Q&A: Several Questions
Several Questions
Question
- The Rabbi has often said that we do not derive two laws from one source. For example, from the word “hear” we do not derive both that one must make it audible to one’s own ear and that it may be said in any language, were it not for the reasoning that one is learned from the other (that is, from the fact that Scripture innovates that it may be said in any language, one must understand that it has to be made audible to one’s ear).
- In Kiddushin 43a the dispute is brought regarding whether an agent can serve as a witness: “Rav said: An agent can serve as a witness, for we thereby strengthen the matter. In the school of Rabbi Sheila they said: An agent cannot serve as a witness, since the Master said that a person’s agent is like himself, he is like his own body.” Apparently the problem Rabbi Sheila raises is that a litigant is disqualified from testimony, and as I understand it that is because relatives are disqualified from testimony and a person is considered related to himself. I do not understand what Rav answers to that. After all, the disqualification of relatives from testimony is a decree of Scripture. I also do not understand exactly what Rav means—does he mean that the testimony of the agent is especially strong, since he is the one carrying out the act, so obviously he can testify about it best?
- In the article you wrote, “What Is the Difference Between Passover and the Sinew of the Thigh?” you write as follows: In conclusion, the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is about the measure that obligates the removal of leaven, while regarding eating there is no dispute, and according to all opinions the measure for sourdough starter and leaven is an olive’s bulk.
And again one should note that Beit Shammai’s view was not rejected because it is unreasonable to ignore the fact that sourdough is unfit for eating. This point did not bother the Talmud. What rejected this interpretation of the dispute was only Rabbi Zeira’s exposition. This sharpens the fact that the Talmud’s initial assumption still requires explanation, even in the conclusion: why is the Talmud not troubled by the irrelevance of permissibility for eating to the prohibition of eating leaven?
I do not understand why not say that Rabbi Zeira’s exposition itself says exactly that: that in truth it is not relevant to learn that sourdough is forbidden for eating, and therefore Beit Shammai derive this only with respect to removal, and the difference between them and Beit Hillel is that they do not make an analogy from eating to removal, so they can remain with the view that there is no reason for Scripture to write a novelty regarding the prohibition of sourdough except because it wanted to teach that its measure is different. Let me sharpen the point: one can say that Rabbi Zeira’s exposition teaches that the prohibition of eating sourdough is not relevant at all were it not for the verse teaching it to us. And Beit Shammai agree with that. Also, everything the Talmud says before that does not contradict this, because the refutation against sourdough, just as there is a refutation against leaven, applies only to one who compares eating and removal—and that is only Beit Hillel. And in fact, for Beit Shammai, who treat the obligation of removal separately, this refutation does not apply. I would appreciate an explanation.
Answer
1. I did not see a question here.
2. Simple. He does not accept that a person’s agent is literally like himself. Only the agent’s actions are like the actions of the sender. And as is well known, an agent cannot put on tefillin or sit in a sukkah for me. See also Bava Metzia 96 regarding halitzah and borrowing with the owner present, where they disputed whether a person’s agent is like himself. There is a well-known passage in Or Sameach that explained the dispute here in a similar way (extended hand or authorization of power).
3. I did not understand
Discussion on Answer
1. The entire Talmud is full of that assumption. Once some word is already “occupied,” they immediately ask: so from where does this sage derive the law in question? And so on. See also the Sanhedrin passage that deals with sources and reasons, and my column that discusses this (whether we follow the reasons or the bottom line. The paradox of judging).
2. The opinion that an agent can serve as a witness holds that this is an authorization of power, and then of course the agent can serve as a witness because that strengthens the force of his testimony. The other opinion holds that although it strengthens the testimony, there is still a disqualification of litigant, because agency is an extended hand. (By the way, I forgot to note earlier that the disqualification of a litigant is not necessarily due to the law of a relative. There is a long discussion about this, and it is rooted in the two answers of Ri Migash in Bava Batra regarding the testimony of members of a community about the theft of a Torah scroll.)
3. I still did not understand. In any case, I’m not at a computer.
1. Thank you very much.
2. But how do you understand that this is what Rav thinks? And if that really is what he thinks, why doesn’t he answer that explicitly? Why answer Rabbi Sheila in a way that makes me understand that he assumes this only implicitly like that (and leaves me to understand on my own that this is really why it doesn’t bother him that he can be a witness)? Besides, why do I need a justification for making him a witness? I thought I only need to explain why there is no problem with his being a witness (and that really is what the authorization-of-power explanation does), but Rav adds that he is also an excellent witness, which seemingly is unnecessary.
3. No worries, Rabbi, thank you very much for all the help!
See also in column 454 what I noted about this inquiry.
Amir: See the comments on column 468, where the Pri Megadim indeed explains as you say—that the first part of the passage, in which Beit Shammai has reason to derive sourdough from leaven (since its leavening is more intense, even though for that very reason it is unfit for eating), is only with respect to removal, after we have already learned from a verse that sourdough is forbidden for eating. In the column there he takes the position that “simply speaking, the dispute deals with the prohibition of eating leaven” (and in the comments there this was indeed brought from Shitah Mekubetzet), and asks: regarding eating, it is obvious that sourdough is less severe, since because its leavening is so intense it is unfit for eating. He explains, according to his approach, that the prohibition of leaven is not rooted in the pleasure of eating but in the act of eating, as a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt.
Wow, sorry—regarding the first question, what is the source for that? Or where do we learn it from / where can I read more about it? And regarding the second question, I did indeed see that the Or Sameach makes that distinction, but can you explain to me how you read the words “for we thereby strengthen the matter”? Meaning, how do you interpret that phrase? (Everyone around here reads it as saying that his testimony is especially strong.)
As for question three, no need if you don’t want to get into it deeply. What I meant there was that you explain that from the Talmud it comes out that even after Rabbi Zeira’s exposition, the logic behind deriving sourdough from leaven by an a fortiori inference according to Beit Shammai still stands—and this despite the fact that sourdough is not fit for eating. I suggested understanding that Rabbi Zeira’s exposition disconnects, according to Beit Shammai, the prohibition of eating sourdough from the prohibition of “it shall not be found,” and therefore the difficulty falls away. Beit Hillel, however, connect the two. I took this from your lecture on what the difference is between the sinew of the thigh and Passover.