From you I learned that defining derashot, for example, as creative interpretation is itself disputed, and that according to Nachmanides the correct definition is revelatory interpretation. According to this view, the legal meaning of God’s words exists and stands even before the interpretive work of the Sages, and the role of the Sages was only to reveal it as well as possible with the intellectual tools at their disposal. If so, according to this view, the correct definitions of the Torah’s laws, in their generalities and particulars, are existing facts (metaphysically?). So what is the difference between heavenly information about them and heavenly information about other entities?
If there is some flaw in the way I formulated this question, I would be glad for some guidance.

I don’t think this depends on the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides. Even if the derashot reveal, that only means that in my opinion this was the intention of the Holy One, blessed be He. But still, what is binding is not what was actually at Sinai, but what in my opinion was there.

It seems that my attempt to relate to the very parameters of the commandments themselves (“the intention of the Holy One, blessed be He”) as reality is not acceptable to you. You relate only to the fact of their transmission, which is historical reality. Why?

First of all, because you are asking a difficulty and I am resolving it. To resolve it, it is enough that there be a possibility that it is not difficult. A strained resolution is acceptable; raising a strained objection is not.
Beyond that, this is my halakhic view. Halakhic obligation does not depend on authenticity (the originality of the law from Sinai). Search here on the site for obligation and authenticity. I elaborated on this in the third book of the trilogy.

But I didn’t want to discuss authenticity at all. Let us assume that we base ourselves on obligation to a body of laws. Now I ask: is it correct to define the accurate formulations of these laws, and the correct conclusions from the rules that accompany them, as “entities,” as an existing reality? It seems to me that your lectures on halakhic truth lead to the conclusion that the answer is yes. So I ask again: what is the difference between an entity of this kind and an entity of another kind? Why are non-human channels halakhically acceptable for capturing basic factual information, facts about this world, but not halakhically acceptable for capturing information about metaphysical or logical truth?
Many thanks in advance (who here is Hillel…)

🙂
My claim is that Jewish law is indeed built on metaphysical reality. But what is binding is our opinion regarding the metaphysical reality, not the reality itself. Therefore, if there is doubt about what the metaphysical reality is, that is not a factual doubt but a halakhic one. For example, suppose that in the dispute over whether a rival wife of one’s daughter is permitted or forbidden, there is uncertainty about the metaphysical bond between him and his daughter’s rival wife. If the bond is X, then she is permitted, and if it is Y, then she is forbidden. Seemingly this is factual uncertainty about what the metaphysical bond is, but no: it is a halakhic doubt, not a factual one. The doubt is how I understand the metaphysical reality, because that is what determines the law. Even if a heavenly voice were to come forth from heaven and tell me that the bond is X, if I think the bond is Y, I would rule in accordance with my own position. By contrast, in an ordinary factual doubt, if a heavenly voice were to come forth from heaven and reveal the facts to me as they really are, I would certainly rule in accordance with the facts that were revealed to me. And that is what they wrote regarding “It is not in heaven.” The claim is that facts can indeed be received from heaven; “It is not in heaven” was not said about them.

Thank you very much. You clarified it well for me.
If I may, I will try to recast your answer—in the point where it answers the first question here, not the clarification itself that understanding is the validating factor in Jewish law—into yeshiva-style conceptual language:
The concept of “Jewish law” contains two components: (a) Torah-based reasoning, (b) knowledge of reality. In order to create the effective legal status of “Jewish law,” the reasoning must be human (a subject has to think it and infer it logically from the Torah’s words), but acquiring knowledge of the facts can also rely on non-human channels.
[Example (far-fetched?): if a person received tefillin from heaven, he would not be able to fulfill his obligation with them, since they were not made by human hands. By contrast, there would be no impediment to fulfilling the obligation with tefillin brought from Spain to Ashkenaz by Rabbi Elijah the Prophet and the like. Perhaps knowledge of reality is considered technical in the creation of Jewish law, like importing the tefillin.]
Does the Rabbi agree?

I didn’t understand any of that, and especially not the connection to our discussion.