Q&A: Exercising Authority by an Individual
Exercising Authority by an Individual
Question
From several places people bring proof that one may separate another person from a prohibition even by causing damage (and maybe even by physical injury): Rav Adda bar Ahavah tore a woman’s garment because of modesty concerns (Berakhot 20), Maimonides in the laws of Kilayim says that one who sees his fellow wearing kilayim pounces on him and tears it off him, and in his Commentary on the Mishnah he wrote that not only is it forbidden to repair utensils for someone suspected regarding the Sabbatical year, but it is proper to ruin them for such people. In Choshen Mishpat 421:13 it is ruled that it is permitted to strike someone in order to separate him from a prohibition. True, there it is speaking about someone who is striking another person, and maybe it is permitted because in any case there will ultimately be a blow, and the blood of this one is no “redder” when he too is violating a prohibition. And seemingly that is what the Rema there implies, that only someone under your authority may be struck in other cases in order to separate him from a prohibition. But then it is not clear where the permission comes from to strike someone who is under your authority.
This question of course also comes up in moral matters, like animal-rights activists who free suffering animals and thereby damage the property of the person who is tormenting them.
As I understand it, there are two problems with this kind of exercise of authority by a private individual: 1. Causing anarchy — I throw your smartphone into my toilet because in my opinion it is forbidden, but maybe someone else will get there first and smash my toilet so that I cannot throw it in, and of course all this leads to the holy wars we know, for example from Ponevezh. 2. Violating individual autonomy — I can go steal miserable chickens that are confined in battery cages, but then someone will come and steal my dog because I did not fulfill the commandment of “do not muzzle an ox,” and it is not humane to raise a dog that way. (That is of course an exaggeration.) Usually these are cases where there are arguments both ways — for example, what is the proper balance between animal suffering and making use of them for human benefit — and my intervening in everything that seems immoral to me undermines the other person’s own judgment.
What is your general view in such cases (halakhically and morally)? For example, when, if ever, should one free, by way of theft, animals whose owners are abusing them?
Answer
This is a very difficult question. I myself encountered it when I was in Yeruham. The son of some friends of ours came to us; he was studying there in the Haredi yeshiva, and we lent him a novel (by Joseph Heller, the author of Catch-22 — Something Happened). The mashgiach at the yeshiva caught him with the book and confiscated it. He came to me embarrassed and told me. I told him to tell the mashgiach that if he did not return my book, I would take him to a religious court and/or file a complaint with the police. The mashgiach said that he had already thrown it in the trash (whether he had or not), so I demanded compensation for the damage, and I got it. Afterward I really thought to myself that from his point of view this was certainly an abominable book and therefore fit to be destroyed — but what can I do if I do not agree?!
I think that in places where there is a dispute, such a step requires at least a decision by a judicial authority or broad consensus. Even that, of course, does not fully solve the issue, because any barbaric person can decide that the required consensus is that of the members of his kollel, and everyone else is criminal and ignorant. But barbaric people are not looking for regulatory rules for their actions. Someone who is looking for such rules would do better not to use violence and harm unless there is agreement from some objective institution; his own personal opinion is not enough.
The examples brought in the Talmud can be regarded as examples that have the agreement of an authorized institution (the Talmud itself), and therefore it is justified to act on them. But of course with respect to our own times, that is not the situation, because today we are not in a society that accepts the Talmud, and given our life circumstances these instructions are not always the right ones even for those who do accept it. Therefore today I almost do not see any situation in which there is justification for violent action to prevent a prohibition.
Discussion on Answer
First, that was not the case, because the fact is that the mashgiach refused to return it either to him or to me on the claim that it was an abomination. Second, one can still go to the police, because violating the rules may justify punishing the student, but it does not justify confiscating and stealing my book.
Tearing up a book and so on — come on. If those are the rules, there is nothing to do; you have to be smart, not right. And regarding the examples above — phone, toilet, and so on — the laws of the state rule that out, so the Torah certainly does too. Unless we are talking about actual idolatry, which there is a commandment to destroy and eradicate from the world.
Same with a person being cruel to his own animal… report him to the authorities and they will deal with him — haha, why do you need to do anything other than report it? Sorry that I answered with a question
Regarding the confiscation of the book: I do not know the case, but confiscation is not always because the book is an “abomination” in the eyes of the mashgiach; sometimes it is a sanction for not keeping the rules, and the student entered the place on that basis.
That is similar to a case where a yeshiva student plays “Tetris” or “Rummy” during study session. He can expect the game to be confiscated plus a monetary fine, even though the game is not an “abomination.” In such a case, would it make sense to go to a religious court or the police?