Thanks for the quick reply!
In line with your numbering:

2. When you yourself noted that this is skepticism—to say that even though I think this way, how do I know that this is really reality—you said that before moving on to discuss the transition from epistemic necessity to ontic necessity.
I expected that after dealing with that transition there would be some difference. But there isn’t. It’s the same thing. There really is no transition here from the necessity of thinking this way to the necessity that it is actually so. So what is the meaning of all this?

In addition, I do identify a difference between my claim and the usual skeptical claim under discussion.
On p. 81 you apply this skeptical claim to the law of gravity—that one can argue that the fact that I arrive at the conclusion that the law of gravity is true does not mean that this is how reality itself actually operates.
But that is not a correct comparison. Because the conclusion about the law I formulate through some encounter with reality itself, in addition to the thought processes of my consciousness that lead me to it.
Unlike here, where everything takes place inside me without any interaction with the external reality, and therefore the basis for doubt seems more reasonable to me.
What I am basically claiming is that the proof in chapter 3 does not really do what it claims to do.

3. I didn’t understand. Could you explain more?

There is no difference from gravity. There too the conclusion is a generalization that is not derived from reality, and you can ask why the fact that I tend to generalize this way means that this is reality. This is David Hume’s problem of induction. Therefore the analogy to ordinary skepticism is complete.

Let’s say the analogy is complete…
I still don’t understand the logic of the move.

At first he says that I am forced to think of Him as existing.
And then he says to me: “Know that not only are you forced to think of Him that way, but He really is that way. (From epistemic to ontic!) Because you are forced to think of Him as a being whose existence is necessary.”

So what’s the point? I don’t get it. This is still all within epistemic necessity…

So what is still unclear now? That’s what I explained. If you arrive at the epistemic conclusion that He is an existing being (in chapter 2) and a necessary one (in chapter 3), the conclusion is that He indeed exists. If you are not a skeptic, then a conclusion you have reached is presumably correct. To say that the conclusion may be correct in my mind, but who says it is correct in the world—that is skepticism. According to this position there is no conclusion you could ever accept, because one could always claim that this is only your conclusion, but who says it is true in reality itself?

Maybe you meant to ask why there is a mix-up between my necessary conclusion that He exists and the claim that His existence is necessary. I explained that too. These are indeed different claims, and the conclusion of chapter 3 is that He is a being whose existence is necessary (the ontic conclusion). Already in chapter 2 he argues that I know necessarily that He exists (the epistemic conclusion).

Forgive me, I’m not managing to understand.
That’s not what I meant to ask.
I’ll try again.

The discussion in the book about a transition from epistemic necessity to ontic necessity is understood as a transition from being forced to think something to the necessity that the thing is indeed so in reality.
But now I understand that the point is to move from being forced to think that He exists to being forced to think that He exists by necessary existence.

Stage 1 — God is not only in my mind, but I am forced to think of Him as a being that exists in reality (ontic). All this is epistemic necessity.
Stage 2 — I am forced to think of Him as a being whose existence in reality (ontic) is necessary—and this too is epistemic necessity.

So why are things presented in the book as though we are talking about a transition between what I am forced to think and what also exists out there?
Page 85: “One can distinguish between ontic necessity, that is, that the existence of the thing is necessary… and epistemic necessity, that is, I necessarily arrive at the conclusion that the thing exists.”
According to what you’re saying here in the comments, there is no difference between what I am forced to think and what must exist in reality.

And therefore the explanation is not precise. The transition is between what I am forced to think of as existing and what I am forced to think of as existing necessarily.

Am I mixing together different meanings of the same concepts?
Or did I misunderstand the whole move?

Anyone who has in his mind a concept of the perfect, than which there is nothing more perfect, must himself be perfect.
And on the other hand, anyone who thinks he is perfect must have in his mind a concept of the perfect.
And in another formulation: I think about perfection, therefore I am perfect—that is, God is me, the perfect one.

And Heaven forbid that one should think skeptical thoughts.

I completely lost you.

??

I didn’t understand… Rabbi, did you lose me? Or the Decisor?

And you, Decisor?
At first I tried to understand what you wrote, but it seems this is your habit here on the site… to jump into threads and scatter your crazy musings without context or clarity… so I gave up.

Your habits*

You. As for the Decisor’s emphatic declarations, I generally don’t respond to them.

I think I understood where the bug in my understanding was.
I’ll try to present it to you, and I’d be glad for feedback..

Before writing this here, the discussion in the book about a transition from epistemic necessity to ontic necessity was understood by me as a transition from being forced to think something to the necessity that the thing is indeed so in reality, and in effect as solving the skeptical question I was trying to ask.
And when I saw that even at the end of the move we were still in the realm of my own mental necessity, I didn’t understand what this whole detour was for.

Now I understand that basically I understood the concepts (especially ontic necessity) incorrectly.

Epistemic necessity is indeed a necessity that relates to me and to the conclusion I am forced to reach—but in addition it also means that as long as we are not skeptics, reality itself is also necessarily like that.

Ontic necessity — the meaning is not (as I understood at first) that reality itself is necessarily such-and-such, and not merely that in thought I am forced to think so. Rather, the meaning of the term is that we cannot conceive of a hypothetical reality that is not like this.

So Anselm’s move is understandable.

Stage 1 — God is not only in my mind, but I am forced to think of Him as a being that exists in reality, which is indeed a necessary epistemic conclusion, and if I am not a skeptic then He must also exist in reality itself—ontologically.

Stage 2 — I am forced to think of Him as a being whose existence in reality is necessary—and this does not mean to say that He must exist in reality itself and not only that I am forced to think of Him that way. Rather, the point is that I cannot conceive of any situation in which He does not exist in reality.

And all this is of course only in my consciousness.. these are conclusions I arrive at, and there is no reason to doubt that perhaps there is no correspondence with reality.
Do I understand the issue?
Did I manage to explain what I didn’t understand then and what I now do understand?

Sorry for the long-windedness, and thanks for the patience 🙂

Now it’s clear. In my opinion, it’s all correct.