Question

Hello and blessings, Rabbi Michi,
I ran into a certain conceptual difficulty regarding the principle of causality when trying to apply it to the cosmological argument, and I would appreciate some clarification on the matter:
According to David Hume’s position, which holds that the principle of causality is based on a psychological habit that does not guarantee metaphysical necessity, how can this approach be reconciled with the central assumption of the cosmological argument, which claims that everything has a cause and that one cannot avoid a chain of causes leading to a first or unconditioned cause?
In this context, doesn’t Hume’s very claim—that we cannot prove with certainty the necessity of causality throughout the entire chain of events—undermine the validity of the assumption that there is a necessary need for a first cause?
In addition, how can the principle of sufficient reason be incorporated into this discussion? Is it capable of addressing the gap between the way we experience causality and the metaphysical necessity on which the cosmological argument rests? I would be glad to understand how the foundational assumptions of the cosmological argument can be addressed in light of Hume’s critique, and to examine whether the argument remains valid even if one accepts the skeptical approach toward the principle of causality.
Thank you.