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Q&A: Statements of the Sages That Don’t Fit Reality

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

Statements of the Sages That Don’t Fit Reality

Question

Hello Rabbi, regarding statements of the Sages that do not fit reality, such as the statement in Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim, section 4: “Our Sages said: one who did any one of all these and did not wash—if he is a Torah scholar, his learning is forgotten, and if he is not a Torah scholar, he loses his mind.” The word “all” refers to the situations in which one must wash one’s hands: one who rises from bed, one who leaves the bathroom, one who leaves the bathhouse, one who cuts his nails, one who removes his shoes, one who touches his feet, one who washes his head, and some say also one who walks among the dead, one who touched a corpse, one who checks his clothes, one who has marital relations, one who touches a louse, and one who touches his body with his hand. But I know quite a few people who are not Torah scholars and do not wash their hands after washing their hair, or after cutting their nails, etc., and they have still not lost their minds. The part about “his learning is forgotten” also seems unrealistic, though that is not so measurable. If so, would it be correct to say that this statement is simply not true (like the idea that lice are generated from decay)? And if so, would that justify changing the Jewish law on this matter?

Answer

First, there is no reason at all to think that everything in the Talmud is correct. Assessments of reality depend on people.
Second, the Jewish law itself does not depend on this. Hand-washing is not meant in order to prevent one’s learning from being forgotten. That is only a consequence that the Sages observed for one who does not wash.
And third, all statements of the type “whoever does X, Y happens to him” should be interpreted similarly to the example brought by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman from the Talmud: “Whoever recites Havdalah over a cup of wine will have male children.” He himself asks: have we not found Jews who recited Havdalah over a cup and did not merit sons? (The Chazon Ish, for example.) And he explains that Havdalah over a cup is a contributing factor toward having sons. But the bottom line is determined by the combined effect of other factors as well. Think about Newton’s law of gravity: a mass located at distance X from another mass develops an acceleration inversely proportional to the square of the distance. Clearly this is not true in any actual situation in reality, since there is always friction and other forces, etc. So does that mean the law is not true? It is completely true; it is just that in addition to it there are other completely true laws that also have an effect. The bottom line is the combination of all the factors (the forces, in this case).
See an article I wrote about ukimtas in the Talmud that develops this idea further (“A Platonic View of Ukimtas”).

Discussion on Answer

Michi (2016-09-19)

Questioner:
Following up on this question,
in the Rema (Yoreh De’ah 265:11) it is brought that one does not give the role of sandak twice to the same person, since serving as sandak is considered like the incense offering, which was not given twice to the same priest.
The Vilna Gaon, in his glosses, wondered about this: “We have never seen a sandak become wealthy.”
Can one similarly question the obligation of hand-washing, since we have never seen that someone who did not wash had his learning forgotten or lost his mind?
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Rabbi:
See my response, where I explain that all these statements are not subject to empirical testing. These words of the Vilna Gaon are very puzzling. Have we seen that one who gives tithes becomes wealthy? Yet about that it is explicitly said, “Test Me now with this.” And so too with the other promises and factual assertions.
It may be that the Vilna Gaon’s intention was to say that this custom has no source or rationale (and perhaps also no basis for the assumption that serving as sandak really brings wealth), and this was simply the polite way he chose to say it.
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Questioner:
If, for the sake of argument, Elijah were to reveal himself to us and say that there is absolutely no connection between hand-washing and forgetting one’s learning or losing one’s mind—would the obligation of hand-washing then lapse? Or did the Sages merely mention the obligation in a threatening way, while the obligation stands even without those threats?
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Rabbi:
Clearly the obligation of hand-washing is a regular halakhic obligation that does not depend on various such outcomes. The threats surrounding it are not the reason for the decree (which depends on impurity). For if one who honors his parents does not merit long life, does the commandment of honoring parents thereby become void? And in general, even if this were the reason for the decree, the accepted halakhic rule is that when the reason lapses, the decree does not lapse.
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Questioner:
The question here is not about washing for the sake of eating bread, but about washing after visiting the bathroom or cutting one’s nails—in other words, as I understand it, the reason for these washings is not impurity and purity (unlike bread). And even if the reason is impurity, what is the problem with remaining impure?

As for “when the reason lapses, the enactment does not lapse,” in another responsum dealing with considerations of evil spirit in Jewish law, you wrote regarding touching the eyes before the morning hand-washing that in your view it is permitted (even though the Sages said it causes blindness), because it does not seem that the Sages were dealing here with mysticism but with physics (as they understood it), and therefore their halakhic authority is not relevant there (even though one could have argued there too that when the reason lapses, the enactment does not lapse). But in any case, why would that same argument—that their halakhic authority is not relevant in physical questions—not apply here as well? If you say that here we are dealing with mystical matters that cannot be disproven, the question still remains regarding Elijah revealing to us that the mystical danger does not exist: would the obligation of hand-washing then lapse (after cutting one’s nails, for example)?
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Rabbi:
Hand-washing after cutting nails is because of an evil spirit (see the commentaries on the Shulchan Arukh, section 4, paragraph 18). Still, forgetting one’s learning and the like are consequences, but apparently not the reason for the law.
When we are dealing with impurity or an evil spirit, it is not necessarily damage, and therefore it seems harder to me to conclude that the Sages were mistaken and cancel the matter without a religious court annulling it (just because it is an error). Indeed, regarding touching the eyes before the morning hand-washing, one could say that, since there it appears to be a warning not to touch because of the consequences (dangers), and not a prohibition. Dangers are a factual matter, and that is why I said what I said. Here too, if they had told us not to do something without hand-washing after cutting nails because of danger, then I would say the same thing. But the hand-washing itself is a halakhic obligation that does not necessarily depend on the consequences mentioned in connection with it. Still, there is room to argue and to see the consequences as the reason for the law (for the Shulchan Arukh itself brings them there), and this requires further examination.

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