Q&A: Free Choice
Free Choice
Question
Hello Rabbi, I’d like to ask a few questions. (If possible, I’d appreciate clear answers, and detailed ones too if necessary, because this topic is very, very important to me. Thank you very much.)
1. I came up with a definition of choice, and I’d be happy if the Rabbi would correct me or add to what I said: free choice is when a person is torn between two desires—for example, the desire to enjoy something now, or the desire to enjoy much more later on. (Note: even if before the choice there is an intellectual conclusion about what is more worthwhile and wiser, still that doesn’t end the matter.) The decision about what the person wants more (and chooses to do) is made by the person.
2. What is the intuition that there is free choice?
3. Can free choice be seen as something logical even without that intuition?
Answer
- That is not a definition of choice, but a description of one example of a situation in which a choice is made. There is no definition of choice other than a negative definition (that it is not an action determined deterministically, but also not random).
- I didn’t understand the question. It is the immediate feeling that each of us has.
- I didn’t understand the question. Choice is one of three possible ways to interpret events (causality, randomness, and choice), and my intuition leads me to decide that it exists, at least in certain situations. This is not a question of whether it is logical or illogical.
Discussion on Answer
1. I have nothing to add. I have a clear intuition about it, certainly no less than the intuition of the principle of causality. If for you it is different, then decide accordingly.
2. Definitely. Worlds apart. See at length in my book The Science of Freedom.
3. I didn’t understand the question. In any case, on that too, see there.
Forgive me, Rabbi, but it’s important to me to understand this topic. Regarding 1: just what is the feeling? Is it the feeling at the moment of choice that I could have chosen otherwise, or just a general feeling that there is such a thing as choice and that someone who does evil deserves punishment? (I simply see that the explanation for this is that we are self-governing, and I can’t understand why one needs to get to that.)
Regarding
2. I don’t have the book, and it’s important to me to know what the distinction is and what the reasoning is for distinguishing, because at the end of the day there is still the right thing here versus the impulse of laziness. (It’s important for me to know, according to the view that there is choice, in which places it definitely exists.) If the Rabbi can explain a bit, I’d be very glad.
Forgive the audacity, but the topic is very important to me. Thank you very much.
3. What is the weight of the principle of causality?
Thank you very much
1. Both.
2. I don’t understand the question. Clearly he can do otherwise, but he decides not to because there is no logic in it. I don’t know exactly what you mean. When I spoke about the value-vs.-impulse dilemma, I wrote that this is a dilemma in which the decision may have been made long ago (regarding the value), and the dilemma is created now because an impulse is something that arises in the present.
3. 2.18 kg.
I don’t see any point in elaborating. The discussion is vague and repetitive. If this is important to you, you’re welcome to read the book or the article here that summarizes it: https://mikyab.net/%d7%9e%d7%90%d7%9e%d7%a8%d7%99%d7%9d/%d7%9e%d7%91%d7%98-%d7%a9%d7%99%d7%98%d7%aa%d7%99-%d7%a2%d7%9c-%d7%97%d7%95%d7%a4%d7%a9-%d7%94%d7%a8%d7%a6%d7%95%d7%9f/
You can also look here:
After reading, maybe you’ll be able to sharpen the questions, or they’ll be answered.
Hello Rabbi, 1. I saw that the Rabbi decides in favor of the intuition of choice over the principle of causality, and I couldn’t quite understand what exactly that feeling is and why it is so strong, no less than the principle of causality. (This issue is very important to me, in order to reach an understanding that free choice is something logical.)
2. Is there reason to distinguish between a major test and a decision in which there was never any real possibility of choosing evil? (That is, could it be that in a simple decision there is no free choice—for example, I don’t see a reality in which an intelligent person would choose not to work for an hour in exchange for one hundred thousand shekels. Seemingly, not only is that unlikely, but such a reality could not even exist.)
3. I saw that the Rabbi wrote that the weight of the desire for a certain value as opposed to impulse is not only a matter of passive recognition, and that you expanded on this in past posts. I’d be glad to read more about it in detail.
Thank you very much, I really appreciate the investment.