Question

If I understood your argument against David Enoch’s position that moral laws derive their validity from themselves (similar to the laws of logic or to rules of economic conduct in reality, such as the assumption that one does not base an assessment of a factual state of affairs on wishful thinking), it was that moral laws and the other “laws” are called laws only equivocally—where only the former are “colored” by a claim of obligation that motivates action, whereas the other laws are merely descriptive. Therefore, moral laws are the kind of laws that require a legislating source—namely, God. In essence, this is another formulation of the naturalistic fallacy: ethical facts do not rise to the level of an “ought” without some commanding agent. But seemingly, the assumption that one ought to obey that legislator must also be formulated as an ethical fact (except that it contains just one principle—that one ought to obey the voice of God—and not a large number of ethical facts). So I do not understand what advantage your claim has over his when it comes to grounding morality.