Q&A: Continuation of a Discussion from an Email Question
Continuation of a Discussion from an Email Question
Question
Regarding the Rabbi's response to my question about a clash between morality and Jewish law,
my claim was that in the end, all obedience to the sages is itself what the Torah asks of us. And just as it is obvious that in something explicitly written in the Torah, morality would not override it,
so too obedience to the words of the sages for example, not saving a gentile on the Sabbath, which in their view is a Torah law there is an explicit command in the Torah. And just as the Rabbi understands that in a regular Torah law explicitly written in the Torah we do not take morality into account,
so too with the Torah's command, "do not turn aside to the right or to the left" even if it is clear to you that their "right" is really "left," why should we assume here that the Torah's command was stated with a reservation relative to moral principles?
Who taught us to distinguish between the nature of the Torah's command to heed the sages and the Torah's command not to go to a witch, and the like?
Thank you very much for the response
Answer
If so, then the whole discussion needs to be brought.
You asked:
Hello Rabbi, I heard the Rabbi say that if morality stands against something the sages said is from the Torah, but is not written explicitly, we would go with morality.
The question is: the Torah explicitly wrote in the portion of Shoftim, "If a matter is too difficult for you… then you shall come to the priests… and to the judge… and they shall tell you the matter of judgment… and you shall act according to the word… and be careful to do according to all that they instruct you."
This is talking about a Torah law that is unclear to you you go to the judge and listen to him even though he can make a mistake; that is what God asks.
And there is a great deal of logic in this, because it cannot be that every person whose personal values clash with the Torah as interpreted by the sages should do whatever seems right in his own eyes; and even if he thinks the sages are mistaken, he should do as they say. This is what the Torah asks, and regarding something explicitly written in the Torah, the Rabbi admitted that morality does not override it.
I would be glad if the Rabbi would respond to my question.
Thank you.
I answered:
Hello Rivka.
First, in the future I prefer questions through the responsa system on the site and not by email.
I never said such a thing. What I said is that when there is an extreme contradiction that is, when the moral price is enormous and irreversible I would consider the possibility that the sages did not interpret the Torah correctly. If it is clear that they did not interpret it correctly, there is no obligation to listen to them in such situations (even according to the view that there is an obligation to obey even when they tell you that left is right. I argue that when the moral price is horrific, everyone would agree that one should not obey an erroneous ruling). Like a religious court that erred in an explicit Mishnah. Notice that you yourself wrote that this is a law that is not clear to me. But if the law is clear to me, the situation is different.
Beyond that, the whole process of going to the Sanhedrin and their ruling is a process for clarifying Jewish law. I am not discussing the question of what the Jewish law is, but rather a case where we know what the Jewish law is and it contradicts morality. In that situation, the question is which prevails. That is not necessarily handed over to the Sanhedrin. Think about an instruction by a doctor that causes moral injustice to someone. The doctor, as a doctor, will give that instruction because that is his role in his capacity as a doctor. But I will not necessarily listen to him because of the moral consideration.
When something is written explicitly, my assumption is that the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself took the moral price into account and nevertheless instructed us to act that way. Therefore, there one probably does have to obey the Jewish law. But when it comes to the sages' interpretation, there is always the possibility that they erred. The formal obligation to obey them despite the fact that their ruling is mistaken cannot justify causing horrific moral injustice.
And to that you responded here in the opening message.
Discussion on Answer
It seems that now I understand a bit more. The main point seems to be that the Rabbi holds that when there is no inherent conflict, there is no absolute necessity to listen to the Torah.
But the fact that maybe the sages are mistaken is not relevant to the discussion, because it is only a possibility that they are mistaken, and my whole reason for doubting is from the side of morality, which we have already seen does not always align in unavoidable conflicts. If so, there is no certainty that the sages are mistaken, and therefore nobody disagrees that from a halakhic standpoint we are required to listen to the sages except that the command to listen to the sages does not stand against morality when there is no inherent conflict.
And seemingly there was no need to emphasize that point.
Did I understand the Rabbi correctly?
I explained why that fact is very relevant. The possibility that the sages are mistaken means that even when the contradiction is inherent, one does not necessarily have to listen to Jewish law rather than morality.
I already answered this in what I wrote.
First, even in something explicit in the Torah, if it contradicts morality, it is not certain that the Torah would override it. It would override only where the conflict is inherent. For example, keeping the Sabbath is written in the Torah. Suppose preserving life is not written there explicitly (that itself is debatable). What should I do in a clash between saving a life and the Sabbath? My claim is that it is בהחלט possible that saving a life would override it, because logically, in a conflict between Jewish law and morality, the decision of what to do is not handed over to Jewish law. That is why there are concepts like a transgression for the sake of Heaven, or in the language of the Chazon Ish, "the fifth section of the Shulchan Arukh."
When does Jewish law override in a mandatory way? For example, the wiping out of Amalek. Why? Because there the conflict is inherent. Every wiping out of an Amalekite infant involves a moral problem. If the Torah nevertheless commands us to wipe them out, then apparently it took the moral price into account. By contrast, keeping the Sabbath does not always involve harm to life, and neither does the reverse. So there this is a conflict that must be decided case by case.
In something that is not explicit in the Torah, another factor enters the picture: the possibility of error. Maybe the sages erred when they understood the Torah that way. So true, there is an obligation to obey the sages even in such a case, but if I have concluded that the content of the command is not correct or is morally extreme in a negative way, perhaps the obligation to obey the sages does not stand in the face of the moral price. Therefore there morality can override. Just as any other halakhic prohibition can be set aside in the face of values (as at the beginning of the message), so too the obligation to obey is a halakhic obligation that can be set aside.
[Note: you assume that "do not turn aside" was said even when it is clear to me that their left is right. That is a dispute among rabbinic sources, and it is really not simple. See the beginning of Horayot, in the passage about one who errs regarding the commandment to heed the words of the sages.]