Q&A: Two Questions
Two Questions
Question
Hello Rabbi,
1. When the Rabbi says that Jewish law does not deal with morality, does the Rabbi mean that in an absolute sense? I mean, do even topics like “a poor person turning over a cake” (Kiddushin 59a), or “He Who Punished,” and those who are lacking in trustworthiness—and one could think of several other similar cases—not deal with morality?
2. Even if we say that Jewish law does not deal with morality, that still does not completely resolve the issue. It does indeed resolve contradictions like a divorcée being forbidden to a priest (because one can understand that there is a spiritual principle here that only incidentally clashes with morality), but it does not really resolve more essential contradictions, such as the status of women. And I am not talking at all about the way their status has become fixed in our time, which is not required by the Talmud, but rather about the fact that they are not obligated in positive commandments that are time-bound, that the son betroths the daughter, etc., and the father’s ownership of his daughter as well (here too one could think of other such examples). I saw the latest column. And of course one can explain that these laws belong to the past. It’s just that I do not understand how this fits with the fact that the Torah is supposed to be eternal and to express divine principles.
Thank you very much
Answer
- I have written several times that rabbinic laws do, in some cases, definitely bring morality into Jewish law. The very fact that legislation by the Sages is required means that, fundamentally, morality does not belong there. The adjoining landowner rule and the principle of the “standard of Sodom,” and the examples you mentioned, are certainly examples of this. There are others as well. The Sages even enforce moral norms (such as returning a lost item after the owner has given up hope), and sometimes they actually incorporate them into Jewish law through formal enactments.
- I did not understand what is difficult about these examples. Why, in your view, do they not fit my framework? The eternity of the Torah does not mean that everything is applied exactly as it always was, but rather that the principles are implemented in accordance with changing circumstances. See my series of columns on Modern Orthodoxy about this (for example, the one on swimsuits and what follows from it). On the contrary, as I explained there, it is דווקא the freezing of the laws despite changing circumstances that makes Jewish law non-eternal. Wearing light clothing in cold weather means that the Jewish law has changed and therefore is not eternal.