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Q&A: Biblical Niddah Status Nowadays

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Biblical Niddah Status Nowadays

Question

Good evening,
A. How can biblical niddah apply nowadays, given that women today do not feel either a bodily tremor, or the flow of something moist, and all the more so the opening of the womb?
The most I’ve seen is the Divrei Yatziv (the Sanz-Klausenburger Rebbe), who combines this claim as a leniency.
In the same way that nowadays there are no utensils that absorb, and there are all the reasons to cancel entirely the laws of meat and milk and other prohibitions involving utensils, so too with the prohibition of niddah we could lower the entire prohibition to rabbinic status, and there would be major practical ramifications.
I’d be happy to hear your opinion, because I see clearly that all the halakhic decisors (even some who are less conservative) do not support this at all!!!
How long can we keep this up?
B. There is a gloss of the Rema in Yoreh De'ah 198:18 (if I remember correctly) requiring immersion without long fingernails, even if they were clean, as a matter of custom, since there are those who would not clean under the nail, and dirt found not opposite the flesh invalidates the immersion. (There is a dispute there between the Taz and the Shakh how to understand the Rema: whether he follows the view of the Ra'avan that fingernails must be cut back to the place where the flesh and the nail connect, or whether he agrees with most medieval authorities that fundamentally there is no obligation to cut them, since they are part of the body.) Nowadays, even according to the Ra'avan, since there are many women (even religious ones) who grow their nails long, perhaps one can be lenient? If so, could you explain to me what the reason would be?

Answer

A. Simply speaking, in fact it is not biblical. The same is true with utensils: what is known not to absorb does not absorb. What the halakhic decisors think does not really matter. If they have convincing arguments, then fine, of course.
B. Customs are customs. There is no need to exaggerate them. When circumstances change, there is no reason to preserve a custom that was practiced under different circumstances. There are very many examples of this, even regarding fully binding Jewish laws.

Discussion on Answer

Yaacov Meyer (2024-01-05)

Wait, so in the laws of niddah do you conduct yourself as though everything is rabbinic? And if not, why not? The same should apply to utensils.

Can you give examples of customs that were ignored after a change in circumstances, even in conservative halakhic rulings?

Michi (2024-01-05)

The reason they were stringent is probably that the sensation is a sign, not a cause. And the proof is that there are cases of Torah-level impurity even without sensation, such as when she found blood in an internal examination. So we see that if it is clear that it came from the source, then she is impure even without sensation. And if in our times women do not feel it, that means nature has changed and the blood comes from the source without sensation. Consequently there is Torah-level impurity even without sensation.

As for your second question, see my article “Annulment of Enactments Nowadays.”

Rash (2024-01-07)

To add a bit to the discussion about sensation: when I studied the passage, it seemed to me that most medieval authorities and halakhic decisors hold that sensation is a cause. Maharam of Lublin proves this from the words of Maimonides, who writes: “And if she did not feel, but checked and found the blood inside the corridor, behold it is presumed to have come with sensation.” He did not write, after all, that it is because it is clear that it came from her. And so too the plain wording of the medieval authorities in their legal works, such as Nachmanides and the Raavad, that sensation is a cause; and this is also the implication of the Taz at the beginning of section 190.

The reason an internal examination renders her forbidden is that we are concerned lest the bodily sensation be confused with the sensation of the cloth, since blood is presumed to come with sensation (see the above Maimonides).

Arukh HaShulchan, and following him Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, write that there is sensation in their times too, except that women do not understand what is being referred to. What I understood from Rabbi Moshe’s responsum is that once the woman knows with certainty that her menstrual period began without checking her clothes, we assume there was sensation.

But it is still difficult: why don’t they explain to them what kind of sensation is being discussed, rather than estimating when they have it? And also, does this presumption apply today even to a tiny drop of blood, with practical ramifications for an internal examination?

I found an interesting article that brings survey results on the matter of sensation in our times, here: https://www.machonso.org/hamaayan/?gilayon=56&id=1672

Yaacov Meyer (2024-01-08)

To Michi,
Listen, I don’t understand what you’re saying, but in the Talmud it is explained that through examination we can attribute the sensation to the sensation of the cloth, and therefore she is impure.
That is not a source for saying that there is a case where a woman becomes impure without sensation.
I simply didn’t understand what you were hinting at with that.

Michi (2024-01-08)

I wasn’t hinting; I wrote it explicitly. If the sensation is a sign and not a cause, that explains the stringency of contemporary halakhic decisors to deem her impure without sensation. Regarding internal examination and other possible cases of impurity without sensation, one can discuss each of them.

Yaacov Meyer (2024-01-08)

Could you clarify your last sentence for me?
(Sorry for bothering you—I just don’t understand.)
Besides that, is it possible to get a digital copy of No Man Has Control Over the Wind, since I bought the book?

Michi (2024-01-08)

I meant that an internal examination without sensation was an example of impurity without sensation, and there are others. And one can discuss each of them: whether sensation is a sign or a cause.
Contact me by email.

Yaacov Meyer (2024-01-08)

Could you send me a link to what you wrote in response to Yitzhak Shilat’s criticism of the second book in your trilogy?

Michi (2024-01-09)

I assume you mean Rabbi Yitzhak Shilat? It would be proper to refer to him that way.
You can simply search the site:

אין אדם שליט ברוח – תגובה לביקורתו של הרב שילת (טור 340)

Itzik (2024-01-10)

The strongest proof is the laws of menstrual cycles, where it is explicitly assumed that niddah impurity is possible even though the woman does not know that she bled. And although sensation is not a sign that the blood came from the source, it is the cause that this is considered “menstrual bleeding” and not merely a discharge; therefore, on days fit for menstrual bleeding, the lack of sensation is not an obstacle.

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