By my life, I never thought I’d hear such a stupid argument here.
The Trinity doesn’t harm monotheism because claiming otherwise is a lack of empathy? Is that a joke?
And because there are critics of the Trinity who themselves aren’t really monotheists, that somehow undermines the factual claim?
There really is no essential difference between the familiar Christian interpretations of the Trinity. The various streams differ on marginal things, not on the main point. Unless you mean tiny, negligible heretical sects, or assorted pseudo-philosophizers whose doctrine is accepted only by themselves. In practice, the belief that God is one who is three, and three who are one, is a foundation of Christianity. As for Kabbalah—it may be that there are interpretations in different directions; I’m not sufficiently knowledgeable—but there is absolutely no doubt that some believers in Kabbalah, especially those who actually study it, are idol worshipers.
To the best of my knowledge, though that interests me less, there is also no dispute among the halakhic decisors regarding the idolatrous nature of Christianity; they only disagreed over whether worship through association is permitted for gentiles or not.

Thank you very much.

I definitely agree that the passage I quoted is not necessarily an association of authorities, but if so, then we should not complain about Christians who believe in the Trinity, which is also basically a description of divinity as an abstract made up of layers constituting one singular God—I did not see an essential difference. Maimonides ruled that Christians are idol worshipers, unlike Muslims.

“The Holy One blessed be He, Israel, and the Torah are one” is definitely similar to the Christian Trinity, but for the sake of fairness it should be said that there there is no granting of divine power to Israel as Christianity grants to the son—to Jesus.

“As a unification for the sake of the Holy One blessed be He and His Shekhinah”—the Noda B’Yehuda already wrote against this that it is a terrible evil, and came out against the Ari; as I understand it, he held that this is an association of two powers and therefore forbade it.

In short, believers in the Zohar will interpret it however they like, and Christian heretics—who did not like the Trinity and its clash with monotheism—will find an apologetic way to explain the “secret of the Trinity” (just like in the Zohar: add the word “secret” and every problem is solved).

One can ask what the Rabbi’s attitude is toward the book of the Zohar and toward Kabbalah in general (with which the Rabbi also agrees that they contain strong Christian elements): should this have any status whatsoever in Judaism, or is it better to ignore and even deny this esoteric doctrine?

Krishna, forcefulness is no substitute either for arguments or for reading comprehension. At least when you present my position as written here in front of you on the screen, present it as it is. After that, laugh as much as you like—so long as it is not like the laughter of a fool.

Lavi, as is well known, Maimonides was not one of the kabbalists either. Are you pitting one person against another?!
My view of Kabbalah and the Zohar is written here, and you can search the site.

A nice distinction—that Maimonides may have related to Kabbalah and Christianity in the same way—though it seems to me that with regard to Kabbalah there were many additional reasons for Maimonides’ reservations.

Regarding other approaches, it seems that Nachmanides held that Christians are idol worshipers, at least in the old form. True, the book of the Zohar did not yet exist (or had not yet been “revealed”…) in his time, but kabbalistic ideas can certainly be found in his writings; that is, at least with respect to some kabbalistic ideas he was not concerned about Christianity/association.

The Vilna Gaon canceled many customs because of their similarity to Christianity (for example tashlikh, trees in synagogues on Shavuot, and more), and he already knew the book of the Zohar and used it.

As a matter of Jewish law, it seems that today people rely on the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that nowadays they are in the category of “the custom of their ancestors is in their hands,” but that does not testify to the ideas of Christianity itself, only to its believers over the years (one could perhaps also say about most believers in Kabbalah that “the custom of their ancestors is in their hands”).

I looked for articles by the Rabbi on the subject; I saw very brief references in responsa, more in the style of lack of interest and that it is not relevant. I did not find an article or post in the Rabbi’s usual style, and if there is one I would be happy to study it.

See column 267.

Thank you very much for the reference. I read carefully the fascinating post that gives a pluralistic perspective to what is considered non-rational (though perhaps rational, in your view).

However, I did not find there what your attitude is toward the book of the Zohar. Even Sefer Yetzirah, which you mentioned at the beginning of the article, you did not discuss from the Jewish perspective; you only noted that there are overlapping ideas between it and mystics in the world.

I understand from your words that the mystical part of Kabbalah and the Zohar is not, for you, a reason to reject them, but a plausibility check is required, and if it turns out to be plausible then rationally it is also correct to accept it (like the Greeks whom you mention in many places).

Is there any plausibility in the doctrine of Kabbalah that allows one to accept it rationally? And if not, since you have no principled objection to accepting mysticism, is the unfolding of Kabbalah in our tradition enough to accept it as it is, until proven otherwise?

Many thanks.

My attitude toward the Zohar is no different from my attitude toward Kabbalah in general. I think I explained there what mysticism is, what its value is, and how one examines it. I also have a series of lectures on mysticism.
I have nothing to say about such materials from the Jewish perspective. The important question is whether it is true or not. What difference does it make whether it is Jewish or not? I also do not examine ethics or philosophy from a Jewish perspective (the devil knows what that even means).
Clearly, the fact that something is passed down in tradition does not validate it and should not cause us to accept it, unless it is a tradition from Sinai. Things must be examined on their own merits.

