Q&A: A Question About the Physico-Theological Argument
A Question About the Physico-Theological Argument
Question
I would appreciate some clarification from you on how one can resolve the objection regarding the Creator’s complexity not requiring a creator.
Why, in the same way, can’t one assume that the laws of nature exist without needing a creator?
When you spoke about a factory that functions perfectly by means of laws written on the wall, you said it necessarily follows that there is a factory manager who created the laws. But that is exactly an example about which one can ask: who created the factory manager? One cannot claim that the manager was there all along.
When you say, “all things in my experience require a creator,” but the Creator is not part of my experience, I don’t really understand why the claim can’t also be applied to the laws themselves.
Answer
The laws of nature are not entities. If they were entities, then the Creator under discussion could be them. I said nothing about Him beyond the fact that He is responsible for the mess here.
Discussion on Answer
That is a different question, and it does not arise directly from the physico-theological argument.
So why call Him a Creator? Surely many atheists would agree that something created the world. The debate is over whether it is merely a something, or a someone capable of preparing a plan in advance and then carrying it out. In short, why should an atheist care about the physico-theological argument?
Indeed, it is reasonable that He has desires and plans (even though that does not necessarily follow from the argument). But that does not matter for the purpose of the argument, since either the laws were legislated by Him, or they themselves have desires and plans (otherwise they cannot be an explanation).
I’m not sure what, in your view, the difference is between “necessarily follows from the argument” and “it is reasonable that.”
Let me try to sharpen the point in another way. In your opinion, is the physico-theological argument an argument in favor of the existence of a planner of the world? When I say “a planner of the world,” I mean an entity that existed when our world did not yet exist, conceived of a possible future in which the world we know exists with its properties and details, and then caused the events that created our world.
I emphasize that such a planner is definitely a someone, not just some inert thing. As far as we know, inert things do not think about the future, much less plan it.
I wrote that the argument proves that there exists something that created the world. It is very reasonable to assume that it has desires and plans.
Something, not someone. Is it reasonable to assume that it is a someone with desires and plans because of the physico-theological argument? Or is it reasonable to assume this for some other reason? In short, why is it reasonable to assume that?
Because if it were mechanical, the explanation would not be sufficient. It itself would require an explanation. I think we’ve exhausted this.
I don’t think we’ve exhausted it.
Why is a mechanical explanation not sufficient, and why is the reason for that not relevant to a design-based explanation?
Is the Creator not conscious? Does He not plan things? Doesn’t He have something like consciousness?