Q&A: Election Bribery
Election Bribery
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Do you think there is anything improper about offering someone money so that they will vote for list X? I know it’s illegal, but it isn’t so clear to me why. After all, that’s what all public officials do. They promise their voters all kinds of things in exchange for voting for them. Sometimes these are even purely financial benefits, like the promise to raise old-age pensions when the Pensioners’ Party ran back in the day. So why is it forbidden when they give actual cash directly?
Best regards,
Answer
I don’t see anything morally improper in such a step. But it is certainly right for the state to prevent it, because it gives direct political power to people with money.
Discussion on Answer
With God’s help, 8 Cheshvan 5783
To Oren — greetings,
When a benefit is given to a certain sector, the benefit is given to everyone, both those who vote for the one initiating the benefit and those who vote for his opponents. True, the one initiating the benefit expects the number of his supporters in that benefited sector to grow, but there is no dependency between the benefit and the vote. So for example, if the pension for the elderly was raised, then all elderly people benefit from it, regardless of whether they voted for the initiator or against him. By contrast, in “election bribery” there is an explicit condition making the benefit dependent on the vote.
Best regards, Shefatyahu Abu-Shahadeh Halevi
According to the principle I proposed — whether there is dependency between the benefit and the political support — the Netanyahu cases collapse. After all, Walla also edited articles for other politicians, and the Ministry of Communications approved mergers for other communications companies as well, in accordance with the approval of the professional echelon.
Likewise in Case 1000 — the extension of the tax exemption for returning residents applied not only to Milchan but to many others, and similarly the attempt to designate the Jordan Valley as a “free trade zone” benefited every other investor as well. Even the effort to prevent the revocation of the American passport would have been made for any Israeli who had contributed to the security of the state and was harmed because of it. In this case it was argued that the gifts Netanyahu received from Milchan were beyond what is customary between friends, but that too is increasingly being disproved. For example, a single instance in which Milchan’s driver brought champagne to Netanyahu in the first version became 20–25 times in later versions.
Best regards, S. A. H.
Case 2000 is the most absurd of all. Mozes did not offer Netanyahu a benefit, but tried to blackmail him. He demanded, with the support of many members of Knesset, to shut down the only right-wing daily newspaper, in exchange for a dubious promise that he would give the right more expression in his left-wing paper. And Netanyahu refused even that, for obvious reasons. The “deal” was a loss for him.
There is a big difference between a benefit in exchange for being elected and giving benefits in the hope of being elected. It is completely different both legally and morally. By the way, this also comes up in Netanyahu’s trials. Many argue that politicians are always trying to get favorable coverage. That is of course a nonsense claim. Here we are dealing (if the indictment is correct) with a quid pro quo. An explicit condition.
But in any case, people with money still have direct political power even after the state prevents this. They can get around the state’s restriction by offering an added budget to population X, where that added budget will come out of their own pocket. For example, the head of the Pensioners’ Party could offer an extra 100 shekels a month to every elderly person, with that 100 shekels coming from his own pocket if he is elected to the Knesset. How is that essentially different from someone offering money directly to a citizen so that he will vote for him?