Beyond the conflict between the philosophical and mystical approaches, there are many customs in Judaism that took root on the basis of Kabbalah, such as the prayer of welcoming the Sabbath and Lekha Dodi, various rectifications and fasts (for example during the Shovavim period), a menstruating woman should not go to the cemetery, the bride circles the groom, growing a beard (although there are kabbalists such as the Ramchal and R. Menachem Azariah of Fano who were clean-shaven, and some say that growing a beard applies specifically in the Land of Israel), intentions in prayer and in commandments, and more and more. Here there is room for more of a Jewish perspective than in a discussion about mysticism.

The book of the Zohar (and Sefer Yetzirah), which have been accepted in most communities for generations, together with a cluster of customs, some of which took root in all Jewish communities, are not a tradition from Sinai, but they are not far from the Talmud. Of course I am not entering the case of a conflict between Kabbalah and Jewish law, but the vast majority of the Jewish people accepted upon themselves that there is such a thing as Kabbalah, that the book of the Zohar is authentic and attributed to the ancients, and they practice many customs because of Kabbalah (the Karaites too did not accept the Mishnah and the Talmud, and the Rabbi accepts that a student has authority); according to the Rabbi’s approach, is that not different and more binding?

These are customs, and one should relate to them like any other custom. It is of no importance that they come from Kabbalah.
Tradition regarding facts has no status at all. Facts are examined according to whether they are true or not. Therefore, when the people accept that there is Kabbalah or the authenticity of the Zohar, this has no significance and no authoritative validity.

Thank you, I’m glad to hear that indeed this is so.

If I may ask one last question on the subject: why indeed is the Talmud authoritative and the Zohar not, if both are texts that were accepted by the Jewish people over many generations?

Because the Talmud was accepted by everyone and Kabbalah was not. Also in terms of reliability, the Talmud passed through a broad and critical front, and Kabbalah did not.

I’m not sure that factually the Rabbi is right.
A. Not everyone accepted the Talmud.
B. The broad and critical front through which the Talmud passed was that of its creators and their students; it is not clear what their share in the people was in real time (if there is information about that I’d be happy to hear) and whether their level of criticism was sufficient.
C. Almost everyone who accepted the Talmud also accepted the new Kabbalah the moment it appeared, and vice versa.

But even if we assume that everyone accepted the Talmud and not Kabbalah, the question here is why accept anything at all, and what the source of authority is. The answer given here is like asking a Christian why he accepts the books included in the scriptures of his denomination and not other gospel books, and he answers that those are what the earlier members of his denomination accepted. But that is the very question—why do *you* accept them as authoritative? Only because that happens to be the religious stream you were born into?
And from other answers here that I’ve read, I assume the Rabbi would answer that if you don’t accept, then you don’t accept. But that’s a circular argument. Why do you accept? Because I accept. And if you don’t accept, then you don’t. In short: why? Just because.

A. Yes, everyone accepted it.
B. I didn’t understand. It passed through a broad front throughout history from the moment it was created.
C. Not true. And even those who accepted it do not see it as something binding like the Talmud.

I’ve written more than once about the meaning of acceptance by the many. It has nothing to do with this or that religious stream. If a certain public to which you belong accepted something as binding, then in principle it binds you. Like a law in the Knesset. And it is not circular in any way.

A. There were groups that did not accept it. At a certain stage in history they almost even won. Strange that this even needs to be said.
B. It passed among those who wrote it and among those who accepted its sanctity and discussed it within the framework that attributes sanctity and authority to it. That is not criticism on the level of scholarship. The impure Zohar too, from a certain stage, passed through a broad front (although I agree that in the case of the Zohar it was more artificial—meaning, once they discovered the book they accepted it, unlike the Oral Torah, which was apparently an organic process to some extent).
C. You can find isolated opponents to anything; we are speaking in generalities. And in this case of an almost absolute majority. In any case, the Judaism that reached us is after hundreds of years of almost total acceptance of Kabbalah. True, most admit that in practical Jewish law the Talmud overrides the Zohar (even in that, surely you know that not everyone restrained themselves), but that does not contradict the fact that both are considered sources of authority. In the Shulchan Arukh, for example, there are laws whose source is only the Zohar, not to mention later halakhic decisors.

The laws of the Knesset bind me against my will. I was born in Israel against my will, I am a citizen in it, and as such I am subject to its laws. If I break the law, I will be punished (unless I belong to a certain caste). I have no obligation to the laws beyond fear of punishment (some happen to accord with my values, opinions, and wishes, but that does not stem from obligation to the law but from myself), and many laws I would gladly violate without any guilty conscience if I knew I would not be caught. And today, when the Jewish religion has no enforcement institutions, I do not understand what binds me. Even if you say that I choose to belong to the Jewish public (and I indeed choose that), that does not mean that this belonging obligates me in all of Jewish law; at most in symbolic customs, folklore, and the like, like most Jews nowadays.
I am genuinely curious to understand the Rabbi’s position and I can’t manage to.

