Q&A: Free Choice and Moral Responsibility
Free Choice and Moral Responsibility
Question
Hello Rabbi, lately, as someone living in a religious community, I’ve come to the conclusion that most people don’t really have free choice and informed judgment regarding their religious path, and that has raised difficult moral questions for me.
Seemingly, it is very reasonable to assume that the average jihadist has no real choice whether to be one or not (because he is probably stupid / brainwashed / believes with “simple” faith and therefore doesn’t examine ideology rationally), which means that he is completely coerced into being a jihadist and one cannot demand moral responsibility from him for that.
If that is the case, then if 2 terrorists attack me, am I supposed to let them kill me, because they are not guilty of their actions (so they don’t deserve to die), and if I kill them that means the loss of 2 lives as opposed to only my own if they kill me? The same would apply on the national level with larger numbers.
(I’m enlisting in a combat unit soon; hopefully this won’t be relevant.)
Answer
There are several mistakes in your thesis.
- It is not true that a person has no choice whatsoever. He definitely does. The circumstances in which he lives and acts do not remove his responsibility; at most, they may serve as grounds for leniency in punishment. When a thief who lived a hard life is caught, that does not exempt him, though it may perhaps mitigate his punishment. It seems to me that even you, as a retired gozmba (according to the nickname you chose here), can testify to that.
- Although a person has choice in almost every situation, it is true that sometimes a person reaches mistaken conclusions even while using his best judgment. A person who lives in a Jewish or Muslim environment will make decisions מתוך different faith-based assumptions, and that really will be his position. In such a case, it is not correct to say that he had no choice, but rather that he made a mistaken choice and is coerced in his belief. A person can freely choose the wrong option, and that does not mean he had no choice. And indeed, one who is coerced in his belief (that is, who formed a mistaken position and did so according to his best judgment) is exempt from responsibility for his actions, both in Jewish law and in general. This is coercion in matters of belief. I have written here more than once that even a Nazi or an ISIS member who was convinced that he was acting rightly cannot be regarded as wicked. His actions are wicked, but he is not. See, for example, Column 372 on this.
- But all this has nothing to do with the law of a pursuer. Even a person who acts in good faith and without guilt (under coercion), if he endangers me, I am allowed to defend myself against him. For example, if a minor is pursuing me, even though he lacks judgment and the ability to make decisions, I am permitted, and should, kill him in self-defense. In order to kill a pursuer, guilt is not required; it is enough that he be the cause of the problem. Whoever constitutes the cause of the problem bears the responsibility to solve it, that is, to pay the price required for its solution. This is not punishment but bearing responsibility, and therefore guilt is not required here.
- Once the law of a pursuer applies, it makes no difference how many pursuers there are. Even if there are ten minors pursuing me, I have the right to harm all of them in order to save myself. Thus, for example, Jewish law rules that a person is not permitted to give up his life in order to save many others from death. The preference for many lives over a single life can find expression only in a completely balanced situation (for example, in a symmetrical trolley problem, such as the dilemma of whether to save one person or many who are drowning in a river).
- This, of course, is the rule on the individual level. On the public level, a person must serve in the army in order to protect the public, and that is not similar to the previous discussion. It is not forbidden in the way that personal risk for saving many others would be. And that is for two reasons: a. In the public sphere there is a distribution of costs. Everyone serves in the army, and each person does so in turn. Otherwise we would all die. Therefore, this should not be viewed as my risk for others, but as the distribution of all our risks among all of us. b. When it is a true suicide mission (and not merely a risk), one may not force a soldier to go out on it. This is true both halakhically and morally, and this is the accepted view in IDF ethics. A well-known case is that of Yehuda Ken-Dror, the jeep driver at Mitla, who volunteered for his suicide mission. Therefore, in the case you described, where the danger to you is certain, there is indeed no obligation to do it even in military service.
- To conclude, I will note that if I have not convinced you, then in my opinion you should update the army and your parents. I assume they will already act to prevent your enlistment in combat service, since I am sure they would not want you to give up your life in order to save the lives of two terrorists. Even if they cannot explain this to you in a rational and conceptual way, people usually have healthy moral intuition, and it comes before the rationalizations we construct for it.
