The wording of the Talmud is:
"Rava said: One who wants to borrow something from his fellow and be exempt should say to him: 'Give me a drink of water,' so that it will be a borrowing with its owner [working for him]."
On the face of it, this seems to be a rule stated as the preferred course, without qualification, and as far as I know the halakhic decisors do not write any qualification.
And later the Talmud says: "And if he is clever, he should say to him: 'Lend it to me first, and then give me a drink of water.'"
That implies that the lender does not know the law.
But perhaps one could say that it is the Torah that creates the obligation of the laws of safeguarding, whereas from simple logic there are no such laws, and therefore there is no problematic conduct here.
What does the Rabbi think about that?

That is not proof. There is a correct halakhic statement here that comes to illustrate the law of "its owner is with him." It is not necessarily a recommendation to do this in practice. The Talmud in Temurah discusses the question of whether, if one did it, it is effective, and it is obvious that one should not commit a transgression. But it is effective. Borrowing in this way is also effective, even if it is not recommended.
The laws of safeguarding are contract law, not a novelty of the Torah. Their details are a novelty of the Torah, and one can also stipulate around them. By the way, nowadays, when we do not apply the law of "its owner is with him," what obligates a person is local custom or the law of the land, since one may stipulate regarding the laws of bailees (Mishnah Bava Metzia 93). Therefore it is likely that nowadays there is no law of "its owner is with him."

Of course, the proof from "if one did it, it is effective" is not proof of anything, since there it is clear that it is forbidden, whereas here it is not clear, so the Talmud should have mentioned that one should not do this.
The laws of safeguarding are contract law when there is an explicit agreement, but if a person lends something without specifying anything, he is not obligated by logic at all; rather, the Torah introduced his liabilities, and in the case of slaves he is completely exempt.
Even today, when there is custom, I am not sure there is a binding custom even regarding unavoidable accidents, so there would still be a practical difference with respect to "its owner is with him."

I did not bring a proof, only an example. My claim is that there are discussions in the Talmud about halakhic transgressions—whether doing them is effective or not. By the same token, there could be a discussion about moral wrongs (all the more so), that doing them is effective. That is all.
By simple logic, one who borrows an item undertakes to safeguard it. I think it is accepted that he is liable even for unavoidable accidents, but that is a marginal detail.
That is it. We've exhausted the issue.