Rabbi Michi, you wrote that the Torah could have used the term “metal,” and since it did not do so, one can derive from that.
In Column 414 you brought the Talmud in Yoma: “Reish Lakish said: Why was no warning stated regarding affliction? Because it was impossible. How should the Merciful One write it? If the Merciful One were to write ‘he shall not eat,’ eating is by an olive-bulk. If the Merciful One were to write ‘you shall not be afflicted,’ that would imply: get up and eat.” And you asked: but every punishment requires a warning. And you answered that “in a place where there is a difficulty of formulation, etc., there one may infer from the fact that the Torah writes a punishment that there is also a prohibition.” Seemingly, the question here about metals can be presented similarly: ‘in a place where there is a difficulty of formulation, one cannot infer from the fact that the Torah writes many details that each one has independent significance.’
(And there I tried to argue categorically that constraints of formulation can in no way affect laws, because the Holy One could create new concepts and a new word could now come into being. And you rejected that by saying that “there may be other constraints that dictated the structure of the holy tongue, and for whatever reasons He did not want to depart from them.”)

Tirgitz, thank you very much.
Just as there, because there is a difficulty of formulation, they departed from the usual rules,
so too here, because there is a difficulty of formulation (of a different sort), we should depart from the rule that each detail needs its own reason.
Rabbi Michi’s answer is: since the difficulty of formulation applies only to the command to the soldiers, the Torah could have formulated it differently for future generations, shortening the list of metals and teaching the rest by general-detail-general.
The question is whether that is the Torah’s way of doing things.

B.K., maybe I missed something. Sorry for the length.

Rabbi Michi argued that the limits of understanding of the people of that generation are not a formulation difficulty that should affect the Torah. Because it would have been possible to explain it to them outside the Torah, while in the Torah, for future generations, it could be written precisely — that is, the list of metals could be shortened. Therefore, from each of the details that do appear, something should indeed be excluded. That seems completely correct to me, and I wasn’t addressing that.

I was addressing your other remark. If I understood correctly, you said that if the intention is to include all metal vessels beyond the six, then why didn’t the Torah simply and briefly say, “every metal vessel you shall pass through fire”? And you said that this is because the word “metal” was not familiar then. In other words, Scripture bent its language by several words because the Torah, which was directed to the people of that generation, could not create new words and concepts.
And to that too Rabbi Michi said that even if the people of that generation did not know the word “metal,” the Torah still could have coined that word and used it. And since it did not do so, but instead wrote all the details, we should infer various exclusions.
And about that I asked: if the Torah can coin words, meaning one cannot justify awkward Torah formulations on the basis of limits in vocabulary, then what are we to make of Reish Lakish’s statement in that Talmudic passage, that the Torah could not find a formulation that would express a warning regarding affliction on Yom Kippur (according to Rabbi Michi’s understanding in that column)?
And it seems to me that Rabbi Michi means that the limitations of the people of that generation are irrelevant, but limitations of the holy tongue are relevant. And the word “metal” is in fact part of the holy tongue — anything that melts in fire into liquid — and therefore the Torah could have used that term; unlike a warning regarding affliction, which already goes beyond the vocabulary or syntax of the holy tongue, and there the Torah could not use such a formulation.

[And my own position is that there is a clear distinction. The Torah cannot use a new term like “metal,” but it can use a new term that expresses a warning against not afflicting oneself. That is because an abstract concept expressing a generalization is not self-defined, but only defined through the generalization, and in that way it is also more precise — as Rabbi Michi says regarding casuistry in the Talmud (and in the Torah). But a formulation that would say there is a prohibition against not afflicting oneself — there is no problem at all simply declaring, for example, that in updated holy-tongue usage “lo tishta’anenu” means a prohibition against not afflicting oneself, and writing that in the Torah. Rather, the Torah chose to teach the warning regarding affliction by derivation and not by inventing a new word.]

Is there any Talmudic passage that deals with the question of including additional metals? One that mentions a detail-and-general derivation regarding those verses?

Thanks for the clarification.
The word “metal” is familiar to you from the language of the Sages, but it does not exist in biblical Hebrew. More than that: even in neighboring languages of that period, such a concept did not exist. So there is no reason the Torah would use it.

As for the second question — whether Moses spoke separately outside the Torah and then wrote in the Torah what suited future generations — that needs proof. Many sections of the Torah would have been written very differently, or would not have been said at all, had they been reformulated for future generations. For example, in the commandment of the red heifer, Eleazar the priest would not have been mentioned; rather it would have said the deputy priest or the High Priest, depending on the tannaitic dispute. Why didn’t the Torah change its wording and write it more clearly?

As for your question about metals: such a derivation does not appear in the words of the Sages. It is my own suggestion for how to interpret the verse in this way.

Clearly “metal” is rabbinic Hebrew. But I said it only according to Rabbi Michi’s view in the answer in Column 414, that the holy tongue is defined on its own terms and may have hidden constraints, so perhaps “metal” is part of that defined holy tongue.

