Question

The Shakh, in his rules of doubts, brings the well-known rule that a double doubt that cannot be reversed is not considered a double doubt. He gives the example of an animal that was slaughtered and then a bone was found that was not covered by flesh, which is a sign of a non-kosher fatal defect. The doubt is whether this happened before the slaughter or after the slaughter, and if you say it was after the slaughter, perhaps it did not protrude outward. The Shakh writes about this that it is impossible to begin the doubt with the second doubt—whether it protruded outward or not—since if you say that it did protrude outward, then it necessarily follows that we are dealing with a case after the slaughter, because before the slaughter it makes no practical difference to me whether it protruded outward or not.
My question is: if conceptually, when I say that it protruded outward I must be speaking about after the slaughter, does that also mean that probabilistically there is more reason to assume it is non-kosher? Or are the rules of double doubt not probabilistic but conceptual?