Q&A: Reason and Action
Reason and Action
Question
Hello Rabbi, I’m trying to find some guiding principle for myself that will help me understand when a certain law should be treated as the concrete act that must be done, and when a certain law should be treated in terms of the reason behind it, which is what matters in practice. One example among many:
“A person must say three things in his household” — some halakhic decisors say that nowadays there is no need to ask specifically those things, because they are less relevant, but in general one should make sure before the Sabbath that everything is in order. That is, here there is reference to the reason behind the law.
By contrast,
“One who does work on Sabbath eves…” — here we see reference to the law as an act in practice, and we do not say to act according to the reason behind it. For example, for someone who says that the reason is to prepare the Sabbath needs calmly, then according to the previous example the halakhic decisors should have said here: prepare the Sabbath needs calmly.
Answer
There is a similar but more fundamental question: how do we know at all what is a law and what is merely a recommendation. I’m not sure that the things one is supposed to say are actually a law. But it is obvious that there is no point in saying something with no meaning. That is not like performing an action because that is what was instituted. It is like what Rabbi Chaim says on Maimonides, that in prayer there is the intention of the words, in addition to the intention to fulfill one’s obligation that exists in all commandments. That is because speech without intention is not speech. So too in our case.
Discussion on Answer
Is what a person must say in his household a halakhic instruction? It looks like a good recommendation. So how do you know whether this is Jewish law or a recommendation? Your question assumes that it is Jewish law, and I am claiming that there is a more fundamental question: is this Jewish law at all? I do not have a general criterion for distinguishing between Jewish law and a recommendation, and therefore it is also hard to determine when one follows the reason behind the law. In Torah-level laws, we do not “derive the reason of the verse,” meaning we do not interpret the law according to its reason. But in rabbinic laws there is more room for that. These three statements are at most a rabbinic law (if this is Jewish law at all).
After that I also suggested an explanation even on the assumption that this is Jewish law. I said that when there is a law that deals with speech, intention is necessary there in order for the act to have meaning. When you put on tefillin, at most you need the intention to fulfill your obligation. But in prayer you also need the intention of the words. Why? Because putting on tefillin is an action, and if you put on tefillin then the action was done, even if you did not think about the purpose for which you are putting them on. But speech without intending what you are saying is not speech at all. Therefore, saying those three things in a place where they are not relevant has no value whatsoever. In speech, the intention is an essential part of the matter.
Thank you very much, Rabbi. I understood the point about whether the rule is Jewish law or a recommendation.
As for the question I asked, you addressed a specific example of the explanation for why in that case they relate to the essence behind the act of the law, because it involves speech, and speech without intention has no value where it is not relevant.
If we say that regarding this law, what about the Amidah prayer or reading the Megillah on Purim? Can one relate to the essence behind them (according to whichever view seems logical to you) and follow that, since here too we are dealing with speech? For example, one could say that the purpose of the Megillah is publicizing the miracle, but nowadays its language is not so well understood, so let’s publicize the miracle in a way that is understood; or the same with the Amidah…
But that helps in understanding one issue out of thousands of different laws where one needs to know whether here the act that was stated must be done, or only the reason behind it. Maybe here too there is no fundamental criterion one can rely on? It’s really hard to learn without fundamental criteria… how does one do this at all?
You are mixing things up. The Megillah is completely clear and there is no problem at all with the publicizing of the miracle that it accomplishes. So I do not see a difficulty. The same is true of the Shemoneh Esrei prayer. Clearly, if you have another way, even a better one, to publicize the miracle, that is irrelevant. This is what they enacted.
A general discussion is not constructive. Specifically the examples make it easier to discuss.
Thank you, Rabbi, but that is exactly what I am trying to understand: why regarding the Megillah would you say that a better way to publicize the miracle is irrelevant, but regarding the three things (for the sake of the example, let us assume it is Jewish law) one can say that because the questions are less relevant, one can make sure everything is in order for the Sabbath in another way?
Also, I am sure there are better examples, but none come to mind. I am trying to understand the principle: when is it possible to give up the act and do something else while sticking to the principle, and when not—or is there no such rule?
And if there is no such rule, how can one learn? Invent my own rule?
We are repeating ourselves. I cannot discuss such a general question. Each case is judged on its own merits. That’s it, I’m done.
Thank you very much, Rabbi, but unfortunately I didn’t really understand the answer. I’d be glad for some further explanation.