Q&A: Practical Jewish Law
Practical Jewish Law
Question
With God's help,
Hello and blessings,
I asked a practical Jewish law question.
A few months ago I signed up for a course, and I told a representative of that course that I wasn't sure whether it was right for me and that I wanted to try it. She answered that it was possible to try it. After a trial period, she called and asked whether I was satisfied, and I answered yes, and I set up a standing order for 12 months. However, after a few months I no longer wanted to continue, and I told her that I didn't want to continue and therefore I wanted to cancel the standing order. I argued that I hadn't signed any commitment to stay there for the whole year. At first I thought it suited me, and afterward it didn't [unlike the other students, they had me sign nothing because I joined the course late, and she saw that I was hesitant, so she didn't want to pressure me, and after I said yes she didn't mention anything]. And of course she claims that since there is a standing order, that is a commitment, and that I am a thief.
Thank you
Answer
This is a question for lawyers. Here Jewish law would follow the law, since the contract was made with that understanding. As a matter of simple reasoning, it really seems to me that a standing order is a commitment. a0
Discussion on Answer
I am relying on the meaning of such an agreement in our society. There is no difference between the halakhic question and the legal one here, so sources have no particular significance. Every source speaks in light of the circumstances it knows.
Why don't you relate to the fact that she did not make sure to inform me at all about the commitment, and why don't you relate to the fact that she saw that I was undecided and therefore it was convenient for her not to tell me anything? [I really did not know about any commitment.]
I don't think she had to inform you if I am right that this is the default. On the contrary, you should have informed her that you were doing this only as a trial, and she should then have said whether they agreed.
I said that it was a trial and she agreed, and after some time she asked me if I was satisfied and I said yes, and she didn't tell me anything, so it was obvious to me that I could still change my mind?
On the contrary, there was a trial period and it ended. You said that you were satisfied, so it was clear to her (and to you as well) that now the trial was over and a regular contract was beginning.
For some reason, the Rabbi determines that it was clear to me at the time, when I am telling you that it was not clear to me at all? That was my question.
I know your opinion on the matter of civil court, but I am asking specifically according to Torah law. When the Rabbi writes that it seems so to him logically, what is he relying on from a halakhic perspective?