Question

In Gittin 4a, Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that a bill of divorce that is invalid from within is disqualified. Tosafot ask: what does an internally invalid document have to do with not being written for its own sake? Tosafot answer that in any case there is room to decree signature because of writing: if the signatures are not done for its own sake, we decree lest the actual writing also not be done for its own sake.
 
Now Pnei Yehoshua asks (on 11a, s.v. “Here, what are we dealing with?”): according to Tosafot, if an internally invalid document in the case of signatures not done for its own sake is disqualified because of a decree of signature because of writing, then later on 10a, where they say that Rabbi Shimon followed Rabbi Eliezer’s approach, who holds that the witnesses of delivery effect the divorce, and therefore he validated bills of divorce produced in gentile courts when there are witnesses of delivery—there the Talmud asks: but didn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rabbi Eliezer agrees that an internally invalid document is disqualified? And they answer: here we are dealing with clearly gentile names. According to Tosafot this is difficult, because although these are clearly gentile names and there is no concern that perhaps people will come to rely on them—since they are clearly gentile names, people will not rely on them—still, the gentiles did not sign for its own sake, because a gentile acts with his own intent, so we should decree signature because of writing not for its own sake.
 
Pnei Yehoshua answers that only with Jewish signatory witnesses does it make sense to decree signature because of writing, since people may come to rely on them—that is, we allow her to remarry without bringing the witnesses of delivery before us, and the signatory witnesses serve as proof—so the witnesses’ signatures are like the writing of the essential part of the document. And since it is considered like the essential text, it makes sense to decree because of the writing of the essential text. But with gentile signatory witnesses bearing clearly gentile names, whose signatures make no difference at all, and are merely like scribbling, we do not rely on them as documentary proof, and she will need to bring the witnesses of delivery; in such a case it does not make sense to decree signature because of writing.
 

1. Can you explain this decree of signature because of writing to me? What exactly are we really afraid of? After all, we write before we sign, so there should be no concern that the signature affects the writing, which came before it. Presumably you’ll say that we are concerned about today’s signature affecting the writing of tomorrow’s bill of divorce—that people will say: if a signature not for its own sake is valid, then writing is also valid not for its own sake. That seems to be the straightforward explanation, but it does not fit into the words of Pnei Yehoshua. I don’t understand why, when the signatory witnesses are Jews and the religious court relies on them, we decree because of writing; but when the signatory witnesses are gentiles and the religious court does not rely on them, we do not decree because of writing. Seemingly there should still be room to decree: if gentile signatory witnesses are valid, despite the fact that this is not for its own sake, people will say that writing not for its own sake is also valid. Do people really follow this case closely enough to know that the religious court did not accept the signatory witnesses and required witnesses of delivery instead?!

 
2. And a more general question: I so hate these Talmudic passages whose whole basis is decrees and reasonings of “perhaps he will come to…” “we decree that…” “we are concerned that…”. It all seems so arbitrary—sometimes they make a decree and sometimes they don’t, seemingly without any justified reason. What about you?