Q&A: Are There Really Polarized Disputes Between Positions?
Are There Really Polarized Disputes Between Positions?
Question
Hello,
I’d like to share a brief thought that occurred to me recently and hear your opinion:
Are there really polarized disputes between positions?
Lately I’ve found myself noticing again and again that in many disputes, both sides forcefully argue for a certain position, and in the heat of the debate the two sides appear to be entrenched positions. But in truth, every reasonable person accepts both sides of the argument, and so the dispute does not really exist. At the very least, the disputes are about dosage and concrete application in certain gray areas.
Here are two examples that come to mind right now:
A. Recently I read a ‘dispute’ between Descartes and Levinas: while the former argued that books only confuse and create difficulties, and therefore “I entirely abandoned the study of books, and then resolved to seek no knowledge other than what I could find either in myself or in the great book of the world,” Levinas saw in books “one of the modes of human existence, an essential aspect of the human soul and of its intellectual formation.”
B. Another dispute exists regarding the meaning of ‘interpretation.’ Can we really know what the author thought? Extreme positions claim not. I have no idea, and we have no access to the depths of the author’s soul. Other positions claim that of course interpretation is possible, and it happens every day.
I would like to argue that in most of these debates, the truth lies in the middle. When I read such arguments, I always think about the reasons of the two sides and which one I agree with. And in the overwhelming majority of cases, it turns out that both sides are saying sensible things, and the question is where the line should be drawn. It is true that one must be careful not to be a ‘donkey carrying books,’ and to think critically about the content. At the same time, it is obvious that a person who does not read does not broaden his horizons and does not sharpen himself.
More sharply and more extremely, I would say that in my impression almost every essay by a philosopher that I have read reaches conclusions that are extreme and mistaken. Whether it is Popper or Hume or others, usually they emphasize a certain aspect and sharpen it, but at the end of the day there are additional positions that are not saying nonsense, and one has to weigh the different sides and place the boundary somewhere. So a total implementation of position A or B almost always leads to extremism.
In this context I thought that this is the meaning of the judgment when we say, “You’re speaking in extremes!” This judgment carries a negative connotation, and ostensibly why? The fact that I do not slam the view as “nonsensical and full of absurdities” teaches that the method is fundamentally reasonable, so what is wrong with taking the logic all the way? That is, what flaw is there beyond simple stupidity (or how can something true be problematic)? And in my opinion, that is exactly the point. The speaker is not saying nonsense, but rather takes something true and pushes it completely to an extreme, until he no longer sees that there are other shades as well [like Abraham our patriarch, who was an embodiment of the sefirah of kindness, and that is beautiful; the problem is that there are other sefirot too. In other words: he was extreme, not false].
In a different style, I thought in this connection about ‘dilemma arguments.’ People think—for example, in your well-known view—that there is no reason to give exams because they are unnecessary (either the student is diligent anyway and does not need them, or he is so disturbed that exams will not help). But in truth there is another model: those whom exams actually would help. And so too in the examples of the disputes above, it seems as though there are only two positions—extreme ones, of course—either one should read books, or one should not. But the truth—not surprisingly—is that there is a third model: it is important to read, and it is important to read with good judgment and with a critical mindset. It seems as if people are not aware of the third option, and once they become aware of it, many arguments simply dissolve.
I would make an exception and say that in factual questions this option does not exist. Either there is a God, or there is not. There is no third possibility. But as stated, in arguments about values, and even about implementing democracy or about educational or economic methods, the impression I get is that most arguments do not really exist as they appear. That is, the extreme positions merely serve as signposts and compasses, while we all agree that the truth is in the middle, with varying proportions this way or that—and that is what one should really argue about. Whereas the philosophers serve as models for those extreme positions, and therefore they are almost mistaken by definition.
That’s the end of these scattered thoughts. I’d be glad to hear your impression.
Answer
Hello.
I completely agree, and I’ve written this as well in my columns on philosophy, on the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and more. I would add that in Continental philosophy not only are there no real disputes, but the positions themselves are in many cases just wordplay and do not assert anything at all.
As for factual questions, such a model may also exist if you look not at the factual claims themselves but at the evidence for and against. The claim is that there is weight to the evidence in favor and to the evidence against. True, in the final analysis there is only one truth.