Question

Good evening!
The evolutionists argue that there is no proof, since morality is evolutionary—that is, a creature that had a gene enabling it to get along socially by being moral survived.
And the argument against them is that the proof is not from the feeling of morality, but from the fact that we demand of ourselves to behave morally, and that demand can exist only through God, who commands us and gives morality its force (and one cannot answer that we decide to act this way because of the evolutionary conscience that was caused in us, because there are those who actually prefer and enjoy not being moral, and only because of the divine demand do they choose otherwise).
My question is:
1. Why can’t choosing to act this way because of a divine command and divine authority also be an evolutionary conditioning of fear? After all, according to their view, religion too is a survival-based conditioning?
2. Is this based specifically on Kantian morality—meaning that if morality is relativistic, then one could reject the argument and say that even the decision to listen to the divine command is an evolutionary conditioning, whereas for Kant morality is specifically based on rational choice that does not necessarily fit with one’s feelings?
And if I am right about this distinction, then it is even harder for me to understand why a value-based decision made by choice (by force of divine authority) cannot be dismissed as evolutionary conditioning—that a person prefers the impulse of submission to God (who of course, according to their view, does not exist). Should one perhaps distinguish here between a need and a value? And if so, maybe they too would define a value as a need with a different kind of experience?
3. What mainly troubles me is that the evolutionists can reject this too and say that even the desire to choose a divine command rather than a moral impulse is an evolutionary process. That is, in a person there are different genes—one gene that developed and pushes him to be moral on the experiential level, and another gene that pushes him to be moral in the sense of doing so because of God’s will (which is an evolutionary fiction)—but this still is not real morality?
And if we answer that the very fact that there is a choice between them proves something, then the proof is from choice and not from morality (and on that too they have many further answers)?
I am of course aware that the process is blind—that is, those who had genes that could survive are the ones who survived, and my whole description is only meant to illustrate. In other words, the evolutionists will say that it will eventually become clear that whoever had the more survival-worthy gene (whether the one with experiential, instinctive morality or the one with chosen, rational morality) is the one who will survive.
Thank you very much!