Q&A: Free Will and More Questions
Free Will and More Questions
Question
Hello and blessings.
1. I wanted to ask about the feeling we all supposedly have that we possess free choice. At first glance, I don’t see any contradiction between causality and the feeling that I am free. It seems to me there is a confusion between the feeling that no one is coercing me and actual choice. The only thing we seemingly feel is that there is no coercion, but every choice can apparently be explained causally without needing to invoke illusions and the like. What is this comparable to? A person has two foods in front of him, and by his nature he wants one of them more. He indeed feels that no one is forcing him to choose either one, but in truth reality dictated what he would choose. In other cases there is deliberation, but we also deliberate about things that involve no choice, such as factual uncertainties. Therefore deliberation apparently proves nothing; it only proves that the matter is uncertain to me, and at the moment of decision either he chose because he had to choose, and since he had no way to decide he chose according to his inclination, or the doubt was resolved—for example, a thought occurred to him: “What will this craving give you?”—and that resolved his doubt. In summary, it is hard for me even to imagine a situation in which one can actually feel free choice. If I am mistaken, I would be happy to understand where the mistake is.
2. Does the Rabbi think that free choice exists only between value and impulse, or also between reason and impulse (that is, between what is more beneficial and wiser for me, and what is more tempting right now)?
3. I read what the Rabbi writes about the authority of the Sages. The Rabbi argues that the advantage of the Sages is only tradition, since apparently not everything they said was stated through divine inspiration. True, apparently not everything they said was stated through divine inspiration, but there is no doubt they had additional sources mentioned in the Talmud besides tradition: revelation of Elijah, transmission from prophets, spiritual attainments, ascent of the soul (“four entered the orchard”). It is true that not all the stories are to be taken literally, but in many of those that are not far-fetched, such as revelation of Elijah, whoever wants to say that this is only a parable bears the burden of proof. In short, in my opinion it is true that what we were used to—that the Sages never err—is a mistake, but still, regarding factual determinations, even when they have no tradition from Sinai, apparently the advantage is with them, especially in matters agreed upon throughout the Talmud, unless it becomes clear otherwise.
4. I saw that the Rabbi argues that the Sages have no authority to obligate a person to believe a certain thing. Even if that is true, apparently they do have authority to forbid saying such things. If the Sages say that one who denies the resurrection of the dead has no share in the World to Come, then even if inwardly someone disagrees, and in your view one cannot obligate him to accept these things, apparently it would still be forbidden for him to publicize and say this, by force of the Sages’ prohibition. For regarding factual claims expressed in speech, they certainly can forbid them. What does the Rabbi think?
4. Lately I’ve been reading a lot on the site, and I appreciate the Rabbi and the integrity, but it is hard for me to understand the reasoning that truth is preferable to everything else even if it is harmful. There is no doubt that views about providence and skepticism regarding the World to Come and the resurrection of the dead are harmful. So what is the point of publishing them openly? I believe that in your view these positions also have some benefit, but that is already a different discussion. The question is whether you truly think that truth is preferable to benefit. If so, I would be happy to understand the Rabbi’s reasoning. Especially since these things are not falsehood, but only different from your opinion, and I am sure that you too admit they have a place in reality.
Thank you very much.
Answer
Hello.
Usually it is not advisable to combine different questions, because then it is not possible to continue discussing them afterward. Unless you only want an answer and do not intend to continue the discussion. I will answer now, but I will not continue a discussion on several questions in parallel.
1. This is compatibilism. A very popular position among philosophers in recent years. It is completely untenable, and I explained this at length at the beginning of The Science of Freedom, and also in my review of Eliezer Malkiel’s book.
2. I don’t see a difference. Isn’t what is beneficial and wise a value? Is it an interest? Then it is impulse versus impulse? In my above-mentioned book I discussed the different kinds of dilemmas (value-value and value-impulse), in the chapter on Libet’s experiments.
3. I am not inclined to interpret those things literally. As for divine inspiration, the Talmud itself explains it as natural signs. The fact is that they have quite a few demonstrable errors.
4. In principle, correct, but I do not accept prohibitions against stating the truth. I also do not believe that they meant to forbid this in a generation like ours, but even if they did—I do not obey. About that I say: “By God, even if Joshua son of Nun had said it in his name, I would not obey him.”
And another 4. (5.) I have no doubt that those beliefs themselves are harmful (that is, seeing them as binding truth, not the beliefs themselves), and not my statements. Many people abandon religion because they lose confidence in those beliefs, and precisely my slimming-down version keeps them in. Others consider me an apikoros, and that’s fine. So my statements are actually beneficial, to the best of my judgment. Beyond that, even if and when the truth is harmful, the situation would have to be extremely severe in order to forbid it. See the previous section.
