Q&A: Will Jewish Law Soon Permit Electronics on the Sabbath?
Will Jewish Law Soon Permit Electronics on the Sabbath?
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I came across an interesting article titled: "Will Jewish law soon permit electronics on the Sabbath?" published in Makor Rishon. The article contains a major novel idea from Rabbi Rabinovitch:
From here Rabbi Rabinovitch arrived at his main innovation: in order to apply the status of a prohibited labor to an electrical action whose results are not one of the thirty-nine categories of labor, and thereby forbid it on the Sabbath, two conditions are required: first, that there be a concrete human action that can be recognized and identified, and second, that there be a perceptible result. As proof for his view he cites the law of "winnowing with the wind assisting him" — "A person shakes a winnowing shovel with his hand, and the grain is tossed by the wind. The person’s action is recognizable as an act done in the normal manner of the labor, and it is evident in the grain that the labor of winnowing was performed on it and the refuse was removed from it."
But if there is no combination of a concrete action and a concrete result, then there is no prohibition. Hence, when a person walks past an electric door, "it is clear that no category of labor applies to this human action, which is nothing more than walking in his ordinary way, and walking in itself is not identified with any of the thirty-nine categories of labor, nor does his walking hint at any labor at all, and furthermore the person is not intending by this walking to perform any labor from among the thirty-nine categories. Therefore, even when he walks toward the door intending to pass through it, and even if there is no other way and it is certain that by his walking the door will open, even immediately — opening a door is not a prohibited labor; therefore this is permitted from the outset, and indeed it even contributes to Sabbath enjoyment." He goes on to extend this to all devices activated by smart sensors: "Could one even imagine decreeing against actions that are in no way labors at all, and whose results bear no resemblance to labor, especially when the person does not perform any action that hints at labor, while preventing them would cause not only discomfort but even real suffering? What is there to be concerned about here?"
What is your opinion of this novel idea?
Best regards,
Answer
I tend to agree (I think I already wrote this here once), but in my opinion the reasoning doesn’t really hold water, or at least it is too vague.
Why is a person who walks and thereby triggers a light via a sensor different from a person who shakes a winnowing shovel and, with the help of the wind, an act of sorting is produced? The difference is intention, not whether there is an act of labor here or a result of labor. So leave aside all this talk about an act of labor and a result of labor. The moment a person is minding his own business and something completely incidental causes some result from that, it is even less significant than unintentional involvement; and even in a case of unintentional involvement, according to all opinions except Rabbi Akiva Eiger, there is no prohibition.
Another formulation (maybe this is what he meant?…): when an ordinary passerby looks at the person and says, "He is walking," not "He is turning on a light indirectly," then there is no act of turning on a light here, only an act of walking. This is even less direct than walking in the street and tearing leaves with one’s body as one walks. There, he himself performs the action, though unwittingly. That is unintentional involvement. Here, he is not involved at all in the prohibited action. Something else, external to him, causes it. True, that is also the case in "winnowing with the wind assisting him," but there the intention — after all, the shaking is done so that the wind will do the sorting — turns the action of the wind into part of his own action.
Discussion on Answer
I’m not talking about an intentional act aimed at opening a door by means of a sensor. That is a different discussion (and that too can be analyzed. On the face of it, it resembles "winnowing with the wind assisting him"). Here I was talking about someone walking down the street and activating various sensors like lighting, a camera, and the like.
It seems to me that Rabbi Rabinovitch, as quoted, actually did mean an intentional act: https://musaf-shabbat.com/2016/07/24/%D7%A9%D7%91%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%94-%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%97/
If we are dealing with an intentional act, then the discussion is completely different. The question is whether a remote automatic result can be attributed to my action or considered part of it. There is room for such reasoning, but again, I don’t see in this passage an argument that helps explain that.
Walking on top of grass, which is forbidden on the Sabbath?
I didn’t understand the connection or the point.
That too is not an intentional act, yet it was forbidden.
If it isn’t intended to uproot, then it is an unintended act. And if he does not even know there is grass there, or that it could be uprooted, then it is unintentional involvement and permitted. In any case, that is an action done with his own body itself and not something external, so it is irrelevant to our issue.
In the responsum regarding a light with a motion sensor at this link:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9D-%D7%97%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%9F-%D7%AA%D7%A0%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%94/
There you wrote the reasoning that a person cannot forbid something that does not belong to him. My question is: what would the law be if I want to visit a friend (secular) on Friday night, he lives nearby, and at the entrance to his house there is a lamp that turns on automatically as soon as someone approaches the front door. In Peninei Halakha it says this:
"One must disconnect the lamp that turns on when someone passes along the access path to the house, because the passerby derives benefit from the light that turns on. And even if he derives no benefit from it, it is not respectful to the Sabbath to cause a lamp to be lit. In pressing circumstances, when the system is operating and there is no other way to enter the house, one may pass there by crawling, in a way that perhaps will not cause the lamp to turn on; and even if it is almost certain that his crawling will activate the lamp, this will be done in an unusual manner. In addition, he should close his eyes so as not to derive any benefit at all from the light that turns on, and open them only slightly so that he will not stumble on the way."
Seemingly, according to what you wrote here, one would be allowed to pass normally at the entrance to the house without crawling and without closing one’s eyes (and not only in pressing circumstances), right?
I was talking about a light that turns on when I walk in the street. If we are dealing with a case where he benefits from the light, that is a different story. There is room for the reasoning that one should try not to benefit from it. Though I’m not sure about that, because if this really is not a transgression, then there is no benefit here from an act done on the Sabbath. But there is a line of reasoning that the benefit creates intention (as in an inevitable result that is advantageous to him, and the reasoning that he in any case benefits, etc.).
I don’t understand why this needs to get so complicated. Seemingly one should be allowed from the outset to press a button that opens an electric door, as Rabbi Auerbach showed that the very act of operating an electrical device on the Sabbath is not in itself a prohibited labor (I think he disagreed with the Chazon Ish).
All halakhic decisors agree that it is forbidden, although for most of them it is rabbinically prohibited. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman did not think there was a Torah-level prohibition of building here, but as far as I know he did not permit it. I heard in his name some tentative thoughts regarding electricity on a Jewish holiday, and even there he did not instruct people to permit it in practice.
There are problems with the proposals to forbid it because of creating a new entity, and reasons to hesitate about instituting new rabbinic restrictions in our times, so I seem to remember seeing that Rabbi Auerbach permitted use in pressing circumstances (he instructed his mother to turn a hearing device on and off so that the battery would not run out). Seemingly the more serious problem is benefiting from Sabbath desecration by Jews who work for the electric company.
The author of Shevet HaLevi permitted walking in the street when lighting goes on and one benefits from it. When is it forbidden to walk on the Sabbath, and when is it forbidden to open a door on the Sabbath? There is not even a weekday-like activity concern, since otherwise it would lead to Sabbath prohibition. See the responsa Siach Nachum.
It seems to me the matter still needs sharpening:
After all, he does intend the electric opening of the door (assuming he knows it’s a door that opens automatically, and in that respect this is more serious than unintentional involvement). What is the difference between pressing a button to open it and stepping into the sensor’s field of view so that the door will open — which is, after all, exactly his purpose? Does the difference come down only to visibility? To what extent does it look like he is doing some special action?