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Q&A: Logical Positivism and the Construction of Concepts of Thought

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Logical Positivism and the Construction of Concepts of Thought

Question

With God’s help,
1- Logical empiricism holds that metaphysics has no existence, since it is impossible to point to it and describe it; therefore it is nonsense arising from an improper use of language. If so, it is difficult for me: how are there scientific theories? After all, observing a “law” (causality) is also metaphysics, since we do not see the law itself (David Hume). So how are scientific theories formulated?
2- Is it correct to say that between the positivist analytics and postmodernism there is almost no difference, and that the transition is direct? Since the claim of the analytic thinkers is that metaphysics cannot be described because one cannot point to it, whereas the claim of the postmodernists is that even the empirical material cannot be described, because everything is a “language game,” etc.
In other words: the transition from the early Wittgenstein to the later Wittgenstein is completely natural (even though on the face of it it is contradictory), since insofar as the criterion for truth is ostension, then language shows that we are not pointing to anything?
3- According to the later Wittgenstein, how did language begin? If there is no real relation between it and reality, then how did it begin? (In essence, this is the analytic thinkers’ claim against metaphysics—that it is impossible to describe what has not been observed, as in the words of the early Wittgenstein himself. So my difficulty with the later Wittgenstein is: what did he solve by saying that everything is a language game? After all, how did it begin, and how is it sustained?)
4- What is the fundamental difference between Hume’s claims that one cannot observe the a priori, and the claims of the analytic thinkers that one cannot describe metaphysics? After all, the basis of Hume’s argument is that the “concepts” and structures of thought are a priori and not empirical, and that is also their claim—that language, meaning the concepts of thought, describes only what is observed?
Is the difference only that the analytic thinkers defined more clearly the connection between the “concepts,” that is, language, and empirical reality?
Or perhaps, whereas for Hume there is room to answer on the basis of Kant that everything is within phenomena, for the analytic thinkers even phenomena have no meaning, because we have said nothing, and concepts to which one cannot point even within phenomena have no meaning?
5- Locke and Descartes disagreed whether the source of concepts is internal and innate within us, or whether they are built by empirical reality. Is this not the same dispute as Plato and Aristotle—whether concepts are existing ideas, or merely abstractions from reality?
Thank you very much!

Answer

  1. A good question, and one that I too have asked more than once. Some of them would say that they make no claims about what they have not seen or what has no proof. They simply use such language because it is convenient for them.
  2. Indeed, that is possible, and I actually wrote this in Two Carts and in Truth and Unstable.
  3. I am not an expert in his doctrine, but I do not think that when he speaks about a game he means that language games have no source at all in the world. He only argues that use represents things better than meaning does.
  4. I did not understand the question. I also do not understand the claim that one cannot observe the a priori. By definition, insofar as it is a priori, it is not derived from observation.
  5. Similar. But Locke and Descartes are not talking about the existence of concepts such as horseness.

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