Q&A: On Differences as Slogans
On Differences as Slogans
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I was surprised to hear in your conversation with Barda that from your perspective the differences between Religious Zionism and (modern) Haredism are just slogans, because in practice they’re supposed to conduct themselves the same way. Precisely from someone who likes getting into the fine distinctions and standing on differences in outlook, I was surprised to hear this from you. For example, in your conversation with Franco you said that in practice, the theses of free choice and determinism have no difference between them at all in practice. So why did you bother writing a whole book about the sciences of freedom and engaging in it so intensively? Just empty slogans, with only the practical meaning being what matters. Maybe the determinists and libertarians should unite in order to support putting criminals in prison? We’ll set up a camp of our own.
In other words, I think there is a difference, both between the libertarian and the determinist and between the Haredi and the Zionist. Refraining from a moral act out of the thought that it is wrong (which isn’t possible without belief in free choice) will lead to a higher level of moral strictness than a deterministic fear of going to prison. By comparison, belief in the state (as a general framework, not a specific government) and in the Land as the beginning of redemption or something with a concept of holiness necessarily brings with it a different motivational attitude than viewing the state as “the authorities,” whom we’ll go along with in the organizational sense of social order. That attitude will express itself in striving for public roles, military roles, and more idealistic initiatives.
To conclude, I’ll sharpen the point that this is not supposed to be connected to a lack of criticism toward the government; I distinguish between the government and the state as a more general framework.
Answer
I explained it there. There is a very large difference between a deterministic worldview and a libertarian one, even though there is no practical difference and explanations can be offered for everything within both pictures. That is not true regarding Haredism and Religious Zionism. There we are talking about theological differences devoid of any real meaning (usually the people themselves do not understand what is being discussed—whether it is the beginning of redemption or the footsteps of the Messiah, and the like). Beyond that, in the discussion about choice I am talking about a theoretical question. In the ideological-political sphere one should conduct oneself according to practical considerations, not philosophical or theological ones.
It is clear that the two outlooks have different psychological effects, and that is exactly what I am trying to change. These differences have no real reason other than inertia, and therefore there is no point in insisting on them; we should simply update the outlooks, at least on the practical plane. To argue about whether it was worthwhile to establish a state 80 years after it has already been established is idiotic. To argue whether it is positive or negative, when we all understand that it needs to flourish, is idiotic.
Discussion on Answer
That is exactly what I wrote. There are differences, but they are the result of inertia (psychological effects) and not ideology. That is exactly what I am trying to fight.
The identity-based division according to one’s attitude toward Zionism still exists, but it is a fiction. Its existence causes different practical consequences that are not inevitable.
My claim is that low enlistment is not a derivative of Haredi ideology, but of ugly separatism. By the same token, enlistment is not the result of Zionism but of the necessity of survival and civic duty. Therefore I oppose the use of terms like an obligatory war and helping Israel against an oppressor. The duty of yeshiva students—and everyone else—to enlist would have existed even in Belgium under a similar situation. When all of us are under threat, everyone needs to shoulder the burden.
If we get rid of the anti-Zionist inertia, which has no meaning whatsoever today (this is sociology, not ideology, since everyone wants the state to flourish), we will also get rid of the practical remnants of this anachronistic sociology. If it had no practical consequences, for whom would I be laboring?
For a significant majority this is definitely just identity politics. It’s hard to break that through intellectual persuasion. Among a considerable part of the Lithuanians, it is certainly more than that; I’m not sure they see every knitted-kippah wearer as part of the Jewish people, but at most as an object-status Jew by virtue of his mother. Either way, even the state’s deep pleas for enlistment into the Haredi brigade, from institutions founded by the Hardali thinkers and commanders, won’t help. I hope I’m proven wrong. Unfortunately (and truly unfortunately—I am very afraid of secular-political liberalism), only a secular Zionist coalition that leads to economic sanctions around enlistment will help.
In practice you see an enormous gap between the two sectors in their attitude toward combat service and what follows from it all the way to age 40.
You can see that the Religious Zionist ethos materially affects practice, unlike a graduate of HaMa’arava who then studied for 3 years in Matara and goes on to study economics.