Q&A: On the Relationship Between Torah-Level Commandments, Reasons, and Validity — On the Prohibition of Niddah
On the Relationship Between Torah-Level Commandments, Reasons, and Validity — On the Prohibition of Niddah
Question
Hello Rabbi.
Is there a connection between the reason for a commandment and the force of the commandment? That is, when the reason for a commandment no longer applies, does the commandment itself also lapse—is there such a relationship between them?
A specific question regarding the prohibition of niddah: following my reading of the book "Forbidden Sex, Permitted Sex," the author argues that the reason for the prohibition of niddah is anachronistic. It arose out of the patriarchal thinking of that time, in which the man was seen as the exclusive source of seed and procreation, and menstruation was viewed as a kind of death. Death was attributed to menstruation, and procreation and death must not be mixed; therefore the prohibition of intercourse with a niddah was created. Today, after science has cleared our minds of magical beliefs about a woman's menstruation and discovered that procreation is shared by both sexes, menstruation is associated not with death but with procreation, and therefore there is no reason to prohibit a niddah.
1. I am not claiming that she is right and that this is indeed the reason for the prohibition, but if she is right—what is the relationship between that reason and the validity of the prohibition of intercourse with a niddah?
2. Is there any other reasonable, rational explanation for the prohibition of intercourse with a niddah?
Answer
- You can’t separate the questions. If this is an explicit law in the Torah, then it is based on true assumptions (the Holy One, blessed be He, knows reality, and what and who causes procreation). If you have reached the conclusion that the assumptions are not true, then the question is not about this specific law but about the Torah in general.
- It would, however, be possible to raise the argument that there is no mistake on God’s part here; rather, the prohibition was originally stated for people whose worldview was like that, and for them it was appropriate to observe the prohibition. But today, when our worldview is different, the prohibition has lapsed. This approach seems problematic to me. It comes up in clearly moral contexts, such as the beautiful captive woman, where some argue that today this no longer applies because of new moral norms.
- I don’t know.
Discussion on Answer
2. Yes.
1. Indeed, the criterion used by those who make such claims is unclear, but I am not inclined to accept those claims. That is, in my opinion even with regard to the beautiful captive woman, it is not correct to say that. See Column 15 on the site. My argument is that the Torah’s determination is that there is no halakhic prohibition, but the moral question remains in place, and it may depend on the reality and norms accepted in that context.
Beyond that, the claim about the prohibition of niddah itself seems to me highly speculative (as is the way of critics of this sort).
Understood. Thank you very much for the response.
Here is support for the claim that the author's argument that niddah is associated with death is speculative. Yaakov Nagan, for example, argues exactly the opposite:
And it would be worth looking at Maimonides’ comments—I don’t have time to search for them—about how the Torah was very lenient regarding the practices of niddah impurity that were common among other nations at the time it was given. From there he argues that it was דווקא liberalism that gave rise to the laws of niddah—that they sought to leave only a small remnant of the customary laws, because abolishing them entirely was not possible.
Thank you very much for the answer.
1. I’m asking from the perspective of point 2 in your answer—
You wrote that “this approach seems problematic to me” — is that because of the eternity of the Torah? Can I ask what the reason is for the problematic nature of it? After all, just as the beautiful captive woman stems from a cultural norm, she argues that the prohibition of niddah stemmed from a certain cultural belief about women.
P.S. I also think it’s problematic to say this, but I don’t know how to explain why.
2. What is your answer to the question: why was a niddah prohibited in intercourse? Because that is what God wanted?