Q&A: Naturalistic Conception
Naturalistic Conception
Question
Regarding Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s naturalistic and ontological conception, which sees legal rulings or halakhic disqualifications (for example, applying to some object) as ontological statuses that exist in reality, and not merely legal relations to the object, one could seemingly bring a direct proof against it from the Mishnah in Bava Kamma, chapter 9, mishnah 2:
If one stole an animal and it grew old, or slaves and they grew old, he pays according to their value at the time of the theft. […] If he stole a coin and it cracked, produce and it rotted, wine and it turned to vinegar, he pays according to their value at the time of the theft.
If the coin became invalidated, terumah became impure, leavened food remained in his possession over Passover, an animal was used for a transgression, or was disqualified from being brought upon the altar, or was going out to be stoned, he can say to him: “Here, what is yours is before you.”
From here we see that a legal or halakhic change does not impair the identity of the object (and therefore the thief can say, “Here, what is yours is before you”), whereas a physical change does impair the identity of the object.
This implies that a legal / halakhic / juridical ruling or status is not something naturalistic and physical in the object, but rather a legal relation that we have toward it. What do you think?
Answer
There is no necessity to say that. It is like the topic of damage that is not externally perceptible (where the examples are always imposing a prohibition on an object). I seem to recall that in Shay Wozner’s book there is a broad discussion of this in Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s approach. It does impair the identity of the object, but in its spiritual dimensions and not its physical ones, and for that there is no obligation of restitution. For example, terumah that became impure is just as edible as terumah that did not become impure; it is just forbidden to eat it. So why should he pay for the damage, if the object serves for eating in the same way and with the same quality? There is only indirect causation here that prevents you from eating it, but no injury to the object itself. Suppose you coated a chair with transparent lacquer—would you be obligated to pay? That is certainly a change in the object itself, but a change that does not damage it.
Ah, so if I understood correctly, basically that means that “ontological” is not necessarily “physical” but at the very least “real,” and a halakhic status can be real but not physical, rather spiritual