Q&A: A Matter That Could Be Learned by an A Fortiori Inference, Yet the Verse Took the Trouble to Write It
A Matter That Could Be Learned by an A Fortiori Inference, Yet the Verse Took the Trouble to Write It
Question
In Kiddushin 4a and above, the Talmud says that in principle the Torah does not write a law that can be derived by an a fortiori inference; and if it does write it, that is a sign that it comes to teach something else. Then the Talmud asks how this fits with the rule that “for a matter that can be derived by an a fortiori inference, the verse nevertheless took the trouble to write it” — meaning, who says it comes to teach something else? Maybe it is teaching that very law, except that the Torah took the trouble to write it explicitly. The Talmud then answers that we say this rule only when we have no other answer, but if there is another answer, such as deriving a different law, then we do derive it that way.
This seems to me to involve lines upon lines of intellectual indirectness. You are aware that the answer “a matter that can be derived by an a fortiori inference — the Torah still took the trouble to write it” is not really a correct answer (otherwise it could be used even when another law could be derived from the verse), and yet you still use it in places where you do not see what other law can be derived! It is utterly baffling. Why not just be straightforward and say: “The Torah came to teach something, but I do not know what”? Instead, a far-fetched answer is presented, saying that it wrote out the a fortiori inference itself!!?
Answer
First, on the straightforward reading, it is possible that this itself is what is written here. From our perspective, the Torah wrote something that we could have learned through an a fortiori inference. Maybe we missed something, and there is a refutation of the a fortiori inference, and maybe not.
But even if you read the Talmud literally, it is certainly possible to adopt a strained solution when there is no other solution. An interpretive limitation or the claim that “the text is defective and should read thus” can also be offered as solutions to a difficulty, but only when we have no other explanation. So why don’t we dismiss every difficulty from a Mishnah or a baraita by claiming that the text is defective and should read differently? Because that is strained.
Discussion on Answer
Interesting
Seemingly, the idea that “the verse took the trouble to write it” means that the matter has independent content and is not merely a branch derived from the root; see Maimonides, Second Principle.
And in principle, when something is written explicitly in a verse, it is fitting to expound it as an inclusion, because there is an emphasis here that ought to be expressed in some specific law. But when it has no halakhic expression, we leave the emphasis as it is and say: this is an independent matter worthy of being written.