Q&A: Source for the obligation to give up one’s life to save the public
Source for the obligation to give up one’s life to save the public
Question
1) If a person is forbidden to endanger himself in order to save his fellow, what halakhic source is there that saving the many is different (coming to the aid of Israel against an enemy attacking them), and what is the definition of “the many”?
2) In the ruling you brought about drafting yeshiva students, you cited a statement in the name of Rabbi Elyashiv regarding the Yom Kippur War: “There is no obligatory war and great obligation greater than this.” In the source you cited I did not find such a sentence; I would appreciate it if you could direct me to the correct source.
Answer
I mixed up the quotations. It is taken from Rabbi Zevin’s letter. Rabbi Elyashiv, in his responsum to Rabbi Shilat, wrote that we are dealing with an obligatory war.
Discussion on Answer
1) I’m asking about Maimonides: from where did he derive that with the many it is different?
2) Which halakhic decisors derive it from the martyrs of Lod?
3) With the martyrs of Lod, seemingly they themselves were included in the danger; also in coming to the aid of Israel against an enemy we have no proof regarding a situation where the fighters themselves are not included in the danger.
4) What do you think about October 7—was there an obligation to go and put oneself in danger in order to save people (before the IDF entered the picture)?
1. Sources are lacking—for one who even needs them. “Curse Meroz,” for example.
2. If I remember correctly, I saw it in Tzitz Eliezer and elsewhere.
3. Even if they were, it is clear that giving themselves over to death was beyond the danger that confronted them as part of the public. Besides, we are talking about a situation where they are in the danger. Regarding someone who is not in the danger, I wrote that this is a practical difference between the approach that sees this as an obligatory war, in which everyone is obligated, and my approach, that these are laws of saving life, in which case only one who is in danger is obligated—unless he does not endanger himself in the rescue, in which case he is obligated under the law of a pursuer.
4. There is an army; that is its job. When the army is not functioning, the law of a pursuer applies, and everyone is supposed to do what he can. It is hard to speak about the precise parameters of the obligation, because I am not obligated to go to the ends of the earth if I know that someone there is in danger.
It seems to me that you are insisting on looking for sharp definitions for a situation that is clear and does not need any definition or source.
1. The source is coming to the aid of Israel against an enemy, and that may perhaps refer to the Jewish people as a whole. And some halakhic decisors also learned it from the martyrs of Lod (there it apparently was not the Jewish people as a whole, but the local community). But in a situation where the rescuer himself is also in danger, like in the case at hand, then it is obvious that he must fight, and there is no need to distinguish between the many and an individual.