On the contrary, your claim — that one can draw halakhic conclusions from incidental formulation constraints imposed on the Torah — is the claim that requires very strong proof. In every dispute and ambiguity, the Torah could have formulated things unambiguously, and therefore it is hard to derive halakhic conclusions from this general claim. Simply speaking — at least in my eyes — the rules of derivation and interpretation are supposed to apply to the Torah as it stands.
By the way, more generally regarding separate statements made outside the Torah, I vaguely remember that in one of Rabbi Benamozegh’s books he tries to find sources in the Written Torah for the idea that alongside it there were also oral teachings. I recall that he had at least one convincing proof there, though I don’t remember it either. (But it seems that his point is relevant against Karaites, who claim that the Oral Torah arose later. Whereas deniers today argue the opposite — that the Written Torah arose later, and of course there were many other traditions and ritual practices around it that preceded it.)

Of course we learn from the Torah as it stands, and generally we do not take formulation constraints and the like into account. Therefore I think the verse should indeed be interpreted as general-detail-general. However, a specific principle within this derivation says that one must give an explanation for all the details. Simply speaking, this principle is based on the idea that there is no superfluous word in the Torah, and that the Torah is concise in its speech. Therefore, if the verse was stated in order to teach by general-detail-general, and that could have been done with fewer words, the Torah would have formulated it that way. But in our case this specific principle within the derivation is not correct, because the words are not superfluous.
Is this principle — that each detail requires an explanation — a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai? Or is it a reasoning of the Sages, which should be considered in light of context?
My novelty is the sort of thing that would fit being said by medieval authorities — that is, it is a line of reasoning of the kind medieval authorities often say, and by that they would limit a rule stated in the Talmud on the basis of reasoning. But I have not found it among the medieval authorities.

Rabbi Michi,
I think I have proof that the Torah leaves the original wording in place and does not “correct” it. For example, in the section of the red heifer, the command is addressed to Eleazar the priest. The tannaim in Sifrei argue whether for future generations it must be the High Priest and one cannot learn from the fact that it was Eleazar, or whether even for future generations it need not specifically be the High Priest. In other words, they disagreed about what can be learned from the command of that generation. But everyone agrees that it need not be a priest actually named Eleazar, because obviously he is mentioned because the command was said to that generation.
And from this it follows that the Torah leaves the wording as is and does not update it, even though that would have made it easier for us to understand the verse.

[B.K., forgive me for butting in. You need proof that these considerations affect halakhic derivation — that is, that we interpret based on the writer’s rationale. And perhaps there is proof against your reasoning, namely that the detailing of the metals does follow the normal rules of interpretation and was not stated merely to explain fully, because of the limited understanding of the people of that generation, something that was not really needed.
After all, they derive laws from the doubled stipulation Moses made with the children of Gad and the children of Reuben, and they do not say perhaps he simply went to the trouble of explaining it to them fully in a way that was unnecessary. And when it says to the sons of Aaron, “Do not let your heads grow wild,” they derive from the fact that the verse was needed that an ordinary mourner is forbidden to cut his hair; they do not say it was stated to the sons of Aaron as a full explanation of something unnecessary. And when the Torah detailed to Aaron the defects that disqualify his descendants for future generations, the Sages learned from every defect to include others as Nachmanides brings there on Leviticus 21; they did not say perhaps it was said to them as a full explanation of something unnecessary. Seemingly the rule is that for all matters of derivation, we have only the Torah as it stands, not that it was written for future generations in a way that included something superfluous because of the limited understanding of that generation.]

Tirgitz, more power to you for butting in 🙂
When the doubled stipulation was said to the children of Gad, the Sages learned from it that this is how one should act in the laws of stipulations. And from what was said to the sons of Aaron, that this is how mourners conduct themselves. In other words, the rule that applied in the wilderness is the rule that applies for future generations.
In our case, I am not talking about the halakhic principle itself — and certainly whatever became impure in Midian transmits impurity for future generations as well.
I am talking about the Torah’s mode of formulation, which does not directly concern the law but rather the mode of derivation. Since one may assume that there is no halakhah given to Moses at Sinai in the derivation of general-detail-general requiring an explanation for every detail, and rather this is simply a reasoning: if one speaks generally, there is no need to specify details for no reason; therefore if the Torah did specify them, one cannot remain only with what is learned from the generality. But since here there is another reason to spell out all the details, the reasoning stated in the general-detail-general derivation is locally displaced.
And if you’d like, I’d be happy to let you read what I wrote about the metals and hear your opinion.

The proofs I tried to bring do in fact deal with the Torah’s mode of formulation when it does not directly concern the law, where there is a quotation of speech addressed to a specific person or people of that generation. I understood you to be saying that in the case of the impurity of metals, since these are not ordinary Torah verses but a quotation of what was said in that generation to the men of war, then perhaps here “superfluous” words are quoted which in truth could have been shortened and omitted, except that to that generation the matter was said at greater length, and therefore that is also how it appears in the Torah. And against that I tried to bring three proofs that the Sages derive law from “superfluous” speech said to people of that generation, and do not judge it as merely unnecessary added explanation. I’d be glad to look at what you wrote on the subject.