I wish you an easy, meaningful, pleasant, and peaceful service.
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t claim that no active act is needed in order to be considered a pursuer. What are you objecting to here?
By the way, the Talmudic passage there is not simple at all. First of all, from Maimonides it appears that even a fetus is killed under the law of a pursuer, and yet a fetus also does not perform an active act (although in my opinion that is not Maimonides’ intention. He is precise and writes “like a pursuer,” and this is not the place to elaborate).
Beyond that, once the fetus has put out its head, there is mutual danger. Just as it endangers the mother, she endangers it. So there it is hard to speak about the law of a pursuer. And not necessarily because an active act is lacking. If someone endangers me without my endangering him, perhaps he would indeed be considered a pursuer even without an act. True, the language of the Talmud implies that it is because the pursuit is from Heaven, but that can be pushed aside. But all this is only for dialectical analysis, since I did not claim otherwise here, and my answer does not assume that no active act is required.
“But all this has nothing to do with the law of a pursuer. Even a person who acts in good faith and without guilt (under coercion), if he endangers me, I am allowed to defend myself against him” — that’s what I understood from what the Rabbi wrote.
“In order to kill a pursuer, guilt is not required; it is enough that he be the cause of the problem” — I’d be glad if the Rabbi would explain what he meant.
You misunderstood. An act by the person is required, but guilt is not required. That is exactly what I meant, as in the case of a minor pursuer. That’s why I brought the example of a minor.
Indeed, according to Rav Huna, guilt is not required, only an act of assault.
However, according to what you explained here https://mikyab.net/posts/75941#comment-64666,
that the victim’s right to life justifies killing an attacker who is not guilty, seemingly the same should apply to someone who does not perform an act of assault but merely constitutes a factor endangering someone’s life?
Why, normatively speaking, does the fact that there is or is not an act of assault affect the application of the law of a pursuer?
Correct. That is what I wrote here. But it is not simple. See the discussion about a fetus whose head has emerged.
So if I understood correctly, for the law of a pursuer to apply to a person, it is enough that he perform an act that endangers me, even if the act is done in good faith; but there still has to be an act, and not a situation of “it is Heaven that is pursuing him,” where the act itself is done against his will?
(If I may answer:) Exactly.
For example, let’s say Reuven pushes Shimon off the roof so that he will fall onto Levi below and kill him. Levi is forbidden to kill Shimon (assuming that is his only way to survive), because he is not performing an act of pursuit (and is also not guilty); he is basically like a stone — it is as though Reuven had thrown a stone at Levi.
It is forbidden to kill him according to what the Rabbi defined. You are allowed to kill only someone who is doing an act, even if the act is done without awareness, under coercion, etc. But if he is not doing an act, then he has the status of a fetus such that if it has emerged from its mother’s womb, it is forbidden to kill it because “it is Heaven that is pursuing him” (without getting into the discussion about the fetus that the Rabbi brought above).
I wrote two things, and I’ll repeat them again: 1. In my answer I assumed that pursuit is an act, and that is what follows from the plain meaning of the Talmudic phrase “Heaven is pursuing him.” Therefore I rejected the objection to my words. 2. But on the substance of the matter I raised doubts as to whether an act is really required. The example of Levi hurling Shimon onto Reuven is a good example. In my opinion, there is a lot of logic to Reuven killing Shimon in order to save himself. He constitutes a danger to me even if he bears no guilt. By the way, when he hits me he will kill me, and in that sense he is also performing an act in some sense. That nicely illustrates the doubt I raised. What Tosafot writes in Yevamot is that if a person is thrown from a roof onto a person standing below, the thrown person does not have to tilt himself and die in order to save the one below, because he is not guilty of that. But that is a different discussion.
Dor, see the article “Self-Defense Against a Non-Culpable Attacker and the Requirement of Awareness of the Existence of a Criminal Defense: An Analysis of Two Talmudic Passages,” by Shay Wozner.
3. Regarding the law of a pursuer, we find the law concerning a fetus in its mother’s womb: if its head has emerged, it is forbidden to kill it, because “it is Heaven that is pursuing him.” So you see that there has to be an active act in order to kill a person; it is not enough that he merely pose a danger to my existence.