Q&A: Argument
Argument
Question
Hello and blessings! I had an argument on the Sabbath with my study partner. He made an argument that seemed utterly illogical to me, but I couldn’t quite put my finger on what exactly was wrong with it. I’d be glad if you could help me with that.
We were discussing the topic of whether a medium-strength identifying sign would help for rabbinic prohibitions, and that led us to discuss the broader question whether the standard of proof required for rabbinic prohibitions is in fact lower than for Torah-level prohibitions. He wanted to explain that the reason the threshold is lower is not necessarily connected to the fact that rabbinic prohibitions are more lenient, but rather to a fundamental difference between them and Torah law—they are person-based prohibitions. He wanted to say that person-based prohibitions do not merely prohibit the act for the person, with that being only a secondary result of the enactment. Rather, the essence of person-based prohibitions is a command to the person to relate mentally to the object of the act as forbidden, like poison, and the practical consequence is that the person is also forbidden to do the act, since if he does it that proves that mentally he does not regard it as poison.
He argued that the advantage of this is that the sages’ prohibitions were designed from the outset only for situations in which a person can control his consciousness and relate to the act as a forbidden act, but in situations where a person would not be capable of feeling that way, the sages never enacted their decree.
He explained that our brains do not work in a way identical to statistical reasoning (see the books of Daniel Kahneman), and therefore once a person sees a medium-strength sign, then even if statistically it is not a sufficiently good sign, from the standpoint of the person’s mind the doubt has already been resolved and he is no longer truly capable of relating to the doubt as a doubt—that would just be pretending on his part.
Therefore, the evidentiary threshold for rabbinic prohibitions is much lower, because in Torah prohibitions, which are object-based prohibitions, we are still looking for the objective truth; but in rabbinic prohibitions the condition is that the person genuinely be able to develop a mental state of prohibition, and therefore….
He wanted to explain on that basis why a rabbinic doubt is permitted even though according to Maimonides this involves a Torah-level prohibition, in light of the principle above.
It sounds to me like way too many acrobatics in the air—what do you think?
Answer
I don’t know what is meant by a medium-strength sign. In the context of returning a lost item? I’ll address the claim itself.
First, the assumption that rabbinic prohibitions are person-based prohibitions is not agreed upon. But if one adopts that view, then in general there is certainly room for reasoning of this sort.
However, there are rabbinic prohibitions that are decrees lest one come to Torah prohibitions, and with regard to those I do not see how this can be made dependent on consciousness alone. We are dealing with a real concern of arriving at Torah prohibitions, and if that concern exists, the matter should be prohibited.
Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman wrote in an article that in all Torah prohibitions where the doubt is treated leniently (doubtful mamzer status, doubtful firstborn status, doubtful mourning, doubt regarding impurity in the public domain, doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel, and more), they are prohibitions of consciousness. That is exactly the reasoning you mentioned, but with respect to Torah prohibitions. Except that according to his view, in prohibitions of consciousness he permits in any ordinary case of doubt, and not only in a lighter case (a medium-strength sign?).
It should be noted from the law of something that will later become permitted, where they were stringent even in a rabbinic doubt, and the reasoning given by the medieval authorities is: instead of eating it in prohibition, eat it permissibly. According to his approach, this is not eating in prohibition, since in a case of doubt this is fully permitted and not merely a temporary override. Still, one could reject that proof.
As for a rabbinic doubt in Maimonides’ view, there are good explanations and there is no need to resort to this reasoning. In any event, even if you do resort to this reasoning, it does not permit every case of doubt, only an easier doubt (a medium-strength sign).
Discussion on Answer
It is supposed to appear as an article in a Torah journal that was published under his editorship in Baranovitch. I learned about it in a lecture I heard many years ago from Rabbi Hershel Schachter, but I haven’t seen it myself.
Thank you very much. Does Rabbi Elchanan’s article appear in Kovetz Shiurim or Kovetz He’arot, or in some Torah journal?