Q&A: Causality and Induction
Causality and Induction
Question
Hume tried to rely on the principle of causality in order to justify the principle of induction.
But doesn't that fail by begging the question? That is, it seems that the principle of causality itself is based on the principle of induction, since how do we know that “everything has a cause”? We have seen (let us assume one can see and sense the causal connection) quite a few times that a certain effect has a cause, and from that we inferred (that is, we performed an induction) that everything in the world has a cause.
Answer
Obviously. He himself pointed this out. Therefore he has no foundation for that principle.
Discussion on Answer
The concept is a priori, but it is not certain that all its details are as well. In any case, there is no necessary identity between a priori and universal. Morality is also a priori, but it is not completely universal.
Or take the concept of causality as well (which, in his view, is an a priori concept): if someone comes along and disputes that concept, and he thinks that not everything has a cause, what does that mean?
It means that he is mistaken. The fact that there is a disagreement does not mean that all opinions are correct. When I said that morality is not universal, I did not mean that everyone is right, but that in practice there are many views.
Is Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena identical to the well-known distinction between matter (the thing in itself) and form (the characteristics of the thing)? And if not, what is the difference?
It is roughly the same distinction.
For an inductivist, a scientific theory is derived from observing a number of facts.
For example, the theory that water boils at 100 degrees.
The inductivist would say that we observed many times that water does in fact boil at 100. However, there is one requirement: the observations must be carried out under a wide variety of circumstances.
1) Do you agree with this scientific conception, that scientific knowledge comes from induction based on several observations?
2) I can't understand how this criterion works, that there has to be a wide variety of circumstances in order to confirm observations. Which circumstances should be varied?? In our example, is there a need to vary the pressure, or the type of water I am measuring, or the heating method, or the time at which I measure, or the color of my shirt?
Rabbi, did you see the question?
1. Obviously.
2. There are no rules for this. It is advisable to vary as many relevant circumstances as possible. You cannot always do that, and you do not always know what is relevant. Still, variety in the evidence is an important parameter in the validity of a scientific theory.
Kant's concept of quantity is an a priori concept. So how can one explain the phenomenon of one, two, many? That is, if the concept of quantity is a priori, then we all understand that there is one, two, ten, a hundred, a thousand, etc., don't we?
Or in other words, does a priori = universal?