What do you mean? There it says: “Just as there are ethical facts, there are also halakhic facts. Both are independent of the Holy One, blessed be He, and binding on Him.” (Although later on there it is suggested that the Holy One, blessed be He, can change the spiritual facts, and maybe that is what is meant here?)

I don’t know where that is written, and I no longer remember. I wrote what I currently think. I assume there are metaphysical religious facts, but I see no reason to assume that they cannot be changed (that is, that they are not dependent on the Holy One, blessed be He—or at least not all of them).

Doesn’t that contradict the assumption that the religious values promoted by Jewish law, according to your view, are also binding on the Holy One, blessed be He?

I really do not think they are binding on Him. At least not all of them.

There, in 457, at the end of the column, the argument goes like this. On the one hand, a halakhic value that overrides binding morality must itself be binding, meaning prior to the command. On the other hand, a resolved halakhic conflict (for example, a neglected corpse overrides lulav and a prohibition) seems completely comfortable, unlike a resolved moral conflict (for example, killing uninvolved people in war), and therefore seems to be only the product of a final command. And the solution you suggested there is that indeed the halakhic value is binding (even though the obligation is by virtue of the command), but the consequences (the spiritual ones) of violating the halakhic value are not binding.
In your answer here, when you say that not all halakhic values are binding, do you mean that halakhic values that override morality (in some situation) are indeed binding, but other halakhic values perhaps are not? By the way, does such a claim imply that in an incidental, non-essential clash, in your terminology (if I remember the term correctly), it is reasonable to assume that this is a non-binding halakhic value, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that morality will prevail?

I find the claim somewhat difficult that the value is binding but its “prices” are not. Simply speaking, the necessity of some value is because of its prices.
The distinction you brought at the end is possible, but it seems to me that the continuation of your argument is problematic. An incidental or essential clash does not necessarily involve different values, but rather different situations. If halakhic value X overrides moral value Y because the clash is necessary, then indeed X appears to be binding. But if there is a situation in which halakhic value Z will not override Y because it is incidental, that does not mean that Z is not binding, because there may be another situation in which Z would override some moral value (because there it is indeed necessary), and that would prove that Z is binding.

It seems that part of the difficulty is that if one separates the value from the price, and the problem with violating it is only because of the price, and that is not binding, then it turns out there is no binding force at all; and if there is an intrinsic problem even aside from the price, then the lack of binding force in the price is of no importance. Maybe it is not just “part” of the difficulty.

As for the continuation, I understand that you are sharpening the point: for a halakhic value, if there exists even one necessary clash (and according to your view, in such a case, given certainty, Jewish law prevails), that means it is a binding halakhic value. But if all the clashes involving it are incidental, then perhaps it is not binding and will not prevail (and perhaps one could say here: a doubtful binding value cannot override a certain binding one). If so, there is an interesting result here: the division is sharp, because all the particulars in morality, and all the degrees of force, are entirely binding across the board, so a halakhic value that is not binding always loses to even the slightest nuance in moral considerations. (If, when he takes the lulav, he blocks his neighbor’s view for a moment and causes him some slight annoyance, then it would be forbidden for him to wave it at that time—and perhaps this would even be a commandment fulfilled through a transgression.) Maybe it is better simply to assume that everything is binding, full stop.

In principle, correct. A religious value that is not binding would lose to any tiny moral consideration. Except that we have no way of knowing what is binding and what is not.
That will always be a conclusion. You apply intuition and the rules of Jewish law, and based on them decide whether the Jewish law is set aside or not, and from that you can infer whether this is a binding value or not.
At most, you can insist on consistency in your doctrine.
And that decision itself is not simple either. If the religious value loses to morality, it may be binding or it may not be binding. If it overrides morality, then it is necessarily binding.

Seemingly, intuition and the rules of Jewish law certainly say that every religious value overrides some minimal fluctuation of a moral value, and if so, all religious values are binding. No?

Not necessarily. For example, entering another person’s territory overrides religious values even over something minimal.

But it is enough to assume that for every halakhic value there exists some moral value that is overridden even by a minimal amount (even if there is some other moral value that is not overridden even by a minimal amount), and who would not assume that?