of its existence.)
I don’t understand anything.
The question is: laws of nature or observation are based on a posteriori claims.
When we ask what the source of justification for knowledge is, it seems strange to use such claims, because the demand for a source of justification comes “prior” to that and is a condition for knowledge, and therefore it would seem that the justification must be a priori. And so we need to assume that there is an entity that implants in us these understandings about the world.
Or does this kind of “after the fact” justification finally seem useful to you?
(That is true even with respect to someone who holds that the assumptions of scientific inference rely on a priori claims, but they still do not think that way regarding a specific scientific theory.)
Certainly, but that is the regular physico-theological proof. The reverse proof works like tongs: if you do not say there is such a component, then you will have no justification for the system.
But the question is whether in a world with such a “direct” law, do you think only the first horn would remain, or also the second?