Q&A: Atheist Critique of the Naturalistic Fallacy
Atheist Critique of the Naturalistic Fallacy
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I read about the naturalistic fallacy in your book, where you explained that the attempt to derive moral obligations (ought) from biological and other facts (is) is doomed to fail, and therefore a commanding agent such as God is required.
Recently I came across an atheist critique of the argument, which says that even if we add the commanding agent to the equation, we would still need to add an ought in the attempt to derive moral obligations from it.
The process of creating moral obligation in a theistic world is structured like this:
A. God commands us to refrain from theft
B. Therefore we are obligated to refrain from theft
But in this process there is still a derivation of ought from is, since the fact that God commands us to refrain from theft says nothing about our obligation to refrain from it.
The only way to create such a moral obligation is by adding an additional premise, according to which we ought to obey God.
But adding this premise turns the derivation of obligation into something derived from an ought that we ourselves decided on, and not from the divine demand itself.
This premise (the obligation to obey God) is itself a moral statement, and therefore it would be absurd to try to base moral obligation itself on it.
I would be happy to hear your answer.
Answer
This is a general question about the non-naturalistic conception of morality. In my opinion, every other conception is a misunderstanding. There cannot be something that gives morality validity in general, because facts do not do the job, and if we add a non-factual premise we will also have to justify that premise itself.
But that is a mistake. The naturalistic fallacy deals with facts in their ordinary sense. There are also ethical facts, and they are not neutral like ordinary facts. One who understands them (= perceives them) thereby understands that there is an obligation to act. The claim “It is forbidden to murder” is not a neutral fact. It is a fact that carries a rationale for action or inaction, and from it one can derive a normative instruction. The fact that God commanded is also an ethical fact by virtue of His being God. God, by definition, is an entity whose voice one ought to obey, meaning that His commands have validity.
By the way, the obligation to obey His voice is not moral in the accepted sense. See my article on philosophical gratitude here on the site.