Q&A: Applying Values from the Torah
Applying Values from the Torah
Question
I share the view that you cannot derive an “economic system,” a “system of government,” and the like from the Torah—just as you cannot derive science from the Torah. Those belong to the development of the secular world.
On the other hand, I have always thought that it is right to derive “values” from the Torah, except that this requires engaging with the reasons for the commandments. The famous Nachmanides apparently understood that the dietary laws are connected to restraining the appetite, and therefore defined someone who gorges himself on kosher food as “a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah.”
And from the standpoint of an economic system, one should analyze what values are expressed in Torah law, which of course includes the system that was customary in the world at the time and what the meaning of Torah law was in that context (for example, Daniel Elazar’s studies on government, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks’s books on the social outlook).
This could lead to general conclusions about what to look for in an economic system—for example, one can reject the pursuit of equality, and on the other hand ideological capitalism in the style of Ayn Rand and Newsweek; one should seek a minimal safety net for everyone. From laws such as compelling someone not to act with the “measure of Sodom,” and the law of the adjacent neighbor, one can also infer infringement of property rights in certain situations, and so on.
Although from a halakhic standpoint “we do not expound the reason of the verse.” But that only means that one should not shape the laws of Jewish law in light of the reason; the statement itself assumes that the laws express a certain value.
I have seen in several responsa that the Rabbi is not enthusiastic about engaging in the reason of the verse. Several times he argues that the details of the laws do not fit, though that can be explained in light of the rule that we do not expound the reason of the verse. Does the Rabbi not agree with this whole line of thinking, but rather hold that in practice we see that it is impossible to draw such conclusions and everyone finds what he wants?
Answer
My claim is first and foremost a practical one. The fact is that everyone finds in the Torah what he identifies with. I do not think you will find anyone who changed his position because of something he found in the Torah.
As for the matter itself, there are certain boundaries, as you noted. Not absolute equality and not absolute freedom. But today nobody is really at those poles. In the debates we have today, the question is where the line is drawn, and I do not think you will be able to find non-trivial statements in the Torah on that issue.
Beyond that, of course, one has to discuss what “Torah” means. The Written Torah, the Talmud, and rulings and responsa?
Discussion on Answer
Absolutely not. I was not persuaded, just as I am not persuaded by most interpretations of the Torah (and therefore I hardly deal with this at all).
There is room for it, each person according to his level. All our rabbis did this; how could I say there is no place for it? But clear proofs will be hard to find by this route.
I am asking on the level of principle. Given that I have become convinced regarding the reason for a certain commandment (or group of commandments), does the Rabbi think it is right to apply the “religious values” in ways that go beyond the formal laws? Is there religious value to such behavior? (This leads me to various initiatives that want to create a contemporary translation of commandments.)
Or is religious value only in relation to what can be defined within the realm of binding Jewish law?
For example, let us say I became convinced that the prohibition of new grain comes to teach us that we must recognize that we receive everything from the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore it is fitting to give to Him before benefiting from these things. Is there any point in doing a parallel act in our economic world?
Given that you are convinced, that is indeed justified. And Tosafot HaRosh already wrote in Bava Metzia 90 that when the reason is clear, we do follow it—we do expound the reason of the verse.
As for your question, of course there is value in proper conduct. But according to Tosafot HaRosh, this is not merely proper conduct but an actual halakhic obligation (it is the commandment itself, and not merely a value derived from it).
Was the Rabbi persuaded by Nachmanides’ understanding that forbidden foods are connected to control over the eating impulse, and that this teaches us not to gorge ourselves even on kosher food?
Is there room to engage in the reasons for commandments and try to implement their rationales, beyond the formalism of the law? Even if those applications would be very broad?
The Sabbath, for example. One can observe its laws without resting (I know someone abroad who held work meetings on the Sabbath while keeping the laws of the Sabbath. True, he was not such a Torah scholar and violated a lot of the rules of telling a non-Jew to do work. But I am asking about the principle).