Q&A: A Jellyfish That Lives Forever
A Jellyfish That Lives Forever
Question
In The Science of Freedom you write about a jellyfish that replaces all the cells in its body and therefore can theoretically live forever. Do you think it really isn’t correct to define the jellyfish as the same entity even after it has replaced its biological clock? And if such a thing were possible for a human being as well, why assume that in a dualistic view there is no continuity in a person who undergoes such a process?
Answer
I no longer remember that example or what I wrote there. But I don’t see why it would be impossible to define such continuity with regard to a human being as well. Did I write there that it wasn’t?
Discussion on Answer
Well, so what do you see here? If everything is indeed preserved, then one can speak of continuity. Of course, one can argue that the memories will not be preserved, and then we are not identical to what was before, and therefore we are not ourselves.
And do you accept that claim?
Which claim? This is a matter of definition. I don’t understand where this discussion is headed.
Do you accept that one cannot speak of continuity of the soul of the one who has the body in a case where the memories are not preserved either?
No. If it is the same soul, then there is continuity even if the memories are not preserved. A person whose personality changed because of an accident or because of maturing is still the same person. Why should continuity of the soul depend on the replacement of cells?
And again, I don’t see where this discussion is going. Just semantic hair-splitting.
If I understood correctly, you wrote there (pp. 453–455) that: “When Gray was asked how we could contain all the memories we would accumulate over an infinite life, he answered that our nature already takes care of that. We forget what happened after about forty years, and so there is always room left for new memories. If so, our memories, too, will no longer remain as they were. So what, after all, will define this future creature as a continuation of us—ourselves? Will that future creature still be us—ourselves? What exactly will be found in it that belonged to us (the creatures we are now)? The memories and nature acquired over the course of our lives? In principle, that too could be produced artificially, as we saw above. If we are prepared to accept that this creature is us—ourselves, then why should we not accept the tempting proposals of Avshalom Elitzur?”