Q&A: On God and His Morality
On God and His Morality.
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I read column 547 about evil in the world, especially in these dark days.
Thank you very much for the investment. And I really think the column softens the question and helps one understand.
But I have a few questions:
And please, even though this came out a bit long, answer me at length as much as you can. Thank you.
1. The column begins with the assumption that God is good because that is what is written in the verses.
And on that I want to ask: why doesn’t the fact that the world is full of suffering undermine that assumption? At least there should be some doubt. Clearly, if there were no suffering, or at least only a low level of it, there would be no reason to doubt, since God says that He is good. But there is so much terrible suffering, so why doesn’t that undermine the assumption?
2. Your argument is that God has to preserve free choice, and also the rigid laws of nature. Regarding the possibility of intervening from time to time, you answered that it is a slippery slope, and also asked what the difference is between the suffering of one person and that of many people.
I really do not understand this:
There is a threshold of pain and suffering that is understandable and reasonable in order to sustain the world, so that we will not all be spoiled and so that there will be free choice, etc.
But there is some threshold that could be blocked. The fact that it is hard to define does not mean it is impossible to do even a little of it.
After all, even if there were a policy that when a terrorist decided to rip open the belly of a pregnant woman, he simply could not succeed, at least we would prevent suffering that severe and terrible, no?
So what if it is hard to define? Is that a reason to let human free choice go all the way to the most horrifying ideas?
I really do not understand how a slippery slope is relevant for a being like God. And I do not understand what the problem is with a being like God managing to solve this problem. He is omnipotent, isn’t He?
In my opinion, even a human committee could roughly decide up to what boundary suffering would be allowed, and they would calculate stringently in order to preserve free choice. At least we would prevent the real atrocities. Why shouldn’t there be a definition that things which are clearly not needed for the existence of free choice, like abuse, should simply not be possible?
And also regarding the suffering of many people, I do not understand why that cannot be a criterion for God’s intervention. After all, we assume that God is not interested in suffering in principle. So just as it makes sense to kill one person in order to save a hundred, it makes sense to intervene for the sake of the suffering of an entire people; that carries greater weight. And for example, I think many people would be willing to die in order to prevent, say, a Holocaust from happening. But not many people would be willing to die for the life of one person. One can understand that the suffering of many would require intervention.
3. Regarding the laws of nature, this is even harder for me. Because I truly do not understand how it harms rigid laws if most of the time there is no intervention.
Take, for example, the earthquake in Turkey. God could have intervened and no one would have known. Fifty thousand people would have remained alive. And millions more would not have lost family members. Where exactly would science and our tools of thought have been harmed? It would have been a small change that no one would have noticed, and the world would have continued with rigid laws without any problem. I do not think science would have collapsed. So some particle in the ground would have moved right instead of left, and so on.
And likewise regarding the mutation of coronavirus. That would have been a small intervention that would not have changed anything in our lives in terms of the laws, and it would have prevented suffering beyond description. All in all, somewhere in China a tiny germ would have disappeared from the belly of a bat. Where is the damage?
And again: even if one cannot intervene every time, why have a policy of never intervening? Why not prevent what can be prevented? At least a little, in part.
This is like an IDF soldier who says now that he will not defend the country because in any case many have already died.
4. Regarding the claim of collective punishment.
As much as I thought about it, I did not understand how this could be moral.
It would be one thing if you argued that the Jewish people or the whole world is one soul that split up, and therefore it is one entity that suffers for what another part did, like a hand suffering because of a decision made by the brain.
But you are not arguing that. And intuitively I do not understand how it is possible to punish someone for something he did not do. So what if he is part of a collective? It really feels wrong. If I did not sin and I had no way whatsoever to prevent the other person’s sin, why should I suffer?
Thank you very much. Your investment is evident, and the benefit is very great.
Y
Answer
- It does undermine it, but there are still good reasons to assume His goodness (both in terms of what He demands of us and the verses as well). Therefore, in the end, if there is an explanation that resolves the difficulty, it is more reasonable to remain with the assumption that He is good.
- The basic slippery-slope argument is not about God but about us. At what point will it no longer be difficult for us to accept? What level of intervention would justify His goodness? Beyond that, even regarding God Himself, I argue that He does not intervene at all, and presumably He has His reasons. And if He were to intervene, why would He not prevent all evil? After all, intervention is not difficult for Him. Presumably the consideration of leaving us free choice outweighs that. As I wrote, this is not a perfect explanation, but it softens the difficulty.
- Same as above. Why intervene for great evil and not for small evil? Either one prevents evil or one does not. By the way, it is possible that He does intervene sometimes. I cannot rule that out.
- I did not understand what you are referring to. What did I write about collective punishment?
Discussion on Answer
My claim that He is not involved was not made in order to solve the problem of evil. It is a result of reflecting on what happens in the world. It seems clear that it is conducted according to the laws of nature. For the problem of evil, I suggested answers that you can find on the site.
Thank you.
1. So at what level of probability is God good? Like the probability that He exists? Like the probability of the event at Mount Sinai?
And if He is evil to some extent, does morality have any weight at all?
2. I do not understand the argument, “When will it no longer be difficult for us to accept?” Right now, from a sober perspective, the suffering is excessive, and it seems that it could be reduced. By how much? I do not know.
But this is a serious difficulty: why not reduce some of it?
The fact that I cannot point exactly to the line does not mean there is no level of suffering that everyone would agree could be dispensed with. So let at least that be done. That is the difficulty.
I do not understand what the consideration of free choice has to do with this.
If we can preserve free choice, for example, 80% of the time, and cancel the rest of that freedom in order to prevent suffering that is truly not right and not fitting, then that should be done.
And if that is not done, and evil is allowed to run wild, that is a difficulty.
And likewise regarding natural evil in relation to the laws of nature.
3. There is room to intervene for the sake of great evil, because deeper suffering even for one person, or greater suffering in terms of the number of people, is understood by many people as a reason for more serious action, like giving charity or taking serious action.
And like the examples I mentioned, that one kills one person to save a hundred. And likewise that a person would give up his life to save tens of thousands, but not one person.
4. You also wrote regarding a collective pursuer, and also regarding free choice, that God handed the world over to humanity, and therefore if the Nazis choose evil, I suffer because of the behavior of the human collective.
This really is not clear to me.
As much as I thought about it, I did not understand how this could be moral.
It would be one thing if you argued that the Jewish people or the whole world is one soul that split up, and therefore it is one entity that suffers for what another part did, like a hand suffering because of a decision made by the brain.
But you are not arguing that. And intuitively I do not understand how it is possible to punish someone for something he did not do. So what if he is part of a collective? It really feels wrong. If I did not sin and I had no way whatsoever to prevent the other person’s sin, why should I suffer?
We are repeating ourselves. I explained what I had to say, and I added that this is not a perfect solution to the difficulty, but it certainly reduces it a great deal. That is all.
As for humanity as a collective, that does not depend on metaphysics (whether one sees it as a single entity). Even if it is not a single entity, one can still relate to it as a group of responsibility. Like a class, or a community, or a city.
Thank you very much.
I didn’t quite understand what is gained by the assumption that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene in the world, since as far as the Holy One, blessed be He, is concerned, non-intervention is equivalent to something being done with His “approval,” and in the final analysis the problem of evil in the world (philosophically speaking) still exists.