Q&A: Regarding your introduction to The First Foundational Principle — the difference between factual claims and ethical claims
Regarding your introduction to The First Foundational Principle — the difference between factual claims and ethical claims
Question
Good evening, Rabbi. Today I began reading your book The First Foundational Principle. At the beginning of the book you wrote that moral claims, being norms measured according to the standards of morality, and with no physical thing to which the various ethical claims can be compared, therefore ethical claims cannot be attributed to the category of factual claims. Is it really true that a moral claim has no contact with physical reality? Is morality really so far removed from reality? After all, any evaluation of a moral situation is measured in relation to the existing reality. Certainly from a utilitarian moral perspective, one can (apparently) empirically measure how much pleasure or suffering is caused as a result of an ethical claim, and thereby determine whether the claim is good or bad. Likewise, in Aristotelian virtue ethics, one can examine to what extent the claim fulfills the purpose of man, and on that basis determine whether it is a good or bad claim. And from a deontological perspective, which completely disconnects any link between existing reality and moral duty, there is a similarity to what you wrote, and this theory leaves no room at all for discussion of changes in situations; everything is fixed and uniform regardless of the specific reality. This is unlike the complexity you presented when you were asked about murder in different situations. I would really be glad to know which ethical school the Rabbi had in mind — it seems from the term “the Idea of the Good” that this is Platonic ethics, which I do not really have a grasp of, and regarding that I have no objection; I would just be glad to know why the Rabbi thinks there is a disconnect between ethics and reality.
Thank you in advance,
Netanel.
Answer
The naturalistic fallacy applies according to all ethical approaches. Even a consequentialist or utilitarian approach determines the character of the moral act, but not its motives and the manner of its performance. Therefore, according to a utilitarian approach, you decide what a moral act is based on the results (which are facts), but the motivation to do it is ethical. From the facts in and of themselves, the moral obligation does not emerge. The existence of suffering or pleasure is a fact. From that alone, no obligation arises to do or not do something.
This approach does not disconnect the act from reality, but only its motivations and its validity. Therefore it is incorrect to conclude that this ethical doctrine does not depend on circumstances. Of course it does depend on them. According to Kant, you must do what you would want to be a general law. But what you would want to be a general law depends on the circumstances and the facts.