Q&A: Questions and Answers I Wrote Based on My Own Reasoning — I’d Be Happy for His Insightful Comments…
Questions and Answers I Wrote Based on My Own Reasoning — I’d Be Happy for His Insightful Comments…
Question
A. Regarding someone who made the blessing with one count in mind and then counted a different count:
The Mishnah Berurah (625:2, note 4) cites in the name of Binyan Olam that if the shofar was taken away in the middle of the blasts and another shofar was brought to him, he does not need to make the blessing again. But if the shofar was taken away between the blessing and the beginning of the blast, he must make the blessing again. This implies that the blessing takes effect on the object of the commandment — the shofar that was before him. But this requires clarification, because regarding the counting of the Omer it is explained in the Shulchan Arukh that if one made the blessing intending to count four days and then remembered that it was five days, he does not make the blessing again, since he intended to fulfill the commandment. This needs explanation, because in the end he did not intend the commandment of this particular day. So what is different from shofar, where there is apparently a requirement to intend the commandment itself?
This is my reasoning:
Regarding a case where the shofar was taken from him before he blew — what should the blessing take effect on? It is like a fruit that fell from his hand after the blessing and before eating. But in the counting of the Omer, the blessing is not on the day but on the commandment itself, and he fulfilled it with the blessing even though he mistakenly counted a different day. (For example, if they switched the shofar for the blower before the blowing, he certainly would not make a second blessing.)
Again, I am not relying on sources here, only on my own reasoning.
B. Regarding the law of reciting Shema as Torah study:
The Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 2 of Berakhot states: “And one may complete it until sunrise. Rabbi Yehoshua says: until three hours… One who reads from this point onward has not lost out, like a person reading from the Torah.” And in the Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chayim 46) in the gloss: “It is good to say in the morning after ‘Hear O Israel’ etc. and ‘Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom forever and ever,’ because sometimes they delay with Shema and recite it not in its proper time, and one thereby fulfills the obligation.” The later authorities explained that this means that when one fears that the congregation will pass the time for Shema, he should intend to fulfill his obligation through this. And in the Shulchan Arukh of Rabbi Zalman of Liadi (ibid. 9) he added that one should intend that if the congregation passes the time for Shema, he will fulfill his obligation with this, and if not, it should be merely like reading Torah; and so too in the novellae of Rabbi Akiva Eiger. They already raised a difficulty from what is explained in Ketubot 74b, that for every condition we require that it be something that could be carried out through an agent. Therefore, when one says to him, “Perform halitzah for her on condition that she give you two hundred zuz,” the halitzah is valid even if she does not give it, because all conditions are derived from the case of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben, where Moses commanded Joshua to give them the land, and there Joshua was Moses’ agent. In every such case a condition is effective, but halitzah, which cannot be done through an agent, likewise cannot be made conditional. Yet here we find that a condition works for Shema even though the commandment of Shema cannot be fulfilled through an agent. And similarly we find regarding the afikoman and the counting of the Omer; see there. This requires clarification. I would be happy to know my teacher and rabbi’s distinguished opinion.
For all conditions that a person makes with himself regarding his own actions, whether for the sake of a commandment (an eruv, a fast) or for optional matters, he does not need to formulate the condition according to the rules of the conditions of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Therefore the question does not begin in the first place. And even in monetary matters between a person and his fellow, there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether the laws of conditions are required. In any case, for any condition between a person and himself, the conditions of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben are entirely irrelevant.
Answer
Hello.
A. It is not clear to me why the blessing over shofar-blowing is a blessing on the object. It is a blessing over a commandment, just like the counting of the Omer. What is the basis for distinguishing among blessings over commandments and saying that some are on the commandment and some are on the object?!
It may be possible to explain that in counting the Omer he intended to bless the commandment of counting today, but he made a mistake in the number. So he blessed the correct commandment and only performed it incorrectly. (This is even more compelling if one maintains that all the days of the Omer count are one continuous commandment, in which case all the days are one single commandment.) But in the case of switching shofars, he blessed a different commandment-act. According to my approach, if he erred in the blowing and now wants to correct it, perhaps he need not bless again. According to your approach, apparently he would have to. Though one could distinguish there as well.
B. Rabbi Shimon Shkop explained that the reason we require that a condition be capable of being carried out through an agent is in order to express his control over the matter — that only regarding something over which he is the owner, something fully in his hands, can he make a condition. But with Shema and afikoman and the like, the reason they cannot be carried out through an agent is not lack of control over the matter, but because they are commandments that must be performed with one’s own body. Therefore, in such a case a condition is effective.