Q&A: A Reasoning in Your Lectures on the Chapter Chazkat That I Didn’t Understand
A Reasoning in Your Lectures on the Chapter Chazkat That I Didn’t Understand
Question
In your lectures on the chapter Chazkat, in the passage about the relatives of Rav Idi, you discussed Ketzot 34:3 regarding a litigant’s admission. Your view is that Maharibal also holds that a litigant’s admission is a matter of credibility, except that he thinks its basis lies in a person’s ability to obligate himself. You said there that on this basis Rav Chisda’s view would be explained—that one cannot obligate him for the dates of the palm tree, because he already ate the fruit and can no longer give it back (and this would be the practical difference between the Ketzot and Maharibal). I do not understand how the credibility of “it is in his power” disappears because he ate the fruit. How is this different from the law of one who admits part of a claim, where he currently has it in his power to give a new gift corresponding to what he admits, rather than return what he already took? And in general, the claim is for the value of the fruit, not for the fruit itself, and he certainly can still give the value of the fruit even now. [You mentioned that side—that he can give the value of the fruit there—as an explanation of the views of Abaye and Rava and of those who disagree with Rashbam, but I do not understand how one could think otherwise.]
Answer
To my regret, I no longer remember that lecture. It was many years ago. Indeed, in my view Maharibal thinks this is a matter of credibility, because it is impossible to say otherwise—among other reasons because of the Ketzot’s difficulties. I no longer remember the proof from the relatives of Rav Idi. As far as I recall, the admission came after a period of denial (when that person ate the fruit). Once he ate it, he can no longer give the fruit itself, only its value. But if he admits regarding the fruit, yet does not admit that he owes him money, then he has no ability to give it. This is not like an admission regarding a loan, which is simply an admission that he owes him money. Here he is admitting that the fruit belongs to the other person, and the money enters only because the fruit is no longer in existence, so he gives its value instead. But his original admission about the fruit is not valid, and consequently he also does not become obligated for its value. A regular partial admission is usually an admission that he owes money, not necessarily about a specific object.
This somewhat resembles the dispute between Maimonides and Raavad regarding someone who damaged land and made a partial admission—whether he takes an oath on that, or whether it is considered an oath concerning land. The common explanation of the dispute is that they disagree over whether this is a claim about land or a monetary claim for repairing the land. If it is a land claim, then even though the land has already been damaged and now he wants money, one does not take an oath on it. Exactly like the distinction I suggested here.