The definition of falsehood is not relevant here. I am not claiming that someone here is deliberately plotting something. But an error is falsehood in the sense that it is not truth. And the fact that I cannot be certain is, of course, true. That is exactly what I am saying: one cannot be certain.
Discussion on Answer
In this way you won’t get very far. You have the feeling that you disagree with me on questions 3–5. But maybe you don’t? (After all, even if it were an illusion, you would feel that way.) You feel that you see a chair in front of you. But maybe not? (After all, in illusions too one “sees.”) You have a feeling that feelings prove nothing. But maybe not? (After all, feelings can mislead.) In short, one can raise skeptical questions about anything in the world. There is no way to answer such questions, but whoever raises them ought not think anything and should remain in absolute skepticism about everything. I am not a skeptic, and therefore I trust my intuitions. Whoever does not trust them—that is his right.
Forwarded from the questioner:
Hello and blessings, perhaps I did not explain myself properly. I also believe in my experiential feelings, certainly more than in the intuition of causality. It’s just that apparently I do not have a feeling of free choice. Explanation: the feeling that I act and am not acted upon (which we all feel) and the feeling of free choice are two different things. Even if that feeling is correct, it does not testify to free choice; there is no contradiction between it and causality. I have a feeling of deliberation; even if it is correct, it does not testify to choice, but to the fact that I am in doubt and have not yet decided what to do. Even a computer takes time to resolve uncertainties (processing data). And the feeling of decision also does not necessarily testify to choice; it may testify to the resolution of the doubt, or to the fact that the doubt remained as it was and I went after my inclination. After all, there is also decision in determining facts. There, what caused the decision was certainly not choice, but either inclination (deterministically speaking) or the doubt was resolved. In other words, a decision can be causal, and I do not understand how one could feel that the decision does not stem from a cause. In short, I am trying to understand what feeling brings me to a situation where either it is illusory or it testifies to choice.
Thank you very much for the patience and the response; I really appreciate it.
But the fact that you do not have such a feeling is your own subjective matter. I do have it. You are trying to explain my feelings to me, but no. My feeling is that I have free choice, not that I am driven in a deterministic way. You can cast doubt on that just as you can about sight. I do not have any significant doubt about it.
By the way, a decision may perhaps stem from a cause (but usually it is for the sake of a purpose and not because of a cause—a very significant difference), but the cause is some sort of value system, and those values do not stem from a cause. Those are what I choose.
Another forwarded message:
The Rabbi’s response: But the fact that you do not have such a feeling is your own subjective matter. I do have it. You are trying to explain my feelings to me, but no. My feeling is that I have free choice, not that I am driven in a deterministic way. You can cast doubt on that just as you can about sight. I do not have any significant doubt about it.
By the way, a decision may perhaps stem from a cause (but usually it is for the sake of a purpose and not because of a cause—a very significant difference), but the cause is some sort of value system, and those values do not stem from a cause. Those are what I choose.
Response: Forgive me, but I did not understand the response. I am not explaining your feelings; I am explaining the possible feelings people have and explaining why they do not contradict causality. Where is my mistake? I feel there is more of a “gut feeling” of choice here and less of an “immediate experience.” Thank you very much.
I do not understand where the quote ends and where the response begins.
In any case, I am really not trying to explain you to yourself. You say that you have a feeling that you are causally operated. I told you—good for you. Are you claiming that you are not causally operated? You wrote otherwise.
If the values are chosen without a cause, then what is the question? That is your choice.
In short, I don’t understand what you want from me. Are you talking about compatibilism? I referred you to that. Compatibilism is complete determinism; it just defines the concept of choice differently.
Hello and blessings. I’ll continue the discussion only regarding free choice. I’ll just say that regarding questions 3, 4, and 5 we will probably remain in disagreement. As for the feeling of choice, I still haven’t understood how one can feel that one’s choice is not causal. If this is the feeling of freedom—that I act and am not acted upon—that proves nothing, since even when reality dictates to me what to do, that feeling still exists. And if it is the feeling of deliberation, that too proves nothing. It makes sense that a person would be in doubt and deliberate even in a deterministic outlook. And decision also proves nothing, since in determining facts there is also decision. If we are forced to decide within a short time, then his inclination at that moment—deterministically speaking—is the cause; and if he is not limited by time, then the decision will be either by resolving the doubt, or, if the doubt is not resolved, by following his inclination. In short, it is indeed possible to interpret our experiences as free choice (I believe in free choice), but it is also possible to see them causally without saying that they are an illusion. That is how I see it, and if I am mistaken I would be happy to understand.