At the end of the book you discuss the topic of commitment to Jewish law. You conduct that discussion with Hillel, a Jew who grew up in Jewish society.

My question is whether those same considerations apply to every person in the world, or whether they have a sociological context. If you were to meet a Chinese person who had never heard of Judaism, and he asked you what the possible source of his obligation would be to observe the Noahide commandments, would you say the considerations are the same?

That is, a religious obligation based on trust in the historical core of the revelation at Mount Sinai? Even though the first time he hears that story is from you, and he has no known personal/familial/communal tradition?

And if that man converts, what about his son?

Now I understand. The Chinese person can rely on the Jewish tradition. The fact that he hears it from me should not lead him to an immediate decision. If he is not convinced, he can examine the Jewish tradition on his own.
Of course, all this is on the basis of Maimonides’ view that there is no religious value to observing the Noahide commandments unless it is done out of commitment to the command given at Sinai. The mere observance itself, if we ignore the religious motivation, does not require tradition or revelation. These are moral commandments and belief in God. One can arrive at that directly as well.
I didn’t understand your question about his son. How is he different from him?

Because his son is obligated not only in a few basic and fairly intuitive commandments, but in the whole Jewish rigmarole.

Let’s suppose the son accepts that the Sinai revelation took place, and that the descendants of the Israelites who stood there really are obligated in the 613 commandments, and everyone else really is obligated in the Noahide commandments. He still asks himself—and you—why he belongs to the first category. His ancestors did not stand at Sinai. God did not command his ancestors to observe all His commandments and pass them on to their descendants. He has a hard time understanding why he has to observe all the commandments just because of the whim of his father and mother, who happened to get excited about Judaism.

He himself has to examine the same things his parents examined. Just as every Jew has to do. Should the son of a Jew be obligated to what his parents obligated themselves to? Why? If he examines it and concludes that it is not true, he will not observe it. And so too with the Chinese man’s son.

Now for the punchline: if he discovers that he is obligated to what his parents obligated themselves to, it may follow that the basis of obligation to the commandments is obligation to one’s parents.

Maybe the conclusion is that you too are obligated in the commandments mainly because you are obligated to your parents.

It could be the other way around: you are obligated in the commandments, Jewish law tells you that if your father converted then you too are a Jew, and therefore because of a general obligation to the commandments you are forced here to honor your father’s will. That’s one option.

But if, after a deep inquiry, the convert’s son discovers that the reason is because he is obligated to his father, that conclusion is certainly called for.

Exactly your “it could be.” I don’t see any punchline here. You don’t owe your parents anything in this sense. If you examined it and they were wrong, then don’t do anything. If they were right, then you act because it is right, not because your parents said so.