We are wasting our time, and my feeling is that you are just being stubborn. I’m done.

Is this your version of “You have found the place of my shame, O King of the Khazars”?

The Rabbi’s argument regarding acceptance of the Talmud may perhaps be circular, but that does not change the main point. The Talmud was accepted. Kabbalah was not. Even the kabbalists admit that and say so outright.

Do you even know Judaism? As I already wrote, everyone who accepted the Talmud also accepted Kabbalah, at least over the last 500 years. The exceptions are very few. The kabbalists admit nothing of the sort, and some of them even say explicitly that Kabbalah is superior to the Mishnah and the Talmud. The only thing agreed upon (and even that not completely) is that for purposes of halakhic ruling, the Talmud overrides the Zohar. But both are sources of authority and are regarded as equally holy. That is the Judaism that reached us—in Jewish law, customs, prayers, and beliefs and opinions.
If you hang your case on the few great figures who opposed it, then all the more so discuss the Oral Torah, which a large part of the Jewish people rejected in various periods.
And in general, I do not understand what kind of argument this is—accepted, not accepted—but I’m already repeating myself.

There is not even a trace of circularity here. I simply do not understand this bizarre discussion.

The circularity arises because there is no documentation whatsoever of an official process in which the Babylonian Talmud was accepted by the Jewish people. All there is is a social reality in which the Talmud is perceived as authoritative. When one asks where the authority comes from, the answer is: because that is how the Jewish people accepted it; and when one asks how you know that the Jewish people accepted it, the answer is: here is the fact that the Talmud has authority over the Jewish people. That is exactly the famous shtreimel argument. From a logical point of view it is completely valid, but it is still circular.

And indeed the historian Salo Baron gave a different historical description. According to his description, the historical process goes like this:
Pre-Muslim period—
Babylonia: the Babylonian Talmud is sealed and accepted as authoritative in Babylonia alone.
The Land of Israel: the Jerusalem Talmud holds authority.
Scattered Jewish communities with various customs, some rabbinic and some Sadducean.

The Muslim conquest takes over the entire Middle East from Central Asia to Spain. The only Jewish communities outside their rule are in Byzantium and Europe. The assumption in scholarship is that those communities had Land-of-Israel traditions called “custom,” if we set aside Professor Haym Soloveitchik’s “third academy in Babylonia” theory. The Muslim caliphs impose the Babylonian exilarch over all the Jews in the Muslim sphere. He in turn uses his political power to impose the Babylonian Talmud over all the Jews in the Muslim sphere. In response, the Karaite revolt breaks out in communities with Sadducean traditions. The Jewish communities in the Christian sphere accept the Talmud while adapting it to local custom. In the new situation, the Jewish world is divided between those who accepted the authority of the Babylonian Talmud and the Karaites.

However, Baron’s description gives us the context of discovery, not the context of justification. After all, the Muslim regime allowed Jews to be Karaites. And nevertheless, most Jews remained loyal to the Babylonian Talmud. That is to say, the rabbinic argument that the Jewish people accepted upon itself the Babylonian Talmud is indeed correct, if only by force of the argument that “the majority is like the whole.” True, we have no official documentation, but the result speaks for itself.

When people are just stubborn, there is no argument on earth that is not circular. There is not a trace of circularity here, but I see that what is needed is a short logic lesson to explain it.
The Talmud was accepted by the entire public and the sages—that is a fact. The claim I raised is that what is accepted has validity. From these two premises it follows that the Talmud has validity. Now note: the statement that the Talmud has validity (the conclusion) is not identical to the statement that it was accepted (the premise), and therefore there is no circularity here. Why? Because the first claim is a normative claim and the second claim is a factual claim.
[The bridging premise is needed precisely in order to bridge between fact and norm without falling into Hume’s ought-is fallacy.] One can of course argue about the bridging premise (that what is accepted has validity) or about the factual premise (that the Talmud was indeed accepted). But there is no circularity here. QED.

Y.D., the historical overview you brought is nice, but it has holes. For example, the geonim of the Land of Israel who ruled according to the Jerusalem Talmud, and whose authority was accepted by Jews in quite a few countries, continued to exist even after the period of the geonim of Babylonia had ended—that is, hundreds of years after the Muslim conquest. Also Karaism, at least the version led by Anan (groups that denied the Oral Torah apparently existed already from Temple times), did not break out exactly at the time of the conquest, though here we are already dealing with a relatively close time period so I’m not sure. In fact, the whole matter of the geonim of the Land of Israel is almost unknown to the public; everyone thinks that from the time the Babylonian Talmud was sealed, everyone accepted it. But in reality there were Sadducean/Karaite sects and there were rabbinic Jews subject to the Jerusalem Talmud, and who knows whether there were not other groups as well.

Just out of interest, do you have a link to material on the geonim of the Land of Israel?