What does it mean that they knew how to expound?
They used their intellect and their reasoning countless times to derive interpretations, and they disagreed with one another's reasoning based on reasoning.
So why are we bound by their reasoning?
Many times a certain derivation doesn't seem reasonable to me, and in fact by force of reasoning another amora learns it differently.
So why can't I?

Who accepted authority, and when?!
And why does that obligate little me, who accepted nothing?

If my ancestors accepted something, does that obligate me?
And even my ancestors—if they suddenly retract, can they not do so?
What is this, an oath?

*And in fact by force of reasoning another amora learns it differently.

I have often written that exegetical derivations are based on reasoning and are not just technical calculation. But you are taking this to an extreme and assuming that derivations are reasoning alone. Therefore, in your view, there is no need to know how to expound, and so whoever disagrees with the reasoning disagrees with the derivation. But that is simply not true. The world of exegesis requires knowledge in using the hermeneutic rules, which I do not have, even though I have worked on it quite a bit, and I allow myself to guess that you don't have it either. When you know how to use the hermeneutic rules, you can rely on your reasoning during the derivation. But if you do not know how to expound, no amount of reasoning will help you.
Accepting authority exists in every normative system. Citizens of the state accepted the authority of the Knesset, and therefore even if I disagree, I must obey the law. Moreover, as long as the law has not been changed, it also binds future generations who were not partners in accepting the earlier legislators.

If in truth it isn't only reasoning, and there are rigid hermeneutic rules,
why can't we derive that from the Talmud?
I mean capable people.
I'm asking seriously and not sarcastically.

A person who decides he does not accept Israeli law can get up and leave, and there's no problem with him.
But of course you don't agree that someone who doesn't accept the authority of the sages behaves properly.

And more than that: regarding state law too, even if someone opposed to the state stays here, why does the law obligate him aside from the categorical imperative that there is already a state and he would want everyone to keep the law?
But a person who does not see the sages as an authority also doesn't want everyone to keep it.
So what obligates him?

People who accepted Jesus as an authority—are their children now obligated to follow his path?

And also regarding the previous point—the limiting interpretations. When there is a true thesis, then yes, we'll adopt strained answers.
That's true.

But every thirty seconds in the Talmud the amoraim set up the Mishnah with difficult limiting interpretations, and I say to myself: fine, fine, you managed to make peace between the Mishnayot or the baraitot. But the simple sense of the Mishnah gives the feeling that the tanna never intended this even in his wildest dreams.

And it's annoying and frustrating and already feels strange, since it happens all the time. Anyone who learns Talmud knows it. There is the straightforward sense of the Mishnah, and by the end of the passage the conclusion doesn't fit the words. And really we never understood the Mishnah at all, because it's talking about a case where there are two witnesses and they're stammering and they're exactly on a ship from overseas because they were excommunicated because they… I don't even know anymore…

It reminds me of the story of David and Bathsheba, where whatever they say and however they explain it away, the verses are screaming that he sinned, for heaven's sake.

Is this feeling—that there are just too many answers—understandable?

Doesn't it ever seem strange to you? Or is it just me?

I didn't understand the question. I explained that these are not rigid hermeneutic rules, since reasoning is also involved, but there is a skill component in using the hermeneutic rules. So far people haven't managed to derive it from the Talmud, though there has been progress.

This distinction isn't relevant. You asked how something that we accepted upon ourselves, or that others accepted upon themselves, can be binding. I showed you that this exists in other contexts too. That there are distinctions is obvious. So what? Someone who does not accept the authority of the sages must interpret God's will for himself. If he has a way to do that—so much the better.

If a person belongs to a community that accepted Jesus as an authority, then he is indeed obligated. He can of course leave. He can also leave Judaism. The fact that Jewish law says he cannot—so what? He doesn't accept it.

As for the limiting interpretations, I don't understand your question. It isn't strained, and that is definitely what the Mishnah means. I explained this well in my article.

And regarding David and Bathsheba, there is no problem at all. Anyone who says David sinned in the formal sense of adultery is mistaken. But no one claims that David did not sin morally. Rabbi Yaakov Medan discussed this at length in his book on that episode.

I just saw the article on limiting interpretations. My mistake.
But the question about authority is hard for me.

I don't understand what you wrote!

"He can also leave Judaism. The fact that Jewish law says he cannot—so what? He doesn't accept it."

But my difficulty is: why does Jewish law itself think that it obligates me?
The fact that if I don't accept Jewish law then I'm not obligated to obey it—I understand that on my own; that's a simple sentence.

My whole question to you is: as a man of Jewish law, how do you turn to me and explain to me that what the sages said and interpreted obligates me when I did not accept their authority?

And the fact that my parents accepted it doesn't interest me. I don't owe them or their decisions anything.
So what is your way of convincing me that I am in fact bound by the authority of the sages, as a person who thinks that God has authority over me?

?

What does it mean that "Jewish law thinks"? If you left, why do you care what it thinks? And if I tell you that it does obligate or doesn't obligate, those are just words.
You are mixing up the question of whether something is true and proper with the question of why it is binding. The covenant and the agreement at Mount Sinai were the reason for the obligation (that is the accepted view. I am not sure about it. It may just have been coercion—"He held the mountain over them like a barrel"), but observance of the commandments is true and proper in itself. It does not depend on agreement and covenant.
You are obligated because the community as a whole accepted it upon itself, just like state law (as I said, the distinction between them is not relevant). But it accepted it upon itself because that is the proper way to act. Like someone who did not sign the social contract regarding morality—people would certainly still tell him that he is obligated, because that is the proper way to act. And that is also something he cannot leave.

I thought that was only regarding the Talmud, no? (Because it was no longer written by the Sanhedrin.)

Meaning, the part that we're obligated because we accepted it upon ourselves.

Also regarding the Torah, if we assume that at Mount Sinai there was acceptance ("We will do and we will hear").

Okay. Thank you.

You wrote:

"Someone who does not accept the authority of the sages must interpret God's will for himself. If he has a way to do that—so much the better."

A. So is that why you accept their authority—because in your opinion there is no better option?

And if so, then that explains exegesis and the method of Torah study.

B.
But what about specific cases where you think the sages are wrong and you are right, such as decrees, fences, and enactments?

There I still don't understand what obligates me to bow my head and accept their words.

C. Regarding Mount Sinai, what does "the accepted view" mean?
What is your opinion?
What happened at Sinai, in your opinion, that obligates us?
Or what happened there at all?

A. No. I accept their authority because of "you shall not turn aside." But if someone thinks there is no such principle, or that it does not mean they have authority—let him act as he understands.
B. You are mixing up interpretation and legislation. In legislation, the question is not what God's will is, but whether the legislator has authority. Rabbinic laws are legislation.
C. As far as I am concerned, the revelation at Mount Sinai is binding because that is God's will. Some based this on our acceptance of it (from the laws of contracts), and that is what the Talmud seems to imply regarding the claim of a great protest. Even if that is true, in my opinion there is no need for it.