Q&A: Torah-level Doubt Is Ruled Stringently
Torah-level Doubt Is Ruled Stringently
Question
In Shev Shema’tata 1:1, Rashba tries to understand from where Maimonides learned that a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently only by rabbinic law, and in the end he suggests that perhaps this rule is subject to a dispute regarding whether we require one piece out of two pieces; that whoever says we do not require one piece out of two pieces holds that a foundling of uncertain status is forbidden by Torah law and disagrees with Rava. Rashba rejects this claim because these are “astonishing words,” but why are they so astonishing?
And in general, there is no need to say that the one who holds we do not require one piece out of two pieces disagrees with Rava. After all, at the beginning of his remarks Rashba explains that the reason, according to Rava, that a foundling of uncertain status is forbidden is because of the specific exposition from the verse, “A mamzer shall not enter (a definite mamzer) into the congregation (a definite congregation),” and not because doubt is ruled leniently everywhere!
Can it be explained that Rav Assi and Chiyya bar Rav disagree about whether ruling stringently in a Torah-level doubt is a matter of Torah law or only of rabbinic law?
Answer
In my opinion, the whole attempt to hinge this on the laws of a provisional guilt-offering is mistaken. Maimonides says that doubt is ruled leniently even in situations where there is liability for a provisional guilt-offering. The reason is explained in my article “What Is a Guilt-Offering.” I showed there that the obligation of a guilt-offering does not require there to have been an actual prohibition at all.
And one more note. Many medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) misunderstand Maimonides’ words, because in a responsum he brings the source for his view from the rule of a definite mamzer and not an uncertain one. Not only is that not a difficulty against him, it is actually the source of his ruling.