Q&A: Non-Binding Morality
Non-Binding Morality
Question
1) Can there be an act that can be defined as moral, but there is no moral obligation to do it? Or should something that is not obligatory be defined under a different category?
For example: a very wealthy person who donates eighty percent of his money to Jewish and philanthropic projects, and says that this is the right thing to do, since he does not need all that money for himself (I know such a person). Can this be defined as morality, even though it cannot be demanded of everyone?
2) If so, is it possible that what is obligatory changes over time? When something becomes accepted in society, does it thereby become binding on everyone?
For example: in Jewish law there is no obligation to return a lost object to a non-Jew (except for the sake of sanctifying God's name); according to Maimonides, this is in order not to strengthen transgressors. Meiri explains that the discussion is about something one is not obligated to return; this is conduct beyond what is required, and therefore it could be limited to Jews. Today, this is considered the right thing to do even among non-Jews—has it therefore become moral and thus obligatory? (This is connected to the principle that it cannot be that they would be obligated in something from which a Jew is exempt, and to the assumption that the seven Noahide commandments are founded on what can be attained through natural morality)
Answer
- Poor wording. A moral act is universal by definition; that is simply a matter of definition. Instead of defining a moral obligation to give such-and-such an amount of money, speak about an obligation to give such-and-such a percentage of your money (a tithe).
In addition, there is a minimal obligation that is universal, and then there is what goes beyond the obligation (pious conduct), and that is already personal. Even if you define a universal obligation for a fixed sum (a third of a shekel per year), there is value in giving beyond that, and that depends on how much you have.
2. Definitely yes. Although in my view that is not exactly Meiri's claim (otherwise he would not have needed to invoke the fact that the non-Jews of our time are bound by the norms of the nations).